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M.B.Z. v. Clinton 
10-699 
Ruling Below: Zivotojsky v. Sec'y o/State, 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009) cert. granted, 131 S. 
Ct. 2897 (U.S. 2011). ' 
In 2002, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Section 214( d) of the FRAA 
directs the Secretary of State to record the place of birth of any U. S. citizen born in Jerusalem as 
Israel, should that citizen request. Petitioner Menachem Zivotofskywas born in Jerusalem to 
parents who are U.S. citizens. Menachem's parents requested his place of birth be listed as 
Jerusalem, Israel, on his official documents but was told the State Department forbid this action. 
In September of 2003, Menachem's parents filed for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking an 
order directing the State Department to comply with Section 214(d). On remand, the district 
court dismissed the action due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the claim to be a 
nonjusticiable political question. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the 
district court's ruling, holding the State Department's refusal to comply with Petitioner's request 
is an exercise of the President's recognition power and as such, presents a non justiciable political 
question. 
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the "political question doctrine" deprives a federal court of 
jurisdiction to enforce a federal statute that explicitly directs the Secretary of State how to record 
the birthplace of an American citizen on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a passpOli; 
and (2) whether Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 
impermissibly infringes the President's power to recognize foreign sovereigns. 
Ari Z. ZIVOTOFSKY, M.B.Z. by his Parents And Guardians amI Naomi Siegman 
Zivotofsky, M.B.Z. by his Parents and Guardians, Appellants. 
v. 
SECRETARY OF STATE, Appellee. 
United States COUli of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Decided July 10,2009 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: 
It has been the longstanding policy of the 
United States to take no side in the 
contentious debate over whethe~ Jerusalem 
is part of Israel. In this case, the federal 
courts are asked to direct the Secretary of 
State to contravene that policy and record in 
official documents that Israel is the 
bhihplace of a U.S. citizen born 'in 
Jerusalem. Because the judiciary has no 
authority to order the Executive Branch to 
change the nation's foreign policy in this 
matter, this case' is non justiciable under the 
political question doctrine. 
I. 
That the United States expresses no official 
view on the thorny issue of whether 
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Jerusalem is part of Israel has been a central 
and calibrated feature of every president's 
foreign policy since Harry S. Truman. State 
Department policy governing how to 
describe the status of Jerusalem in passports 
and Consular Reports of Birth of U.S. 
citizens born there implements the 
presidential decision to' remain neutral. 
Although the State Department typically 
records a passport holder's birthplace as the 
nation with sovereignty over his city of 
birth, passports issued to U.S. citizens born 
in Jerusalem note only the city[.] The State 
Department follows the same policy for 
Consular Reports of Birth. 
In 2002, Congress passed the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 
2003, Pub.L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 1350 
(2002) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2651 note 
(2006)). Section 214 of the Act, entitled 
"United States Policy with Respect to 
Jerusalem as the Capital of Isra.el," 
challenges the Executive's position on the 
status of· Jerusalem. Subsection 214(a), for 
example, "urges the President '.' . to 
immediately begin the process of relocating 
the United States Embassy in Israel to 
Jerusalem." Under subsection 214(c), 
Congress forbids the Executive from using 
appropriated funds for "publication of any 
official governmental document which lists 
countries and their capital cities unless the 
publication identifies Jerusalem as the 
capital ofIsrael." And subsection 214(d), th~ 
provision at issue in this case, states: . 
Record of Place of Birth as Israel for 
Passport Purposes.-For purposes of 
the registration of birth, certification 
of nationality, 01' issuance of a 
passport of a United States citizen 
born in the city of Jerusalem, the 
Secretary [of State] shall, upon the 
request of the citizen or the citizen's 
legal guardian, record the place of 
birth as Israel. 
Id. § 214(d), 116 Stat. at 1366. 
In a written statement issued when he signed 
the bill into law, the President took the view 
that section 214 is merely advisory because 
a congressional command to the Executive 
to change the government's position on the 
status of Jerusalem would "impermissibly 
interfere with the President's constitutional 
authority to formulate the position of the 
United States, speak for the Nation in 
international affairs, and detennine the terms 
on which recognition is given to foreign 
states." Even in signing the Act, the 
President made clear that "U.S. policy 
regarding Jerusalem has not changed." 
Enactment of the law provoked confusion 
and criticism overseas. The U.S. Consulate 
in Jerusalem informed the State Department 
that "[ d]espite [its] best efforts to get the 
word out that U.S. policy on Jerusalem has 
not changed, the reservations contained in 
the President's signing statement have been 
all but ignored, as Palestinians focus on 
what they consider the negative precedent . 
and symbolism of an American law 
declaring that Israel's capital is Jerusalem." 
In October 2002, Menachem Zivotofsky was 
born in Jerusalem to parents who are U.S. 
citizens, making him a citizen as well. In 
December 2002, Menachem's mother 
applied for a U.S. passport and a Consular 
Report of Birth for her son at the U.S. 
Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel. She requested 
that both documents record her son's place 
of bhih as "Jerusalem, Israel." U.S. 
diplomatic officials told Mrs. Zivotofsky 
that State Department policy forbade them 
from recording "Israel" as her son's 
birthplace. Consistent with its policy, the 
State Department issued a passpOli and 
Consular Report of Birth identifyin'g 
"Jerusalem" as Menachem's place of biiih 
without reference to Israel. 
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In September 2003, Menachem (by. his 
parents) filed this action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief ordering the State 
Department to comply with the directive in 
section 214(d) and record "Jerusalem, 
Israel," as his birthplace in both his passport 
and Consular Report of Birth. The district 
court ruled that Menachem lacked standing 
to complain about the contents of the 
documents because he could use them 
regardless of how they described his 
birthplace. Invoking the political question 
doctrine, the court also concluded that it was 
without jurisdiction to consider his claim 
because there is "a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department." Zivotofsky 
v. Sec 'y of State, No. 03-1.921, slip op. at 9 
(D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004)[.] In the district 
court's view, the "desired passport wording. 
. . would confer recognition in an official, 
diplomatic document that Israel has 
sovereignty over Jerusalem." Such a result, 
the court held, would unlawfully trench 
upon the Executive's exclusive power to 
recognize foreign governments. 
We reversed the district court's decision on 
standing, concluding that the relevant issue 
is not whether Zivotofsky can use his 
passport. He has standing because 
"Congress conferred on him an individual 
right to have 'Israel' listed as his place of 
birth on his passport and on his Consulm 
Birth Report," and "the Secretary. of State 
violated that individual right." Zivotoftky v. 
Sec'y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619 
(D.C.Cir.2006). We also remanded the case 
for the district court to determine whether 
section 214(d) is mandatory or advisory, 
develop a more complete record, and 
consider the implications, if any, of 
Zivotofsky's request, first made in his 
motion for summmy judgment, that his 
passport and Consular Report of Birth 
record "Israel" as his place of birth, instead 
of noting "Jerusalem, Israel," as he pleaded 
in the complaint. On remand, the district 
court granted the Secretary's motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under F ed.R. Civ.P. 12(b )(1), 
holding again that because the complaint 
asserts a claim. that implicates the 
President's recognition power, it "raises a 
quintessential political question which is not 
justiciable by the courts." Zivotojsky v. Sec 'y 
of State, 511 F.Supp.2d 97, 102 
(D.D.C.2007). 
Zivotofsky appeals the district court's 
dismissal of his case, which we review de 
novo. We have jurisdiction to consider the 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). The 
threshold question before us is whether the 
courts have jurisdiction to provide 
Zivotofsky the relief he seeks or whether he 
must pursue his remedies from the political 
branches. 
II. 
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court held 
that courts may not consider claims that 
raise issues whose resolution has been 
committed to the political branches by the 
text of the Constitution. 369 U.S. at 217,82 
S.Ct. 691. Following the framework laid out 
in Nixon v. United States, we begin by 
"interpret[ing] the [constitutional] text in 
question and determin[ing] whether and to 
what extent the issue is textually committed" 
to a political branch. 506 U.S. 224, 228, 113 
S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993)[.] But to 
perform the ~nalysis prescribed by Nixon, 
we must first determine "the issue" before 
us. Only then can we decide whether that 
issue has been committed by the 
Constitution solely to the political branches 
or whether it is a proper matter for the 
judiciary to resolve. Relying on section 
214( d) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Zivotofsky asked the 
district court to "order[ ] the [Secretary of 
State] to issue a passport to [him] specifying 
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[his] place of birth as [Israel]" and to 
instruct the Executive "to comply with 
Section 214(d)." Given Zivotofsky's claim, 
the issue before us is whether the State 
Department can lawfully refuse to record his 
place of birth as "Israel" in the· face of a 
statute that directs it to do so. The issue is 
not, as the concurrence asserts, "[w]hether § 
214(d) . . . is a constitutionally valid 
enactment," Concurring Op. at 1234. This 
critical difference sets us on different paths 
at the very outset. 
It is well established that the Constitution's 
. grant of authority to the President to 
"receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers," includes the power to recognize 
foreign governments. That this power 
belongs solely to the PreSIdent has been 
clear from the earliest days of the Republic. 
The Supreme Court has recognized this 
constitutional commitment of authority to 
the President repeatedly and consistently 
over many years. 
The President's exercise of the recognition 
power granted solely to him by the 
Constitution cannot be reviewed by the 
courts. A decision made by the President 
regarding which government is sovereign 
over a particular place is an exercise of that 
power. As the Supreme Court explained 
nearly two hundred years ago, "when the . 
executive branch . . . assume[s] a fact in 
regard to the sovereignty of any island or 
country, it is conclusive . on the judicial 
department." As a result, we have declined 
invitations to question the President's use of 
the recognition power. 
Thus the President has exclusive and 
unreviewable .constitutional power to keep 
the United States out of the debate over the 
status of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, 
Zivotofsky asks us to review a policy of the 
State Department implementing the 
President's decision. But as the Supreme 
Court has explained, policy decisions made 
pursuant to the President's recognition 
power are nonjusticiable political questions. 
And every president since 1948 has, as a 
matter of official policy, purposefully 
avoided taking a position on the issue 
whether Israel's sovereignty extends to the 
city of Jerusalem. The State Department's 
refusal to record "Israel" in passports and 
Consular Reports of Birth of U.S. citizens 
bom in Jerusalem implements this 
longstanding policy of the Executive. By 
asking the judiciary to order the State 
Department to mark official government 
documents in a manner that would directly 
contravene the President's policy, 
Zivotofsky invites the courts to call into 
question the President's exercise of the 
recognition power. This we cannot do. We 
therefore hold that Zivotofsky's claim 
presents a non justiciable political question 
because it trenches upon the President's 
constitutionally committed recognition 
power. 
Zivotofsky argues that the political question 
doctrine cannot foreclose a court from 
enforcing a duly enacted law. In his view, 
this court is asked to do nothing more than 
interpret a federal statute-a task within our 
power and competency. To grant the 
requested relief would not require that we 
determine the status of Jerusalem, he argues, 
because enactment of section 214( d) has 
decided that question. Enforcement of the 
rights Congress created presents no political 
question. The government responds that 
even if we find jurisdiction to consider 
Zivotofsky's claim, we· must nevertheless 
strike section 214(d) as an unconstitutional 
infringement on the President's recognition 
power. We agree that resolving Zivotofsky's 
claim either at the jurisdictional stage under 
the political question doctrine or on the 
merits by striking section 214( d) implicates 
the recognition power. Only the Executive-
not Congress and not the courts-has the 
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power to define U.S. policy regarding 
Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem and 
decide how best to implement that policy. 
The question for us is whether Zivotofsky 
loses on jurisdictional grounds, or on the 
merits because Congress lacks the power to 
give him an enforceable right to have 
"Israel" noted as his birthplace on his 
government documents. 
Under the Supreme Court's precedent and 
our own, the answer must be the former. We 
are aware of no court that has held we 
cannot or need not conduct the jurisdictional 
analysis called for by the political question 
doctrine simply because the claim asserted 
involves a statutory right. We must always 
begin by interpreting the constitutional text 
in question and detelmining "whether and to 
what extent the issue is textually 
committed." The question is not whether the 
courts are competent to interpret a statute. 
Certainly we are. But as our recent decision 
makes clear, we will decline to "resolve [a] 
case through . . . statutory construction" 
when it "presents a political question which 
strips us of jurisdiction to undertake that 
otherwise familiar task." In a case such as 
this, to borrow the words of Professor 
Wechsler, "abstention of decision" is 
required because deciding whether the 
Secretary of State must mark a passport and 
Consular Report of Birth as Zivotofsky 
requests would necessarily draw us into an. 
area of decisionmaking the Constitution 
leaves to the Executive alone. That Congress 
took a position on the status of Jerusalem 
and gave Zivotofsky a statutory cause of 
action in an effort to make good on its 
pronouncement is of no moment to whether 
the judiciary has authority to resolve this 
dispute between the political branches. We 
have never relied on the presence or absence 
of a statutory challenge in deciding whether 
the political question doctrine applies. We 
. decline to be the first court to hold that a . 
statutory challenge to executive action 
trumps the analysis in Baker and Nixon and 
renders the political question doctrine 
inapplicable. 
III. 
. Because we conclude that Zivotofsky's 
complaint raises a nonjusticiable political 
question, we affirm the district court's 
dismissal of his suit for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Lacking authority to 
consider the case, we do not address the 
merits of the parties' other arguments. The 
judgment of the district court is 
Affirmed 
EDWARDS, 
concurring: 
Senior Circuit Judge, 
.' * * * 
In defending against Zivotofsky's action in 
this case, the Secretary has pressed two 
principal arguments: 
[1] Zivotofsky has no judicially 
enforceable right because his 
complaint presents a' political 
question. The power to recognize 
foreign sovereigns-including the 
power to recognize claims over 
disputed foreign territory-is 
textually committed by the 
Constitution to the President, and is 
therefore not subject to judicial 
override. 
[2] Section 214(d) is 
unconstitutiorial. Aliicle II assigns to 
the President the exclusive power to 
recognize foreign sovereigns, and 
Congress has no authority to 
override or intrude on that power. 
Appellee's Br. at 18,21. 
The Secretary's first argument-that 
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Zivotofsky's claim is a nonjusticiable 
political question-is specious. The 
Secretary's second argument, contesting the 
constitutionality of § 214( d), stands on solid 
footing. 
1. THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRlNE HAS NO APPLICATION IN 
THIS CASE 
A. The Issue Before the Court 
The Secretary does not doubt that 
Zivotofsky has standing to raise a viable 
cause of action under § 214( d) of the 
Foreign Relations Authorizatjons Act. Nor 
does the Secretary doubt that Zivotofsky 
properly invoked the District Court's 
statutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1346(a)(2), and 1361. Therefore, the 
issue before this court is: 
Whether § 214(d) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorizations Act, which 
affords Zivotofsky a statutory right 
to have "Israel" listed as the place of 
birth on . . his passport, is a 
constitutionally valid enactment. 
, Put another way, the court must decide: 
Whether, in enacting § 214(d), a 
provision purporting to address 
"United States Policy with Respect 
to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel," 
Congress impermissibly intruded on 
the President's exclusive power to 
recognize foreign sovereigns. 
These questions involve commonplace 
issues of statutory and constitutional 
interpretation, and they are plainly matters 
for the court to decide. And in answering 
these questions, this court has no occasion to 
address a "political question" that is 
reserved to the exclusive authority of one of 
the political branches of government. 
* * * 
C. Nonjusticiable "Political Questions" 
The political question doctrine embraces a 
limited exception to the rule that "federal 
comis lack the authority to abstain from the 
exercise of jurisdiction that has been 
conferred." As the Supreme Court explained 
in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 
691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), "[w]here the 
Constitution assigns a partiCUlar function 
wholly and indivisibly to another 
. department, the federal judiciary does not 
intervene." The converse of this proposition 
is that a federal court must not abstain from 
the exercise of jurisdiction that has been 
conferred, unless it has been asked to 
. conclusively resolve 'a question that is 
"wholly and indivisibly" committed by'the 
Constitution to a political branch of. 
government. "Underlying these assertions is 
the undisputed constitutional principle that 
Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the 
scope of federal jurisdiction within the 
constitutionally permissible bounds." 
The Supreme Court has described the 
political question doctrine as follows: 
Prominent on the surface of any case 
held to involve a political question is 
found a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political 
depmiment; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
the impossibility of a court's 
undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of 
government or an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a 
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political deCision already made; . or 
the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one 
question. 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691; see 
also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941, 103 
S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983); United 
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-
90, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). 
As explained below, this case in no way fits 
within the frame of the Baker v. Carr 
"political question" paradigm. 
D. The Crucial Distinction Between 
Jurisdiction and Nonjusticiability 
In explaining the political question doctrine, 
the Court in Baker .v. Carr was careful to 
amplify a crucial distinction between "cases 
withholding federal judicial relief [1] 
restring] upon a lack of federal jurisdiction 
[and] [2] upon the inappropriateness of the 
subject matter for judicial consideration-
what [the Court has] designated 
'non justiciability. ,,, 369 U.S. at 198, 82 
S.Ct. 691 
The distinction between the two 
grounds is significant. In the instance 
of non justiciability, consideration of 
the cause is not wholly and 
immediately foreclosed; rather, the 
Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds 
to the point of deciding whether the 
duty asserted can be judicially 
identified and its breach judicially 
determined, and whether protection 
for the right asserted can be 
judicially molded. In the instance of 
lack of jurisdiction the cause either 
does not "arise under" the Federal 
Constitution, laws or treaties (or fall 
within one of the other enumerated 
categories of Art. III, § 2), or is not a 
Id. 
"case or controversy" within the 
meaning of that section; or the cause 
is not one described by any 
jurisdictional statute. 
When a federal court dismisses a case 
because it presents a "political question," it 
does so not because the court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction but, rather, because the 
"duty asserted can[ not] . be judicially 
identified and its breach judicially 
determined." "[T]he mere fact that [a] suit 
seeks protection of a political right does not 
mean it presents a political question." And 
"it is error to suppose that every case or 
controversy which touches foreign relations 
lies beyond judicial cognizance." As noted 
scholars have pointed out, "[i]nterpretation 
of statutes affecting foreign affairs is not 
likely to be barred by [the] political-question 
doctrine." 
The political question doctrine is purposely 
very narrow in scope, lest the courts use it as 
a vehicle "to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given." As the Court 
noted in Baker, 
[t]he doctrine of which we treat is 
one of "political questions," not one 
of "political cases." The courts 
cannot reject as "no law suit" a bona 
fide controversy as to whether some 
action denominated "political" 
exceeds constitutional authority. 
369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691. 
Unsurprisingly, federal cases in which 
subject matter jurisdiGtion anq. standing are 
properly asserted are rarely dismissed as 
non justiciable pursuant to the political 
question doctrine. Indeed, since Baker, the 
Supreme Court has only dismissed two cases 
as presenting non justiciable political 
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questions. 
The Supreme COUli often hears and decides 
cases bearing major foreign policy 
implications. These cases are not dismissed 
pursuant to the political question doctrine. 
The reason is simple: Although the 
establishment of policies governing foreign 
relations is the business of the political 
branches, the determinat~on of the meaning 
and legality of a congressionally enacted 
statute is the business of the cOUlis. 
E. The Legal Principles Controlling This 
Case 
The principles enunciated by Baker and its 
progeny are really quite simple to 
comprehend and apply in this case. The 
controlling principles governing this case 
are these: 
•. The federal courts decide matters of 
statutory constmction and constitutional 
interpretation. 
• When the federal courts review the 
constitutionality of a challenged statute, they 
do not infringe the authority of the 
legislative branch. In Munoz-Flores, 495 
U.S. at 390, 110 S.Ct. 1964, the Supreme 
Court tellingly stated: 
The Government may be right that a 
judicial finding that Congress has 
passed an unconstitutional law might 
in some sense be said to entail a 
"lack of respect" for Congress' 
judgment. But disrespect, in the 
sense the Government uses the term, 
cannot be sufficient to create a 
political question. If it were, every 
judicial resolution of a constitutional 
challenge to a congressional 
enactment would·be impermissible. 
• The federal courts may not decide art issue 
whose resolution is committed by the 
Constitution to the exclusive authority of a 
political branch of government. This does 
not mean that a court may not decide a case 
that merely implicates a matter within the 
authority of a political branch. Congress, 
alone, has the authority to pass legislation, 
but it does not follow from this that the 
courts are without authority to assess the 
constitutionality of a statute that has been 
properly challenged. Rathel', the political 
question doctrine bars judicial review only 
when the precise matter to be decided has 
been constitutionally committed to the 
exclusive authority of a political branch of 
government. 
• The courts may, however, decide whether 
and to what extent a matter is reserved to the 
exclusive authority of a political branch. 
• The courts routinely adjudicate separation-
of-powers claims. As the COUli noted in 
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 393, 110 S.Ct. 
1964: 
In many cases involving claimed 
separation-of-powers violations, the 
branch whose power has allegedly 
been appropriated has both the 
incentive to protect its prerogatives 
and institutional mechanisms to help 
it do so. Nevertheless, the Court 
adjudicates those separation-of-
powers claims, often without 
suggesting that they might raise, 
political questions. In short, the fact 
that one institution of Government 
has mechanisms available to guard 
against incursions into its power by 
other governmental institutions does 
not require that the Judiciary remove 
itself . from the controversy by 
labeling the issue a political 
question. 
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• If a federal court finds that a political 
branch has overreached in its claim of 
constitutionally committed authority, the 
court will decide the matter that is properly 
before it for resolution on the merits. 
• If a federal court determines that a political 
branch has acted within the compass of 
exclusive authority granted to it by the 
Constitution, the coUrt may determine 
whether the other branch has acted to 
infringe that authority. The court does not 
review the substantive decision reached by 
the branch with exclusive authority; it 
merely determines whether the exercise of 
that authority has been infringed by the 
other branch. 
F. The Zivotofsky Claim is Plainly 
Justiciable 
In light of the legal principles that control 
this case, the Secretary's attempt to invoke 
the political question doctrine is meritless. 
The following example amplifies the point: 
Assume that a lawfully enacted 
congressional statute provides that 
individuals over the age of 18 have a right to 
secure a passport on their own. Assume 
further that the statute gives individuals an 
. enforceable right of action. If the Secretary 
of State adopts a policy pursuant to which 
18-year-olds are denied passports without 
parental consent, claiming an exercise of the 
Executive's recognition power, an aggrieved 
party would have a right of action to 
challenge the Secretary .. A federal court 
hearing the case would be without authority 
to dismiss the action as a non justiciable 
political question. Why? Because the 
plaintiff has standing to pursue her claim 
and the COUlt has jurisdiction to hear it. And 
the court would be well able to evaluate the 
competing claims of power and easily 
determine that the Executive overreached in 
its claim to exclusive authority under the 
recognition power. The court would find no 
valid exercise of textually committed power 
by the executive branch. 
The flip side of this example is seen in a 
case like Nixon, 506 U.S. 224, 113 S.Ct. 
732. In Nixon, the petitioner asked the Court 
to decide whether Senate Rule XI, which 
allowed "a committee of Senators to hear 
evidence against an individual who has been 
impeached and to report that evidence to the 
full Senate," violated the Constitution's 
Impeachment Trial Clause[.] The Trial 
Clause provides that the "Senate shall have 
the sole Power to try all Impeachments." 
The Court first found that this provision 
reflects a clear "grant of authority to the 
Senate, and the word 'soie' indicates that 
this authority is reposed in the Senate and 
nowhere else." Having found a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the impeachment issue to a coordinate 
political department, the Court held that the 
action involved a nonjusticiable political 
question. . Zivotofsky's claim, which is 
founded on a cause of action under § 214(d), 
is nothing like Nixon's clairri. 
In this case, there are two questions that are 
properly before the court: (1) whether the 
Executive's passpOlt policy reflects an 
action taken within the President's exclusive 
power to recognize foreign sovereigns; and 
(2) if so, whether Congress' enactment of § 
214( d) impermissibly intruded on the 
President's exclusive power to recognize 
foreign sovereigns. These questions raise 
issues that are constitutionally committed to 
the judicial branch to decide. Zivotofsky's 
claim resting on § 214(d) does not require 
this court to evaluate the wisdom of the 
Executive's foreign affairs decisions or to 
determine the political status of Jerusalem. 
The court's role in this case is to determine 
the constitutionality of a congressional 
enactment. And this role is well within the 
constitutional authority of the judiciary. 
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II. SECTION 214(D) 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INFRINGES 
THE EXECUTIVE'S EXCLUSIVE 
AUTHORITY UNDER THE 
RECOGNITION POWER 
Zivotofsky has asked the court to direct the 
State Department to designate "Israel" as his 
place of birth on his passport pursuant to 
Congress' directive in § 214(d). The 
Executive asselis that § 214( d), if construed 
to be mandatory, represents an 
unconstitutional infringement of the 
President's recognition power as it concerns 
Jerusalem. 
A The Recognition Power 
The Executive has exclusive and 
unreviewable authority to recognize foreign 
sovereigns. This power derives from Article 
II, § 3 of the Constitution, which gives the. 
President the sole power to "receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers" 
from foreign countries. The power to receive 
ambassadors includes the power' to 
recognize' governments with whom the 
United States will establish diplomatic 
relationships. This recognition power is 
vested solely in the President. 
. It is also clear that, under the recognition 
power, the President has the sole authority to 
make determinations regarding the 
sovereignty of disputed territories. Finally, 
and impOliantly, the recognition power is 
"not limited to a determination of the 
government to be recognized. It includes the 
power to determine the policy which is to 
govern the question of recognition." 
B. The President's Passport Policy 
Regarding the Designation of Jerusalem Is 
an Exercise of the Recognition Power 
The Executive and Congress historically 
have shared authority over the regulation of 
passports. However, "[f]rom the outset, 
Congress [has] endorsed not only the 
underlying premise of Executive authority in 
the areas of foreign policy and national 
security, but also its specific application to 
the subject of passports. Early Congresses 
enacted statutes expressly recognizing the 
Executive authority with respect to 
passports." Congress passed the first 
Passport Act in 1856, endorsing the 
Executive's power to control passports[.] 
The current Passport ACt maintains this 
recognition of Executive authority. 
Although Congress often has recognized the 
authority of the Executive to regulate the 
issuance of passports, this obviously doe~ 
not confirm that the Executive retains 
exclusive control over all matters relating t6 
passports. fudeed, the history of 
congressional legislation in this area 
suggests otherwise. It is clear, however, that 
Congress lacks the power to interfere with a 
passport policy adopted by the Executive in 
lllliherance of the recognition power. 
Appellant Zivotofsky does not dispute this. 
Rather, Zivotofsky contends that the 
passport rules regarding Israel do not 
embody a policy in furtherance of the 
Executive's recognition power. Zivotofsky's 
po~ition fails. The record in this case 
suppOlis the Secretary's claim that the 
policy relating to the designation of 
Jerusalem on passports lawfully "govem[s] 
the question of reco gnition." 
"The status of Jerusalem is one of the most 
sensitive and long-standing disputes in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, having remained 
unsettled since 1948." The United States has 
long refrained from recognizing Jerusalem 
as a city located within the sovereign state of 
Israel. Instead, United States policy since the 
Truman Administration has been "to 
promote a final and permanent resolution of 
final status issues, including the status of 
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Jerusalem, through negotiations by the 
parties and supported by the international 
community." .. "u.s. Presidents have 
consistently endeavored to maintain a strict 
. policy of not prejudging the Jerusalem status 
issue and thus not engaging in official 
actions that would recognize, or might be 
perceived as constituting recognition of, 
Jerusalem as either the capital city of Israel, 
or as a city located within the sovereign 
territory of Israel." These points are 
uncontested. 
The Secretary's rules regarding the 
designation of Jerusalem on passports 
obviously aims to further the United States' 
policy regarding the recognition of Israel. .. 
. There are special rules for Jerusalem 
because it is a disputed territory. For citizens 
born after 1948 in Jerusalem, the Birthplace 
Transcription Guide instructs that only 
"Jerusalem" should be recorded as the place 
of birth. The Guide specifically indicates 
that the official is not to write "Israel" or 
"Jordan." Th~ Guide further instructs that 
Israel "[ d]oes not include Jerusalem or areas 
under military occupation," and Jordan 
"[ d]oes not include Jerusalem." These rules 
plainly implement the Executive's 
determination not to recognize Jerusalem as 
part of any sovereign regime. 
Zivotofsky contends that the "designation of 
a passport holder's place of birth does not 
involve the 'recognition of foreign 
sovereigns. '" This argument misperceives 
the issues in this case. As noted above, the 
recognition power is "not limited to a 
determination of the government to be 
recognized. It includes the power to 
determine the policy which is to govern the 
question of recognition." The rules 
regarding the designation of Jerusalem are 
part of the Executive's overarching policy 
governing the recognition of Israel. 
Zivotofsky also claims that the "'bhihplace' 
entry on a passpOli ... is nothing more than 
one means of identifying the passport-
holder." This attempt to downplay the 
significance of a passport is futile. As the 
Supreme Court has said, "[a] passport is, in 
a sense, a letter of introduction in which the 
issuing sovereign vouches for the bearer." It 
is a "political document" that is "addressed 
to foreign powers," "by which the bearer is 
recognized, in foreign countries, as an 
American citizen." A "political document" 
indicating that a person born in Jerusalem is 
from the sovereign nation of Israel misstates 
the United States' position on the 
recognition of Israel. So long as the 
Executive remains neutral on the question of 
Jerusalem, the Secretary surely may adopt 
polices declining to issue official documents 
that suggest otherwise. 
Finally, Zivotofsky argues that, because the 
Secretary's passport rules concerning 
Jerusalem have only a "negligible impact on 
American foreign policy," the rules cannot 
be viewed as policy governing the 
recognition of Israel. The Secretary responds 
by pointing to evidence of the international 
reaction to the enactment of § 214 in 2002. 
According to the State Department, 
"Palestinians from across the political 
spectrum strongly condemned the Jerusalem 
provisions of the [Act], interpreting those 
provisions as a reversal of longstanding U.S. 
policy that Jerusalem's status should be 
determined by Israel and the Palestinians in 
final status talks." One need not assess the 
international reaction to § 214 to find that 
the Secretary's rules regarding the 
designation of Jerusalem on passports aims 
to further the United States' policy of 
neutrality on the question of J erusalem. It is 
obvious. The Executive's policy is not to 
prejudge the status of Jerusalem, and any 
official statement to the contrary impinges 
upon the Executive's prerogative. The 
Executive has the exclusive authority to 
implement policies in furtherance of th~ 
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recognition power and this court has no 
authority to second-guess the Executive's 
. judgment when, as here, it is clear that the 
disputed policy is in furtherance of the 
recognition power. 
C. Section 214(d) is a Mandatory Statutory 
Provision 
The Secretary also argues that "Section 
214(d) constitutes only a legislative 
recommendation-not a command-to the 
Executive Branch with respect to 
recognition of sovereignty over JelUsalem," 
and therefore there is no reason for this court 
to opine on its constitutionality. The District 
Court rejected this argument, finding that "it 
is difficult to constlUe Section 214( d) as 
. anything but mandatory." Zivotofsky ex reI. 
Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 511 F.Supp.2d 
97, 105 (D.D.C.2007). This IS an 
understatement. Section 214(d) states, 
"[T]he Sec~etary shall, upon the request of 
the citizen or the citizen's legal guardian, 
record the place of birth as Israel." As 
appellant aptly notes, "section 214( d) is as 
mandatory as a statute can be." The words 
of the statute make it plain that "Congress 
was fully aware when it enacted the law that 
the Secretary of State was acting differently 
than Congress wanted him to act. It enacted 
subsection (d) with the specific intent of 
altering the State Depaliment practice." 
Section 214(d) is plainly mandatory. The 
provision dictates that the Secretary shall 
record Israel as the place of birth upon the 
request of a citizen who is born in JelUsalem 
and entitled to a United States passport. 
"Shall" has long been understood as "the 
language of command." 
There are rare exceptions to this lUle that 
apply only where it would make little sense 
to interpret "shall" as "must." There is no 
evidence in this case that the legislature 
intended "shall" in § 214(d) to mean 
anything other than "must." Indeed, when § 
214(d)'is read in conjunction with the title of 
§ 214-"United States Policy with Respect to 
Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel "-there 
can be little doubt about Congress' intent. 
This conclusion is bolstered by reference to· 
the language in § 214(a), where Congress 
merely "urges the President . . . to 
immediately begin the process of relocating 
the United States Embassy in Israel to 
JelUsalem." Given the stlUcture of the 
statute, Congress obviously understood the 
difference between an advisory provision 
and a statutory command. Section 214( d) is 
undoubtedly mandatory. 
The Secretary also argues that "Section 
214( d) should be interpreted as advisory to 
avoid constitutional doubt." However, 
because the statute is unambiguous, the 
canon of constitutional avoidance does not 
apply in this case. The congressional 
command of § 214(a) is clear and 
unmistakable; therefore, this court is obliged 
to render a decision on its constitutionality. 
D. Section 214(d) Unconstitutionally 
Infringes the President's Exclusive Power to 
Recognize Foreign Sovereigns 
The final question in this case is whether § 
214(d) of the Foreign. Relations 
Authorizations Act, which affords 
Zivotofsky a statutory right to have ."Israel" 
listed as the place of birth on his passport, is 
a constitutionally valid enactment. Given the 
mandatory terms of the statute, it can·hardly 
be doubted that § 214( d) intlUdes on the 
President's recognition power. In 
commanding that the Secretary shall record 
Israel as the place of birth upon the request 
of a citizen who is born in JelUsalem and 
entitled to a United States· passport, the 
statute plainly defies the Executive's 
determination to the contrary. As noted 
above, the rules adopted by the Secretary of 
State explicitly ban government officials 
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from recording ~'Israel" as the place of birth 
for citizens born in Jerusalem. Section 
214(d) effectively vitiates the Executive's 
policy. 
Zivotofsky argues that § 214(d) cannot be 
seen to interfere with the Executive's 
recognition power, because the statute here 
is no different from another uncontested 
legislative action taken by Congress with 
respect to Taiwan. In 1994, Congress 
enacted a provision requiring that, "[f]or 
purposes of the registration of birth or 
certificate of nationality of a United States 
citizen born in Taiwan, the Secretary of 
State shall permit the place of birth to be 
recorded as Taiwan." This example is 
inapposite. Following the enactment of the 
statute covering Taiwan, the State 
Department determined that the 
congressional provision was consistent with 
the United States' policy that the People's 
Republic of China is the "sole legal 
government of China" and "Taiwan is a part 
of China." Because listing "Taiwan" did not 
contravene the President's position 
regarding China's sovereignty, the State 
Department allowed American citizens born 
in Taiwan to record "Taiwan" as their place 
of birth. The present case is different from 
the Taiwan example. The State Department 
here has determined that recording Israel as 
the place of birth for United States citizens 
born in Jerusalem misstates the terms of this 
country's recognition ofIsraei. 
The more important point here is that the 
President has the exclusive power to 
establish the policiesgoveming the 
recognition of foreign sovereigns. The 
Executive may treat different· situations 
differently, depending upon how the 
President assesses each situation. These are 
matters within the exclusive power of the 
Executive under Art. II, § 3, and neither 
Congress nor the Judiciary has the authority 
to second-guess the Executive's policies 
governing the terms of recognition. 
"[I]t remains a basic principle of our 
constitutional scheme that one branch of the 
government may not intrude upon the 
central prerogatives of another." In my view, 
the bottom line of the court's judgment in 
this case is inescapable: "Section 214(d) is 
unconstitutional. Article II assigns to the 
President the exclusive power to recognize 
foreign sovereigns, and Congress has no 
authority to override or intrude on that 
power." Section 214(d) impermissibly 
intrudes on the President's exclusive power 
to recognize foreign sovereigns. Because 
appellant Zivotofsky has no viable cause of 
action under § 214(d), I concur in the 
judgment. 
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'" Jerusalem' or 'Israel?' Supreme Court Case Raises 
Trove of Constitutional Questions" 
. Washington Post 
May 8, 2011 
Robert Barnes 
Young Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky, an 
8-year-old American born in. Jerusalem, 
likes to brag to his older siblings that he is 
the only one of them born in Israel. 
He and his parents would like the U.S. 
government to agree. 
But the Zivotofskys' request to change 
Menachem's passport to say his birthplace is 
"Israel" rather than simply "Jerusalem" has 
met firm resistance from the State 
Department. 
"The status of Jerusalem is one of the most 
sensitive and long-standing disputes in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict," the government said 
in its brief to the court. It is not one in which 
the United States has been willing to choose 
sides. 
Over the objection of the Obama 
administration, the Supreme Court last week 
agreed to review the long-running dispute 
over Menachem's passport. The slim 
petition filed by veteran Supreme Court 
practitioner Nathan Lewin manages to pack 
in a trove of constitutional questions for 
argument next fall. 
It raises a broad separation of powers 
. question about Congress' power to influence 
the nation's foreign policy. It broaches the 
question of when courts may get involved in 
settling such disputes between the legislative 
and executive branches. And it even touches 
on the unsettled question of presidential 
"signing statements," in which the president 
signs a bill while declaring he will ignore 
parts he considers unconstitutional. 
u.s. recognition of Jerusalem is a perennial 
question for American politicians, but one 
that American diplomats consider best left 
for negotiations between Israeli and 
Palestinian officials. Israel has had control 
of the once-divided city since the 1967 war, 
and considers it the capital; the United 
States maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv. 
In 2002, Congress passed a provision in a 
broader foreign relations act that said 
Americans born in Jerusalem could request 
that official documents recognize their 
birthplace as "Israel." 
President George W. Bush signed the law, 
but said in a signing statement that U.S. 
policy regarding Jerusalem had not changed. 
The prOVlSlon, he said, would 
"impermissibly interfere with the president's 
constitutional authority to formulate the 
position of the United States, speak for the 
nation in international affairs and determine 
the terms on which recognition is given to 
foreign states;" 
Not long after, Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, 
Americans who moved to Israel in 2000, had 
a baby boy in a hospital. in West Jerusalem . 
Naomi Zivotofsky's request that her son's 
Consular RepOli of Birth Abroad and his 
passport list the country of his birth as Israel 
were denied. 
The Zivotofskys sued, but a district judge in 
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Washington dismissed the case, saying it 
"raises a quintessential political question 
which is not justiciable by the courts." 
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit agreed. But Senior Judge Harry 
T. Edwards disagreed, saying the court 
should have moved on to hear the merits of 
the arguments. The case, he said, "raises an 
extraordinarily important question" that 
"calls into question the role of a federal 
court in our system of justice." 
(Edwards' bottom line, though, is of little 
help to the family: he concluded that while 
the court should have considered the case, 
he would have found the 2002 congressional 
language unconstitutional because it 
"impermissibly intrudes on the president's 
exclusive power to recognize foreign 
sovereigns. ") 
Lewin is encouraged that the Supreme Court 
asked for a briefing on both questions-
whether the courts should hear the case and 
whether Congress' actions were 
unconstitutional. 
He believes the D.C. Circuit Court got it 
wrong. He said the Zivotofskys are not 
asking the courts to decide a matter of 
foreign policy, but simply to enforce a law 
that Congress has passed and the president 
has signed. 
The circuit court's refusal to even hear the 
merits of the suit is an "abdication of the 
court's duty to determine the lawfulness of 
governmental conduct that affects the rights 
of individual citizens," Lewin said in his 
brief. 
Ari Zivotofsky, a neuroscience researcher at 
an Israeli university, said he and his wife 
were aware they were testing the law with 
their request, "but I can't say I expected it 
would end up at the Supreme Court." 
But he said it is important "really for the 
same reason we moved here-to live in the 
state of Israel." He added: "Jews for 
thousands of years prayed daily to be able to 
go to Jerusalem." 
The case is M.R.Z. v. Clinton and will be 
heard in the court's next term. 
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"A Political Question, or a Judicial 
One-and Then What?" 
National Review 
May 12,2011 
Matthew J. Franck 
Legal scholars-not to mention judges-live 
or die professionally with the myth that. 
constitutional questions are so frequently 
hard ones. In truth, while the Jaw has many 
procedural· intricacies grounded in statutes, 
rules, and precedents, most questions of 
constitutional interpretation aren't all that 
hard. The case of Zivotofsky v. SecretarY of 
State seems to be one of the rare hard ones. 
Since its recognition of the state of Israel in 
1948, the United States has officially treated 
the status of Jerusalem as unresolved-not 
only the question whether Jerusalem is to be 
considered Israel's capital, but whether. it is 
part ofIsrael's sovereign territory in the first 
place. This underlies the refusal of president 
after president to move the U.S. embassy 
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 
It is also the longstanding practice of the 
State Department that when a U.S. citizen is 
born in Jerusalem (i.e., a child of sojourning 
American parents), the department will 
issue, on request, a "consular report of birth" 
as well as a passpoli, giving the place of 
birth simply as "Jerusalem," with no country 
specified. 
Enter the Congress. In its 2002 authorization 
act for State, Congress directed that the 
Secretary of State "shall," in such 
documents, for citizens born in Jerusalem, 
"record the place of birth as Israe1." Now 
comes Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky, 
born in October 2002 in Jerusalem. His 
parents have been requesting, and 
subsequently litigating for, such documents 
for young Menachem since he was an infant. 
President George W. Bush, in a signing 
statement regarding the 2002 statute, 
declared the executive branch· would not 
consider itself bound by this provision of it, 
arguing that it "impermissibly interferes" 
with the president's control of foreign 
relations. But whence comes this control? In 
this context, it rests entirely on some 
innocuous words in Article II,. that the 
president "shall receive Ambassadors and 
other public Ministers." In due. course-and 
fairly rapidly-this clause took on rather 
large meiming, that presidents and only 
presidents, without any role for the 
Congress, could give or withhold 
recognition of another nation's sovereignty, 
by the simple act of receiving or not 
receiving its ambassador, establishing or 
declining to establish diplomatic relations. 
In international law and foreign relations, 
this is a very big deal, and it often impinges 
on domestic legal questions as well. 
The Obama administration is following the 
Bush lead here, and so far it's winning. In 
2009 a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit· 
ruled that the question raised in the case is a 
"political" one, not to be decided by the 
judges at all-which meant no decision. on 
the merits but a de facto victory for State's 
refusal of the Zivotofsky family's demand, 
and de facto nuilification of the statutory 
requirement. One judge, Harry Edwards, 
wrote that the issue was not political, and so 
could be decided on the merits-but that he 
would decide in the executive branch's 
favor. In 2010, the full D.C. Circuit denied 
en banc rehearing. Now the Supreme Court 
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has accepted the case for review in its next 
October term. 
The notion of "political questions" is a 
venerable one, traceable all the way back to 
. Marbury v. Madison (1803) itself, the very 
case that first enunciated the federal 
judiciary's power to treat some statutes as 
unconstitutional. Is this a case. in such a 
category? One would be hard pressed to see 
how courts could adjudicate, for instance, 
the executive's choice to recognize a certain 
country and not another, or one putative 
government of a country and not a rival 
faction claiming to be the government, in his 
reception of some ambassadors and not 
others. 
But since 1948, the U.S. has consistently 
recognized Israel. Is Congress foreclosed 
from all participation in regulating the U.S.-
Israel . relationship (other than 
. appropriations)? Is it barred from legislating 
on the rights of American citizens . born 
overseas, such that it cannot impose the 
ministerial duty on. executive branch 
functionaries that they identify the state of 
Israel as the birthplace of Americans born in 
Jerusalem? Or is a large encroachment on a 
core executive power lurking in this merely 
ministerial duty? 
John Marshall said in Marbury that 
"questions, in their nature political" are none 
of the judiciary'S business, and the 
paradigmatic case involved those questions 
that "respect the nation, not individual 
rights," and thus were questions on which 
the executive's discretion was "conclusive." 
But he also said that "the question whether a 
right has vested or not is, in its nature, 
judicial, and must be tried by the judicial 
authority." Which sort of situation is the 
Zivotofsky case? 
I incline towm'd the view that a legal right is 
involved here· and so the Court should not 
dodge it with talk of its "political" character. 
And if the merits are reached, I don't see 
how Judge Edwards' pro-executive view can 
prevail here. That is, it's either a political 
question or the· Zivotofskys win on the 
merits, and I think the second outcome 
makes more sense. On balance, I'm with 
Seth Lipsky, who wrote about this case the 
other day in the Wall Street Journal. 
But it's a tougher case than most. 
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Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California 
09-958 
Ruling Below: 
Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Association 
09-1158 
Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital 
10-283 
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. California, Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009) 
cert. granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 992 (U.S. 2011). 
California Pharmacists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. 
granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 992 (U.S. 2011); Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger, 596 F.3d 
1087 (9th Cir. 201 0) cert. granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 992 (U.S. 2011). 
Santa Rosa Mem'l Hosp. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 380 F. App'x. 656 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. 
granted in part .. 131 S. Ct. 996 (U.S. 2011). 
In February of 2008, California altered Medi-Cal, the state's implementation of Medicaid by 
passing AB 5. Section 14105.l9 reduced payments to a number of health care providers and 
facilities by 10%. Section 14166.245 reduced inpatient services for acute care hospitals not under 
contract with the state by 10%. The plaintiffs in Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of 
Southern California were both providers and beneficiaries that were affected by the passage of 
AS 5. Plaintiffs argued AB5 violated the .Supremacy Clause because it was inconsistent with the 
requirement of 42 U.S.C. 1396(a)(30)(A) ("30(A)") that payments assure efficiency, economy, 
and quality of care. On remand, the District Court granted preliminary injunctive relief to the 
plaintiffs, holding they had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits due to the 
Director's failure to present evidence the impact of AB 5 had been duly considered. That order 
was amended to apply only proactively, as the District Court held retroactive application would 
be inconsistent with the state's sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's 
injunctive relief and reversed on the sovereign immunity issue finding the state had waived that 
immunity. 
Subsequently, California enacted AB 1183 which scaled back on the changes introduced by AB 
5. Instead of a broad 10% reduction, AB 1183 created a schedule of one, five, or ten percent 
reductions based on the type of provider. The plaintiffs in California Pharmacists Association v. 
Maxwell-Jolly represented adult day health care centers that faced a five percent reduction in 
payments under AB 1183. Plaintiffs challenged AB 1183 on the same grounds as Independent 
Living and prevailed at both the district and circuit court levels on the same reasoning. Similarly, 
the Ninth Circuit held Independent Living controlled when it affirmed the district court's grant of 
preliminary injunctive relief in Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital v. Maxwell-Jolly. 
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Question Presented: Whether Medicaid recipients and providers may maintain a cause of action 
under the Supremacy Clause to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) by asserting that the provision 
preempts a state law reducing reimbursement rates? 
INDEPENDENT LIVING CENTER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC., a nonprofit 
corporation; Gray Panthers of Sacramento, a nonprofit corporation; Gray Panthers of San 
Francisco, a nonprofit corporation; Gerald Shapiro, Pharm. D. doing business as Uptown 
Pharmacy and Gift Shoppe; Sharon Steen doing business as Central Pharmacy; Mark 
Beckwith; Margaret Dowling; Tran Pharmacy, Inc. doing business as Tran Pharmacy; 
Jason Young, Petitioners-Appellees, 
Sacramento Family Medical Clinics, Inc.; Theodore Mazer M.D.; Ronald B. Mead; Acacia 
Adult Day Services, Interveners-Appellees, 
v. 
David MAXWELL-JOLLY, Director of the Department of Health Care Services, State of 
California, Respondent-Appellant. 
Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc., a nonprofit corporation; Gray 
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[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge: 
Petitioners-Appellees! Appellants 
(Independent Living), a group of 
pharmacies, health care providers, senior 
citizens' groups, and beneficiaries of the 
State's Medicaid program, Medi-Cal, seek 
to enjoin the California Department of 
Health Care Services (Department) Director, 
David Maxwell-Jolly (Director) from 
implementing state legislation reducing 
payments to certain medical service 
providers under Medi-Cal by ten percent. 
We hold that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in granting Independent 
Living's motion for a preliminary 
injunction, because the Director failed to 
"rely on responsible cost studies, its own 
and others," in determining the effect of the 
rate cuts mandated by AB 5 on the statutory 
factors of effiCiency, economy, quality, and 
access to care before implementing those 
cuts. We also hold that the district court's 
preliminary injunction should be modified to 
cover payments for medical services 
provided on or after July 1, 2008, because 
the Director waived the State's sovereign 
immunity in both state and federal court. 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
On February 16, 2008, the Califomia 
Assembly passed AB 5, which added §§ 
14105.19 and 14166.245 to the Califomia 
Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 
14105.19 reduces payments under the Medi-
Cal fee-for-service program to physicians, 
dentists, phmmacies, adult health care 
centers, clinics, health systems, and other 
providers by ten perdent. Section 14166.245 
similarly reduces payments for inpatient 
services provided by acute care hospitals not 
under contract with the State by ten percent. 
Both of these rate reductions were scheduled 
to take effect on July 1, 2008. 
On April 22, 2008, Independent Living filed 
a verified petition for a writ of mandamus in 
Los Angeles County Superior Court, seeking 
to enjoin the Director from implementing 
AB 5. Independent Living argued that the 
ten percent rate reduction violates Title XIX 
of the federal Social Security Act (the 
Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., and 
is therefore invalid under the Supremacy 
Clause. Specifically, Independent, Living 
alleged that AB 5 is inconsistent with 42 
U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A) (hereafter § 30(A)), 
which requires that a state plan 
provide such methods' and 
procedures relating to the utilization 
of, and payment for, care and 
services available under the plan .. . 
as may be necessary . . . to assure 
that payments are consistent with 
efficiency, economy, and quality of 
care and are sufficient to enlist 
enough providers so that care and 
services are available under the plan 
at least to the extent that such· care 
and services are available to the 
general population in the geographic 
area. 
On May 19, 2008, the Director removed this 
action to federal court based on federal 
question jurisdiction. On May 30, 2008, 
Independent Living filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction. The district court 
heard argument on June 23,2008. Two days 
later, the court entered an order denying the 
motion, holding that Independent Living had 
not demonstrated a likelihood of success on 
the merits of their preemption claim because 
§ 30(A) did not create any judicially 
enforceable "rights." 
Independent Living then sought emergency 
relief from this court. After full briefing and 
argument, we vacated the district court's 
order, holding that Independent Living could 
bring suit directly under the Supremacy 
Clause to enjoin a state law allegedly 
preempted by federal law. We remanded to 
the district court for reconsideration of 
Independent Living's' motion for a 
preliminary injunction. 
On remand, the district court issued an order 
granting in part and denying in part 
Independent Living's motion for a 
preliminary injunction. The district court 
held that Independent Living had 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 
merits of its Supremacy Clause claim, as the 
Director failed to provide any evidence that 
the Department had considered the impact of 
the ten percent rate reduction on quality and 
access to care, as required by § 30(A). The 
court also held that Independent Living had 
demonstrated a risk of ineparable injury as 
to some-but not all-of the challenged Medi-
Cal services. The' district court thus granted 
the motion "to the extent that it seeks to 
enjoin enforcement of Cal. Welf. & 
Inst.Code § 14105.19(b)(1), which reduces 
by ten percent payments under the Medi-Cal 
fee-for-service program for physicians, 
dentists, pharmacies, adult day health care 
centers, clinics, health systems, and other 
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providers· for services provided on or after 
July 1, 2008." The court denied the motion 
to enjoin enforcement of the rate reductions 
for managed care plans and non-contract 
acute care hospitals, as Independent Living· 
had not shown a risk of irreparable injury as 
to those services. 
On August 27, 2008, the Director filed a 
motion "to alter or amend, and clarify" the 
August 18 order. The Director argued that 
the injunction should apply only to 
payments for services provided on or after 
August 18, because reqU1l'1ng full 
reimbursement for services provided prior to 
the court's order would violate the State's 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 
The Director also argued that the order was 
vague and ambiguous and that the Ninth 
Circuit had yet to rule on the Director's 
petition for rehearing and rehearing en bane 
regarding the Supremacy Clause right of 
action issue. The district court granted the 
motion in part the same day, issuing an 
order in chambers modifying the 
preliminary injunction to apply only to 
payments "for services provided on or after 
August 18, 2008." Although the order itself 
did not. provide any explanation for the 
modification, the district court later stated 
that it was its "intention only to issue an 
order that would provide for prospective 
relief," and that it agreed with the Director 
"that the order as it was phrased violates the 
Eleventh. Amendment." The district court 
also indicated that it would not grant the 
Director's request for a stay and that 
Independent Living's request for a contempt 
citation was premature. The district court 
did not afford Independent Living an 
opportunity to respond to the Director's 
argument before issuing its order. 
The August 18 order, as modified, generated 
three appeals, two of which remain before 
us. In case number 08-56422, the 
Directorappeals the district court's decision 
to grant the motion for preliminary 
injunction in part, arguing primarily that the 
analysis of AB 5 conducted by the 
Department was legally sufficient and 
Independent Living therefore cannot 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the 
merits. In case number 08-56554, 
Independent Living appeals the district 
court's August 27 order modifying the 
injunction to apply only to payments for 
serviCes provided on or after August 18, 
arguing that the earlier order-which would 
have granted relief for services provided on 
or after July I-did not violate the State's 
sovereign immunity. We address these 
arguments in turn. 
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
* * * 
DISCUSSION 
I. Independent Living's Likelihood of 
Success on the Merits 
This is not the first time that we have 
interpreted the substantive and procedural 
requirements of § 30(A). In Orthopaedic 
Hospital v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th 
Cir; 1997), several hospitals and health care 
associations· alleged that the Department 
violated § 3 o (A) by setting provider 
reimbursement rates "without proper 
consideration of the effect of hospital costs 
on the relevant statutory factors [of] 
efficiency, economy, quality of care, and 
access." We interpreted § 30(A) to require 
the Director to set reimbursement rates that 
"bear a reasonable relationship to efficient 
. and economical hospitals' costs of providing 
quality. services, unless the Department 
shows some justification for rates that 
substantially deviate from such costs." To 
meet this statutory requirement, we held that 
the Director "must rely on responsible cost 
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studies, its own or others', that provide 
reliable data as a basis for its rate setting." 
Under the standards established in 
Orthopaedic Hospital, it is clear that the 
Director violated § 3 o (A) when he 
implemented the rate reductions mandated 
by AB 5. The Director failed to provide any 
evidence that the Department or the 
legislature studied the impact of the ten 
percent rate reduction on the statutory 
factors of efficiency, economy, quality, and 
access to care prior to enacting AB 5, nor 
did he demonstrate that the Department 
considered reliable cost studies when 
adjusting its reimbursement rates. Several of 
the declarations submitted by the Director 
candidly admit that the Department does not 
maintain information on provider costs for 
covered services. In the absence of such cost 
data, the Director could not have complied 
with § 30(A) as interpreted in Orthopaedic 
Hospital. 
Perhaps as a result, the Director's primary 
argument on appeal is that the standards 
established in Orthopaedic Hospital are 
inapplicable, for several reasons. We 
address each of them. 
A. Action Under the Supremacy Clause 
First, the Director argues that Orthopaedic 
Hospital is inapplicable because the 
plaintiffs in that case were not asserting a 
claim of federal preemption directly under 
the Supremacy Clause. As the Director 
notes, Orthopaedic Hospital addressed 
claims brought to enforce the provisions of § 
30(A) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
provides a remedy for deprivation of any 
"rights ... secured by the Constitution and 
laws" of the United States. In this case, by 
contrast, Independent Living does not seek 
direct enforcement of any "rights" created 
by § 30(A), but rather argues that the ten 
percent rate reduction conflicts with the 
federal requirements established in § 30(A). 
The question is whether this difference in 
the theory of recovery renders Orthopaedic 
Hospital's interpretation of § 30(A) any less 
persuasive. To answer this question, we tum 
to basic principles of conflict preemption. 
Conflict preemption arises "when 
compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility, or 
where state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress." 
Under this latter strand of so-called 
"obstruction" preemption, "an abelTant or 
hostile state rule is preempted to the extent it 
actually interferes with the 'methods by 
which the federal statute was designed to 
reach[its] goal. ", "Thus, obstruction 
preemption focuses on both the objective of 
the federal law and the method chosen by 
Congress to effectuate that objective, taking 
into account the law's text, application, 
history, and interpretation." 
As the description above makes clear, the 
first step in any conflict preemption analysis 
is to detelTI1ine the purpose of the federal 
law at issue. Orthopaedic Hospital discussed 
the purpose underlying § 30(A) at length, 
reading its text and legislative history as 
demonstrating that "Congress intended 
payments to be flexible within a range; 
payments should be no higher than what is 
required to provide efficient and economical 
care, but still high enough to provide for 
quality care and to ensure access to 
services." We held that the Department 
. could not accomplish this purpose in the 
absence of some determination of "what it 
costs an efficient hospital economically to 
provide quality care." Thus, while the 
Department "need not follow a rigid formula 
of payments equal to an efficiently and 
economically operated hospital's costs 
regardless of other factors," § 3 o (A) 
required the Depilliment to at least ascertain 
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provider costs when it adjusted 
reimbursement rates. 
The Director has not provided any coherent 
reason why the purpose underlying § 30(A) 
would be different for purposes of federal 
preemption than it was for direc~ 
enforcement under §1983, and we see none. 
That Independent Living in this case has 
proceeded under a different cause of action 
than the plaintiffs in Orthopaedic Hospital is 
therefore an inconsequential distinction. In 
both cases, the central question is the 
purpose underlying § 30(A), and as to that 
question, Orthopaedic Hospital clearly 
controls. 
B. Continuing Validity of Orthopaedic 
Hospital 
Second, the Director argues that our more 
recent decision in Sanchez, 416 F.3d 1051, 
"effectively overruled" Orthopaedic 
Hospital, and that the district court's 
analysis of the merits was thus based on 
legal error. This argument is unavailing. 
Sanchez did not overrule Orthopaedic 
Hospital's interpretation of § 30(A). 
Sanchez addressed the narrow question of 
"whether . developmentally disabled 
recipients of Medicaid funds and their 
service providers have a private right of 
action against state officials to compel the 
enforcement of a federal law governing state 
disbursement of such funds." Applying the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga 
University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 
2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), we held that 
§ 30(A) does not create any federal "rights" 
enforceable under § 1983. In so holding, we 
did not reach the substantive requirements of 
§ 30(A), as we were concerned solely with 
whether the plaintiffs in that case could 
bring suit in federal court. In fact, Sanchez 
.does not explore the congressional 
"purpose" underlying § 30(A), the 
touchstone of federal preemption analysis. If 
the· Sanchez court had any qualms about 
Orthopaedic Hospital's substantive 
interpretation of § 30(A), it did not say so. 
More fundamentally, Sanchez cannot be 
read to have overruled Orthopaedic 
Hospital, for three reasons. First,· Sanchez 
does not even cite Orthopaedic Hospital, 
much less overrule its holdings. Second, 
Sanchez was decided by a three-judge panel 
that, under our circuit rules, was powerless 
to overturn one of our prior decisions in the 
absence of intervening authority[.] Third, we 
affirmed the "continuing vitality" of 
Orthopaedic Hospital in a published opinion 
filed one month after Sanchez. In that case, 
the State argued-much as the Director has 
here-that subsequent developments 
rendered Orthopaedic Hospital 
anachronistic. We were "not persuaded," 
and we noted that "the relevant language of 
§. 3 o (A) remains unchanged since 
Orthopaedic Hospital, and thus our 
interpretation of its purpose, and the' State's 
obligations thereunder, still holds." 
Aside from his misreading of Sanchez, the 
Director also argues that Orthopaedic 
Hospital is no longer good law because its 
interpretation of § 30(A) "conflicts with the 
interpretation of the federal agency that 
Congress vested with authority to enforce 
and implement" the statute. By this, the 
Director apparently means that Orthopaedic 
Hospital conflicts with the interpretation of 
§ 30(A) presented in an amicus brief filed by 
the Solicitor General when the Supreme. 
Court asked him to opine on whether our 
decision in Orthopaedic Hospital was 
wOlihy of a grant of celiiorari. In the process 
of recommending denial of certiorari, the 
Solicitor General opined that requiring states 
to reimburse medical providers at rates 
roughly equal to their costs ran counter to 
the text and legislative history of § 30(A). 
From this, the Director concludes that a 
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"federal agency" repudiated our 
interpretation of § 30(A). 
Whatever the merits of the Solicitor 
General's views, we owe them no deference 
in this case. Although at one time the 
Supreme Court suggested that a legal 
opinion expressed by an agency in the 
course of litigation may be entitled to 
deference, it subsequently limited such 
deference to an agency's interpretation of 
ambiguities·in its own regulations[.] 
The Director also contends that oUl; holding 
in Orthopaedic Hospital has oeen 
undermined by Congress's . subsequent 
repeal of the so-called "Boren Amendment," 
which required states to set hospital 
inpatient reimbursement rates that were 
"reasonable and adequate to meet the costs 
which must be incurred by efficiently and 
economically operated facilities." This 
argument is not persuasive either, as 
Orthopaedic Hospital itself expressly 
distinguished the requirements of the Boren 
Amendment, previously codified at· § 
1396a(a)(13)(A), from the "more flexible" 
requirements of §. 30(A). The fact that 
Congress repealed· the more rigid 
requirements of the Boren Amendment does 
not speak to the propriety of our past· 
interpretation of § 30(A). Moreover, we 
have previously rejected the same argument 
made by the Director in this case, noting that 
the repeal of the Boren Amendment, "like its 
enactment, modified § 13 (A) alone; it 
effected no change to § 30(A)." 
Finally, the Director urges us to reconsider 
our interpretation of § 30(A) in Orthopaedic 
Hospital, noting that several courts have 
disagreed with its reasoning. Even if we 
were at liberty to ovel1'ule Orthopaedic 
Hospital, we would nonetheless affirm the 
district court's injunction, for several 
reasons. 
First, even those courts that have rejected 
Orthopaedic Hospital's procedural 
requirements have generally recognized that 
state Medicaid rate reductions may not be 
based solely on state budgetary concerns. In 
this case, the record supports the district 
court's conclusion that "the only reason for 
imposing the cuts was California's CUl1'ent 
fiscal emergency." The legislation was 
passed in an emergency session called to 
"address[ ] the fiscal emergency declared by 
the Governor." Thus, quite apart from any 
procedural requirements established by 
Orthopaedic Hospital, the State's decision 
to reduce Medi-Cal reimbursement rates 
based solely on state budgetary concerns 
violated federal law. . 
Second, even if we were in a position to 
relax the procedural requirements 
established in Orthopaedic Hospital, the 
Director's failure to study the effect of the 
rate reduction in any meaningful way would 
still lead us to enjoin implementation of AB 
5. Those courts that have criticized 
Orthopaedic Hospital's reasoning have not 
simply rubber-stamped rate reductions 
imposed by state agencies; rathel', reviewing 
courts typically subject state rate-making to 
something akin to "arbitrary and capricious" 
review. 
In this case, the State's own Legislative 
Analyst warned that the ten percent rate 
reduction had "the potential to negatively 
impact the operation of the Medi-Cal 
Program and the services provided to 
beneficiaries by limiting access to providers 
and services,'" and on that basis 
recommended that the legislature "reject the 
Governor's proposal to reduce payments for 
all providers except hospitals." Nothing in 
the record indicates that any other State 
official considered~let . alone studied-
these possibilities prior to enacting the cuts. 
Thus, it is far from clear that the Director 
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would prevail under a different standard, as 
there is no evidence that the agency's 
decision-making process was "reasonable 
and sound." 
Third, those courts that have resisted 
interpreting § 3 o (A) to include certain 
procedural requirements have nonetheless 
held that § 3 o (A) imposes substantive 
obligations on states that elect to participate 
in Medicaid. In this case, Independent 
Living alleges that at least some medical 
providers have refused to treat Medi-Cal 
recipients since the ten percent rate 
reduction was implemented. Even if we 
were to interpret § 30(A) to mandate a 
substantive rather than procedural result, the 
ten percent rate reduction might still conflict 
with the quality of care and .access 
provisions of § 30(A), as the cuts have 
apparently forced at least some providers to 
stop treating Medi -Cal beneficiaries. 
The potential difficulties inherent in 
assessing substantive compliance with the 
factors laid out in § 30(A) demonstrate why 
the more process-oriented view of the statute 
espoused in Orthopaedic Hospital has much 
to recommend it. As Judge Levi stated in 
Clayworth v. Bonta" 
[Orthopaedic Hospital's] approach 
has substantial practical benefits. 
The Medicaid Act is clearly intended 
to give states discretion and 
flexibility in. setting reimbursement 
rates, within the limits of federal law. 
The arbitrary and capricious standard 
limits the court's review of the 
State's rate setting and permits the 
court to defer to the judgment of 
specialists in a complex regulatory 
field. Furthermore, it is fair to 
assume that a rate that is set 
arbitrarily, without reference to the 
Section 3 o (A) requirements, IS 
unlikely to meet the equal access and 
quality requirements. 
295 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1127 (E.D.Ca1.2003), 
rev'd, 140 Fed.Appx. 677 (9th Cir.2005) 
(internal citations omitted). 
As Judge Levi recognized, the framework 
established in Orthopaedic Hospital allows 
reviewing courts to defer to a state agency's 
balancing of competing interests, so long as 
the record created by the agency 
demonstrates that the State considered the 
factors mandated by statute. In this sense, 
the procedural approach is far less intrusive 
than the "substantive compliance" stapdard 
espoused by the Third and Seventh Circuits. 
In sum, the Director has not demonstrated 
that Orthopaedic Hospital has been 
overruled or undermined in the past twelve 
years, and a recent decision of this court 
expressly reaffirmed its central holding. 
Moreover, even if we were not bound by 
Orthopaedic Hospital, there are compelling 
reasons to retain Orthopaedic Hospital's 
process-oriented focus. The district court 
thus correctly applied binding precedent to 
Independent Living's claims in this case. Its 
conclusion that Independent Living had 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 
merits was not an abuse of discretion. 
II. Irreparable HanTI 
The Director also argues that the district 
court committed clear error by holding that 
Independent Living had demonstrated a 
likelihood of irreparable harm. The bulk of 
the Director's argument, however, focuses 
on the alleged harm to the State in light of 
its current fiscal crisis. The district court 
clearly .considered the hardship to the State 
but concluded that any such harm was 
outweighed by the hardships likely to be 
suffered. by Medi-Cal beneficiaries, who 
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would be forced to go without medical care. 
We have previously held that it is not legal 
error to conclude, when balancing "the 
medical or financial hardship to [Medi-Cal 
recipients] against the financial hardship to 
the state," that the balance . of hardships 
"tipped sharply" in favor of the plaintiffs, 
and we reach the same conclusion in this 
case. 
The Director argues that whatever harm 
Independent Living will suffer if the 
injunction is reversed, the State will suffer 
more harm if the injunction is upheld. To 
suppOli this· argument, the Director cites 
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson for 
the proposition that the State will be most 
harmed by losing this appeal. See 122 F.3d 
718, 719 (9th Cir.1997) (stating, in dicta, 
that "it is clear that a state suffers irreparable 
injury whenever an enactment of its people 
or their representatives is enjoined")[.] 
As the cited authority· suggests, a state may 
suffer an abstract form of harm whenever 
one of its acts is enjoined. To the extent that 
is true, however, it is not dispositive of the 
balance of harms analysis. If it were, then 
the rule requiring "balance" of "competing 
claims of injury," would be eviscerated. 
Federal courts instead have the power to 
enjoin state actions, in part, because those 
actions sometimes offend federal law 
provisions, which, like state statutes, are 
themselves "enactment [s] of its people or 
. their representatives[.]" Here, Independent 
Living alleges that allowing AB 5's 
implementation would violate the Medicaid 
Act and the Constitution. If .we uphold the 
injunction and interfere with AS 5's 
implementation, then we will have 
detelmined that to do otherwise would 
permit a violation of a federal law which, 
like AB 5, was produced by a democratic 
process. Therefore, in assessing the relative 
harms to the parties, we reject the Director's 
suggestion that, merely by enjoining a state 
legislative act, we create a per se harm 
trumping all other harms. 
The Director also challenges the evidence of 
irreparable injury provided by certain 
Independent Living entities, taking issue 
with the gravity of the economic harms 
alleged by pharmacists and other medical 
providers. The Director fails to 
acknowledge, however, that several of the 
entities are Medi-Cal recipients. This court 
has previously held that Medi-Cal recipients 
may demonstrate a risk of irreparable injury 
. by showing that enforcement of a proposed 
rule "may deny them needed medical care.". 
In this case, the district court carefully 
considered the voluminous evidence 
presented by the paliies, concluding that 
Independent Living had made such a 
showing with respect to some medical 
services and failed to do so with respect to 
others. Aside from restating its own 
evidence, the Director does not present any 
specific. reason· why the district court's 
weighing of Independent Living's evidence 
was erroneous. We therefore refuse to. 
disturb the district court's factual findings 
regarding irreparable injury, which we 
review for clear error. 
III. Balance of Equities and the Public 
Interest 
Finally, the Director contends that the 
district cOUli erred in its assessment of the 
public interest. The public interest analysis 
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction 
requires us to consider "whether. there exists 
some critical public interest that would be 
injured by the grant of preliminary relief." 
The district court held that, although "there 
is a public interest in ensuring that the State 
has enough money to meet· its financial 
obligations," this interest was outweighed by 
the public interest "in ensuring access to 
health care." The Director argues that, in 
light of the State budget crisis, the balance 
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of hardships tips in his favor, as the cuts 
mandated under AB 5 are necessary to help 
reduce the State budget deficit. 
We do not doubt the severity of the fiscal 
challenges facing the State of Califomia. 
State budgetary concems cannot, however, 
be "the conclusive factor in decisions 
regarding Medicaid." A budget crisis does 
not excuse ongoing violations of federal 
law, particularly when there are no adequate 
remedies available other than an injunction. 
State budgetary considerations do not 
therefore,. in social welfare cases, constitute 
a critical public interest that would be 
injured by the grant of preliminary relief. In 
contrast, there is a robust public interest in 
safeguarding access to health care for those 
eligible for Medicaid, whom Congress has 
recognized as "the most needy in the 
country." We therefore hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the balance of hardships and 
the public interest weighed in favor of 
enjoining implementation of the ten percent 
rate reduction required by AB 5. 
IV. Sovereign Immunity and the Order 
Modifying the Injunction 
On cross-appeal, Independent Living 
. challenges the district court's August 27, 
2008 order modifying its August 18, 2008 
order granting Independent Living's motion 
for a preliminary injunction. Independent 
Living principally argues that, in modifying 
the earlier order to eliminate its retroactive 
effect, the district court misconstrued the 
extent of the State's sovereign immunity. 
Independent Living contends that the State 
of Califomia has consented to actions in 
state court for retroactive awards of 
unlawfully withheld funds. Independent 
Living further maintains that, by removing 
this case to federal court, the Director 
waived whatever immunity he had in state 
court. The Director responds that the district 
court correctly modified the August 18 
order. He contends that requiring a state 
agency to expend state funds based on past 
conduct violates state sovereign immunity, 
which, the Director insists, was never 
waived in either the state or federal forum. 
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity 
generally prohibits damage suits against 
states in both state and federal court without 
their consent. The doctrine comes froni the 
Eleventh Amendment, but its essence 
"derives . . . from the structure of the 
original Constitution itself." 
The Supreme Court has held that state 
sovereign immunity bars citizens of any 
state from bringing a lawsuit for damages 
against a state or state agency. However, 
there are three well-established exceptions 
to this general rule. Two of them-Ex parte 
Young and state waiver (both explicit 
consent and implied removal waiver)-are 
relevant here, and we consider them below. 
A. The Order's Validity Under Ex parte 
Young 
Although the Eleventh Amendment 
expressly prohibits suits against states in 
both law and equity, a plaintiff may 
nonetheless maintain a federal action to 
compel a state official's prospective 
compliance with the plaintiff s federal 
rights. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156, 
28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); id. at 
160, 28 S.Ct. 441 ("The State has no power 
to impart to [its officer] any immunity from 
responsibility to the supreme authority of the 
United States.")[.] The court may order such 
an injunction even if the state's compliance 
will have an "ancillary effect" on the state 
treasury. This exception applies only to 
prospective relief; it does not permit 
retroactive injunctive relief. 
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In this case, the August 18 order constituted 
retroactive relief under our controlling 
precedent. In Native Village of Noatak v. 
Blatchford, we held that, "[i]n requesting an 
order requmng the Commissioner to 
perform his 'legal duty' to disburse ... 
funds" to him, the plaintiff "essentially 
seeks an injunction directing the state to pay 
damages." 38 F.3d 1505, 1512 (9th 
Cir.1994). What the plaintiff sought, we 
held, was "precisely the type of retroactive 
relief that the Supreme Court refused to 
allow in Edelman, " and therefore his 
"attempt to characterize its claim as one for 
prospective relief fail [ ed] to avoid the bar of 
the Eleventh Amendment." 
In this matter, the August 18 order provided 
retroactive relief that required the State to 
pay monetary compensation to affected 
providers. Therefore, under Native Village 
of Noatak, the retroactive portion of that 
order does not fall under the Ex parte Young 
exception to the sovereign immunity 
doctrine. As a result, the order violated the 
State's sovereign immunity unless the 
Director waived that immunity-impliedly 
through removal, explicitly through consent 
to suit in state court, or. through some 
combination thereof-an issue we now 
consider. 
B. The State's Waiver of Sovereign 
Immunity 
Even if a plaintiff seeks damages for past 
conduct, sovereign immunity will not 
insulate a state from suit in state court, 
provided the state has previously consented 
to be sued in state court under like 
circumstances. While a state's consent to . 
suit in its own courts does not waive 
sovereign immunity against suit in federal 
court, a state that consents to suit in state 
court cannot invoke the sovereign immunity 
defense after removing the suit to federal 
court[.] As a result, given that the Director 
removed the case, sovereign immunity will 
not protect him if the State has previously 
consented to suits like this one in state court. 
Here, Independent Living points to several 
state authorities it claims constitute such 
consent. First, it notes that California Code 
of Civil Procedure § 1085 provides: 
A writ of mandate may be issued by 
any court to any inferior tribunal, 
corporation, board, or person, to 
compel the performance of an act 
which the law specially enjoins, as a 
duty resulting from an office, trust, 
or station. 
Though it does not explicitly waive 
sovereign immunity against retroactive 
disbursements, this provision can be read to 
sanction judicially ordered fund 
disbursements generally. 
California state courts, some interpreting 
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085, 
have condoned such orders in more explicit 
terms. Various decisions have interpreted 
state law to permit mandamus actions 
seeking disbursement of unlawfully 
withheld funds. Notably, some of these 
cases have specifically recognized the 
availability of monetary awards against a 
state agency or official resulting from 
unlawfully withheld health and welfare 
payments. In Los Angeles County v. Riley, 
the cOUli authorized back payments for 
needy services against the State and noted 
that "[t]he rule is well established in this 
state that where the action is one simply to 
compel . an officer to perform a duty 
expressly enjoined upon him by law, it may 
. not be considered a suit against the state." 
128 P.2d at 543 (citing, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of 
Woman's Relief C01pS Home Ass 'n of Cal. 
v. Nye, 8 Cal.App. 527, 97 P. 208 
(Cal.Ct.App.1908))[.] 
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Thus, California has construed the scope of 
its sovereign immunity as it relates to 
awards of unlawfully withheld funds more 
narrowly than have the federal courts. Under 
California law, an action seeking injunctive 
relief that requires a state official to disburse 
funds is not an action against the State. 
Thus, it does not implicate the State's 
sovereign immunity against liability in its· 
own courts. Had this action remained in 
state cOUli, the Director would not have 
enjoyed sovereign immunity against a order 
directing payment of retroactive benefits. 
Under our precedent, because the Director 
enjoyed no sovereign immunity in state 
cOUli against a order directing payment of 
retroactive benefits, it follows that the 
Director-by removing the case to federal 
court-. waived sovereign immunity in that 
forum as well. See Embury, 361 F.3d at 566 
(citing Lapides v. Board of Regents, 535 
U.S. 613, 623-24, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 
L.Ed.2d 806 . (2002)) (holding that, in 
removing a case to federal court, a state 
defendant waives its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity}; see also Stewart, 393 F.3d at 
488. Embury's rule is grounded on the 
Supreme COUli's holding in Lapides, which 
held that where a state removed a state law 
defamation action to federal cOUli, it waived 
its sovereign immunity against the state 
claim. Embury extended Lapides's principle 
to federal claims. Under Embury, the 
Director, having waived state court 
immunity, also waived federal court 
sovereign immunity by voluntarily removing 
the action. Because the Director lacked 
sovereign immunity against retroactive 
orders, the district court's August 18 order 
should have applied retroactively. As a 
result, by basing its order on an en'oneous . 
legal standard, the district court erred in 
eliminating the injunction's retroactive 
effect. We hold that the district court's 
injunction should extend to all services 
covered by that injunction and provided on 
or after July 1,2008. 
C. Other Claims of Error Regarding the 
August 27, 2008 Order 
Independent Living also contends that the 
district court's August 27,' 2008 order 
violated their right to due process, namely, 
their property right in the jUdgment reflected 
in the cOUli's August 18, 2008 order. They 
. also allege that, in modifying the August 18 
order, the district court abused its discretion 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). 
Based on our conclusion that the August 27, 
2008 order erroneously construed the State's 
sovereign immunity, we do not reach these 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The district cOUli properly applied this 
court's prior decision in Orthopaedic 
Hospital to hold that Independeht Living has 
. demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 
merits. Moreover, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that the 
balance of hardships tips sharply in 
Independent Living's favor, as the ten 
percent rate reduction threatens access to 
much-n~eded medical care. We therefore 
affirm the. district cOUli's order granting in 
part Independent Living's motion for a 
preliminary injunction. 
However, the district court's subsequent 
order modifying the injunction to apply only 
to payments for services provided on or after 
August 18 was based on an erroneous legal 
standard. The State of California has waived 
its sovereign immunity against mandamus 
actions in state courts seeking 
reimbursement of unlawfully withheld 
funds, and the Director, by voluntarily 
removing this case to federal court, waived 
the State's sovereign immunity in federal 
cOUli. We therefore reverse the district 
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court's August 18 order modifying the 
injunction and remand to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, 
and REMANDED. 
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"V.S. Supreme Court to Decide If California Can Cut 
Payments to Medi-Cal Providers" 
Los Angeles Times 
January 19, 2011 
David G. Savage & Shane Goldmacher 
The U.S. Supreme. Court announced 
Tuesday that it will decide 'whether to give 
California and other cash-strapped states 
more freedom to cut the amounts they pay 
doctors" hospitals and other providers of 
medical care for the poor. 
The case could have a major impact on Gov. 
Jerry Brown's plans to close the state's 
massive budget deficit. 
Federal courts previously blocked about $1 
billion in Medi-Cal cutbacks adopted by the 
Legislature in 2008. Brown has proposed 
trying those cuts again. His budget plan 
would reduce the amounts the state pays 
healthcare providers by 10%, which would 
reduce the program by $719 million. 
Many other states have indicated an interest 
in making similar cutbacks. Twenty-two 
states joined California in its appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 
Attempts in California to trim spending on 
Medi-Cal and other health programs have 
repeatedly been tied up in the courts. Former 
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger once 
criticized federal judges for "going 
absolutely crazy" in their continued 
blockage of attempted spending reductions. 
Brown spokeswoman Elizabeth Ashford 
said the federal courts had been a 
"roadblock" in allowing California to 
balance its budget. The issue before the high 
court, she said, was a matter of "state 
sovereignty. " 
"It's incredibly important," she said of the 
high comt's decision to consider the case. 
"The fact that they are taking this up 
indicates that they understand how 
important this issue is to the state." 
But medical groups said the state's plans 
would essentially deny healthcare coverage 
to hundreds of thousands of people by 
driving doctors from the program. 
CUlTently, 57% of California doctors accept 
new Medi-Cal patients, according to a study 
published last year by the California 
HealthCareFoundation. That number would 
drop further if the state reimburses doctors 
less, said Anthony Wright, executive 
director of Health Access, a consumer 
advocacy group. 
About seven million Californians get their 
health coverage through Medi-Cal. 
"The practical effect" of the state's cutbacks 
"is that it makes it harder for the millions of 
Californians on Med-Cal to get in to see a 
doctor," Wright said. 
The California Medical Assn., which 
represents 35,000 doctors, called the state's 
existing Medi-Cal payment rates 
"ridiculously low-. among the lowest in the 
nation." 
Cutting them further "would only serve to 
force more doctors out of the program and 
decrease access to care for millions of poor 
and unemployed Californians/' the 
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association's president, James Hinsdale, said 
in a statement. "Regardless of the legal 
issues involved, slashing Medi-Cal rates is 
bad public policy that would undermine the 
state's healthcare system." 
The program of healthcare for the poor, 
known as Medicaid nationally and Medi-Cal 
in California, is funded jointly by the federal 
government and the states. The law is 
unclear on how far states can go to reduce 
the amount they pay to providers. 
After California's cutbacks in 2008, doctors, 
hospitals, pharmacies and other providers 
sued in federal court. They argued 
successfully that the cutbacks were so steep 
that poor patients would no longer have 
access to acceptable healthcare and that the 
cuts were preempted by the federal 
Medicaid Act. 
But lawyers for then-Atty. Gen. Brown 
appealed to the Supreme Court. They argued 
that private parties,such as doctors, had no 
right to sue the state and no dght to a 
particular reimbursement payment. 
This appeal touched a chord in the high 
court. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., 
among others, has been skeptical of the 
notion that when the federal government 
provides public money for ben~fits such as 
health or education, federal law authorizes 
suits by those unhappy with the level of 
spending. 
The Obama administration so far has sided 
against the state. In December, the Justice 
Department told the high court it should turn 
down California's appeal. 
Instead, the justices agreed to hear three 
separate appeals from the state, all of which 
raise the same issue. The lead case IS 
Maxwell-Jolly vs. Independent Living 
Center of So utlt em Califomia. 
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"The Other Healthcare Lawsuit: California Medicaid 
(aIm Medi-CaI) Case Headed to Supreme Court" 
Los Angeles Times 
June 6, 2011 
Marilyn Chase 
With valet parking for pat!ents, video-
conferencing for parents of premature babies 
and a healing garden abloom with azaleas, 
Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital tries to 
maintain the amenities of a thriving 
community hospital. 
But chief financial officer Mich Riccioni is 
focused on the fiscal strains Memorial is 
facing. Nearly a quarter of the hospital's 
patients are on California's Medicaid 
program, known as Medi-Cal, and the state 
has been trying for years to cut its 
reimbursement rates for hospitals and other 
healthcare providers. 
Memorial, a 278-bed hospital in this city 55 
miles north of San Francisco, sued 
California to try to stop the payment 
reductions. Now it is part of a case before 
the U.S. Supreme Court that could redefine 
states' responsibilities on Medicaid services 
and ultimately determine whether 
Democratic Gov. Jeny Brown can go 
forward with cuts he says are vital to closing 
the state's budget gap. The court is likely to 
hear arguments in the fall and render a 
decision by next spring. 
Many states are pressing for more flexibility 
on Medicaid, a joint federal-state health 
program for the poor and disabled. But 
Memorial, as well as other hospitals and 
doctors, counter that the steep cuts violate 
federal law, which requires that payments be 
set high enough to ensure providers will see 
enrollees. They note the state's 
reimbursement rates rank 46th among the 
states. 
The Obama administration recently 
proposed a rule that would require states to 
consider the impact of payment cuts and to 
perform reviews to see if patients are getting 
necessary services. 
In 2008, California targeted its Medicaid 
program, which today has an annual budget 
of $42 billion. The legislature and 
Republican Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger 
approved a 10 percent cut in payments to 
providers. 
Riccioni estimated that the proposal would 
reduce Memorial's revenue by $17.5 million 
over three years. The hospital, officials say, 
already is struggling financially. Memorial 
has slashed 180 jobs, imposed a one-year 
salary freeze, closed its inpatient psychiatric 
ward and its skilled nursing facility and 
canceled a planned $260 million' surgery 
tower. 
Supreme Court focus 
In the legal battle over reimbursement cuts, 
the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
against the state in several cases. In January, 
the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case 
based on Memorial's suit and two others. 
The court will focus on whether outside 
groups, such as hospitals and other 
providers, as well as Medicaid recipients, 
have the right to sue when they believe the 
state is violating federal law. For now the 
state-baned by the 9th Circuit injunction-
is holding off on the disputed cuts at issue in 
the lawsuit. 
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"This is an extremely important case," said 
Charles Luband, a partner with the law firm 
Ropes & Gray LLP in New York City, 
which has drafted letters in support of 
hospitals and doctors in the case. "The 
Medicaid statute was created to assure 
payments were sufficient to enlist enough 
providers to participate in the program. 
That's why it's important providers be able 
to bring such lawsuits to assure that statute 
has meaning and relevance." 
Sara Rosenbaum, chairwoman of the 
Department of Health Policy at George 
Washington University, said the case could 
have broad ramifications for patients. If 
Califomia wins, Medicaid recipients 
wouldn't be able to sue states to compel 
them to fulfill an array of duties under the 
law, such as conducting "fair hearings" for 
emollees deemed ineligible, she said. 
But 22 states, in an amicus brief, asserted 
that they must be able to control their own 
Medicaid spending and that a ruling against 
Califomia would open a spigot of suits from 
health care providers. 
"To allow private litigants to bring such 
actions would devastate amICI States' 
financing ability to provide assistance to its 
ever-growing lower income citizens in the 
current economiC climate," the states said. 
The Obama administration is backing the 
states up. In an amicus brief that angered 
consumer advocates, the Justice Department 
said that Medicaid patients and providers 
can't sue state officials to block payment. It 
argued that allowing such suits could lead to 
"a plethora of private action~ threatening 
disparate outcomes." Federal health officials 
should decide when cuts go too far, the brief 
said. 
The court isn't expected to rule on whether 
the proposed provider cuts are legal. If the 
providers win in the Supreme Court, that 
issue would likely be sent back to the 9th 
Circuit. Also, the administration's proposed 
Medicaid rule on payment cuts isn't likely to 
have much impact; the Supreme Court will 
be considering the narrow issue of whether 
private parties have standing to sue states 
over alleged violations of the Medicaid law. 
'Within its means' 
Medi-Cal-the largest chunk of California 
general fund expenditures after education-
covers 7.5 million people and is growmg, 
according to state officials. 
Brown and the legislature agreed on a 
budget that would cut rates by 10 percent for 
Medi-Cal providers like Memorial that don't 
have· contracts with the state and up to 5 
percent for providers such as doctors. 
Officials estimate it would save California 
$567 million this year. 
"These are not choices we'd make in 
another environment," said health 
department spokesman Norman Williams. 
"But California must live within its means." 
One of the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court 
case is Norma Jean Vescovo, founder of the 
Van Nuys-based Independent Living Center 
of Southern California serving about 6,000 
disabled clients a year. She says her clients 
have trouble finding doctors and druggists 
who will accept Medi-Cal' s reduced rates. 
"We've had diabetic patients who couldn't 
get their medications," Vescovo said. 
"When you look around,You see pharmacies 
closing." . 
"They want to pay me 1 0 percent below my 
costs," said Gary A vnet, owner of Sayre 
Medical Pharmacy in Southern California. 
"What do I do?" Selling pricey drugs for 
diabetes and HIV below cost means, "I'd be 
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out of business," he said. 
In downtown Los Angeles, Jerry Shapiro 
runs Uptown Drug and Gift Shoppe, a store 
his father opened on VJ Day in 1945. 
Shapiro said he breaks even on drugs 
costing up to $124, but loses money filling 
costlier prescriptions for serious conditions 
. such as cancer or multiple sclerosis. "I'm 
having a very tough time," he said. "I 
borrowed a lot of money to stay in 
business." 
While big box stores can better absorb cuts, 
small pharmacies . that offer services like 
delivery and patient· counseling· are hurt 
more by the reductions, Shapiro said; "I had 
my house completely paid for and now I'm 
in hock for more than I ever had a mortgage . 
for," he said. 
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"State Can't Cut Medi-Cal Payments to Hospitals" 
San Francisco Chronicle 
March 4,2010 
. Bob Egelko 
A federal appeals court barred California on 
Wednesday from lowering Medi-Cal 
payments to doctors and hospitals by 5 
percent and from cutting in-home care 
workers' wages by nearly 20 percent, saying 
the state's budget crisis doesn't justify 
violating federal laws that protect the poor 
and disabled. 
In four rulings, the Ninth U.S. Circuit COUli 
of Appeals in San Francisco rejected 
attempts by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger 
and the Legislature to reduce the state's 
deficit by paying less to the health 
professionals who treat 6.6 million low-
income Californians, and to hundreds of 
thousands of workers who care for some of 
the neediest. 
The reductions would have totaled at least 
$175 million a year, according to estimates 
by the state and employee groups. But the 
court said the federal government-which 
pays at least half of each program's costs-
requires states to maintain poor residents' 
equal access to basic health care, and forbids 
cuts intended solely to save money. 
Previous rulings had reached the same 
conclusion, including one that 
Schwarzenegger tried to get the U.S. 
Supreme COUli to review. 
Federal law doesn't prohibit Medi-Cal 
reductions, Judge Milan Smith said in one of 
Wednesday's decisions, all issued. by the 
same three-judge panel. But he said the state 
must first conduct a study to make sure that 
the rates cover reasonable costs of care. 
The rulings reaffirm that "the state. cannot 
solve its budget problems on the backs of 
some of the most vulnerable Californians," 
said Stacey Leyton, a lawyer for unions 
representing workers in the In-Home 
Supportive Services program, which serves 
440,000 people. 
Likewise, cutting Medi-Cal rates-already 
among the nation's lowest-for doctors and 
other health care providers is both illegal 
and harmful to the providers and their 
patients, said Lloyd Boolamin, attorney for 
the California Hospital Association and 
adult day health care centers. 
Schwarzenegger was unyielding. 
Spokeswoman Rachel Arrezola noted that 
the governor has another appeal pending 
with the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that 
the appeals court has misinterpreted the 
federal health-care law for more than a 
decade. 
Wednesday's court action "interferes with 
the state's ability to manage its finances and 
reduce its spending to match its revenue," 
Arrezola said. 
The governor and the Legislature first tried 
to cut Medi-Cal provider payments by 10 
. percent in July 2008, then enacted a 5 
percent reduction in February 2009, but 
were thwarted by the courts. 
A federal judge also blocked the state in 
June 2009 from reducing in-home care 
workers' wages by $2 an hour. Most of the 
workers now.get $12.10 an hour, including 
benefits. 
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Workers provide care for low-income 
residents who are over 65, or are disabled or 
blind, and need help with everyday living 
tasks. Schwarzenegger has proposed 
abolishing the program in his 2010-11 
. budget unless the federal government 
increases state aid. 
Leyton, who represents. the Service 
Employees Intemational Union's home-care 
workers unit, said the funding cuts would 
actually drive up state costs, because many 
patients would be forced into nursing homes 
or hospitals. 
At a union-sponsored news conference, 
Mary Harms, a home-care worker in Contra 
Costa County, described the likely effect of 
program cuts on her 53-year-old client, 
ShelTY, who suffers from cerebral palsy and 
mental retardation. 
Harms said the services she has provided for 
ShelTY foi' seven years, helping her get out 
of bed and bathing her, allow her to stay at 
home with her loved ones. "Without home 
care, ShelTY would be institutionalized," she 
said. "She would just lay in bed and 
eventually die." 
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"Federal Court Rules Against California 
Medicaid Cuts" 
NYAPRS 
March 5, 2010 
Tom Gilroy, BNA 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reiterated March 3 its oft-stated 
opinion that California may not cut its Medi-
Cal reimbursement rates purely for 
budgetary reasons, but instead must rely on 
responsible cost studies, prior to any cuts, to 
show that the planned reductions. do not 
reduce access to care for Medicaid recipients 
(California Pharmacists Assn. v. Maxwell-
Jolly, 9th Cir., No. 09-55532,3/3/10). 
The ruling, affirming a preliminary 
injunction granted by a federal district cOUli 
. judge in February 2009 against a planned 5 
percent rate cut voted by the Legislature in 
September 2008 (A.B. 1183), again relied 
heavily on the Ninth Circuit's 1997 decision 
in Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 
1491. In Orthopaedic, the court held that 
Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act requires 
that payments for Medi-Cal services "must 
be sufficient to enlist enough providers to 
provide access to Medicaid recipients." 
. That, in turn, required that the Department 
of Health Services, the predecessor agency 
to the current Department of Health Care 
Services (DHCS), "must rely on responsible 
cost studies, its own or others,' that provide 
reliable data as a basis for its rate setting." 
Judge C1n'istina A. Snyder of the U.S. 
District COUli for the Central District of 
California had granted a preliminary 
injunction against the A.B. 1183 
. reimbursement cuts. Snyder cited the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Orthopaedic, and said a 
DHCS analysis. supporting the rate 
reductions was completed well after 
. enactment of the law, and thus did not meet 
the requirements set out in Orthopaedic. 
The challenge to the rate cuts was brought 
by a· group of adult day health care centers 
(ADHCs), hospitals, pharmacies, and other 
beneficiaries of the state's Medicaid 
program, known as Medi-Cal. It was similar 
to a lawsuit filed in 2008 by other providers 
protesting a 10 percent Medi-Cal rate cut, 
which Snyder also blocked, and the Ninth 
Circuit upheld (Independent Living Center 
of Southern California v. Shewry, C.D. Cal., 
No. CV 08-3315 CAS (MANx), preliminary 
injunction grated 8/18/08) (162 HCDR, 
8/21108). 
More recently, Snyder on Feb. 24 granted, 
on virtually identical grounds as the other 
cases, a preliminary injunction sought by the 
California Hospital Association, against 
state legislation (A.B. 5) that effectively 
freezes certain designated hospital services 
at 2008-2009 levels . 
Rejecting State's Argument 
In its appeal of the adult day care centers' 
preliminary injunction, the state argued that 
Orthopaedic did not hold that rate-setting 
had to be based upon pre-enactment 
legislative studies undeliaken and completed 
by the Legislature itself prior to the action 
authorizing implementation of the cuts. That 
case focused solely on thedepmiment's 
actions, and thus only the department was 
required to consider Section 3 o (A) 
requirements, the state maintained. 
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But the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel 
disagreed. The court in Orthopaedic did, in 
fact, focus on the department, since it was 
. setting the rates . in that instance. 
Nevertheless, the state is "misguided" in 
thinking that focus "absolves the legislature 
of the same requirements when it sets rates," 
Judge Milan D. Smith Jr., who wrote the 
OpInIOn, stated. In Orthopaedic, the 
Legislature was "one step removed from the 
regulations promulgated by the 
Department," and thus the Ninth Circuit had 
no reason to focus on what that body 
considered before rates were set, Smith 
noted. "Yet if the legislature elects to bypass 
the Department, and set rates itself, it must 
engage in the same principled analysis we 
required of the Director in Orthopaedic II," 
he added, "In sum, we find nothing 
remarkable in holding that the final body 
responsible for setting Medicaid 
reimbursement rates must study the impact 
. of the contemplated rate reduction on the 
statutory factors of efficiency, economy, 
quality of care, and access to care prior to 
setting or adjusting payment rates," the court 
wrote. The appellate court also agreed with 
Snyder that the DHCS's post hoc analysis of 
the rate cuts did not satisfy the requirements 
of Orthopaedic. "To satisfy Section 30(A), 
any analysis of reimbursement rates on the 
statutory factors of efficiency, economy, 
quality, and access to care must have the 
potential to influence the rate-setting 
process," the court ruled. 
Yet the DHCS analysis of AB. 1183 with 
regard to adult day care centers was issued 
more than five months after enactment of 
the law, it noted. While that was still before 
the cuts were actually implemented, the 
Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the 
DHCS's argument that the director could 
have vetoed the cuts if he determined they 
did not comply with Section 30(A). 
Finally, the appellate court rejected the 
state's claim that the lower court erred when 
it found that plaintiffs demonstrated a 
likelihood of irreparable harm if the 
preliminary injunction was not granted. In 
fact, showing a procedural violation of the 
statute, n~ely the state's failure to consider 
the impact of the rate cuts on the statutory 
factors set forth in Section 30(A), may 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the 
merits that the setting of provider 
reimbursement rates conflict with Section 
30(A), the cOUli stated. 
If at least some providers stop treating 
Medi-Cal beneficiaries as a result of the rate 
cuts, and evidence indicates that at least. 
some adult day care center providers would 
stop treating beneficiaries due to AB. 1183, 
that might be sufficient for a finding of. 
irreparable harm~ Smith wrote. 
"We have now handed down multiple 
decisions instructing the State on. Section 
30(A)'s procedural requirements," Smith 
noted in the court's conclusion. "We trust 
that the State now understands that in order 
for it to comply with Section· 30(A)'s 
'requirement that payments for services 
must be consistent with efficiency, 
economy, and quality of care, and sufficient 
to ensure access,' . . . it must: 1) 'rely on 
responsible cost studies, its own or others,' 
that provide reliable data as a basis for its 
rate setting,' ... and 2) study the impact of 
contemplated rate change(s) on the statutOlY 
factors prior to setting rates, or in a manner 
that allows those studies to have a 
meaningful impact on rates before they are 
finalized," he added. Because the state did 
neither with regard to AB. 1183, the district 
court's order granting plaintiffs a 
preliminary injunction was affirmed, Smith 
added. 
* * * 
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"Healthcare Programs May End: Governor's Revised 
Budget Is Expected to Call for Axing Some He 
Couldn't Scale Back" 
Los Angeles Times 
May 13,2010 
Evan Halper 
Gov. Arnold Schwarzeneggeris expected to 
present a revised budget plan Friday that 
would dismantle some of California's 
landmark healthcare programs after efforts 
to scale them back have been reversed by 
federal courts. 
The rulings, issued mostly over the last two 
years, have already forced the state to 
unwind roughly $2.4 billion in cuts 
approved by the governor and Legislature 
and have alarmed other financially strapped 
states seeking ways to balance their budgets. 
Schwal'zenegger has lashed out at the federal 
judges, saying they've been "going 
absolutely crazy" and accusing them of 
interfering with the state's ability to get its 
finances in order. 
The rulings tie their hands, administration 
officials say, and they are asking the u.s. 
Supreme .Court to intervene in a petition 
supported by 22 other states. 
"We can't make any changes to these 
programs," said Susan Kennedy, the 
governor's chief of staff. "Anybody can just 
walk into a courthouse and freeze them." 
Administration officials declined to reveal 
which specific programs the governor would 
eliminate. But officials involved in the 
budget. process, who spoke on condition of 
anonymity because they are not authorized 
to speak publicly, said they would probably 
include home healthcare for the elderly and 
disabled, a nearly $2-billion program that 
serves 440,000 Californians. Cuts that 
lawmakers and the governor made to the 
program' in an effort to balance the budget 
have been blocked by legal rulings over the 
last year. . 
The court decisions restrict their ability to 
make cuts in the programs, officials said, but 
they don't preclude dismantling them. 
Abolishing home healthcare services would 
mean forfeiting the federal Medicaid money 
that helps fund them. But the money comes 
with requirements that the courts said 
California did not meet. The state would not 
have to follow the requirements if it did 
away with the program, and thus would no 
longer risk having its financial plans 
upended in court. 
The Schwarzenegger administration may 
also propose the dismantling of the Healthy 
Families program, which uses federal money 
to help provide health insurance for about 
900,000 low-income children. The 
administration warned in January that it 
would try to abolish the program if the 
state's budget situation did not improve------'-
which it has not. The deficit remains swollen 
at $18.6 billion, or roughly 20% of general 
fund spending. 
"It is a tenible situation," said Sara 
Rosenbaum, a professor of health policy and 
law at George WashingtOli University in 
Washington, D.C. "If you take the federal 
money, there is an obligation to comply with 
the rules .... But it has reached this extreme 
in California where the state is saying, 'We 
just won't run the program.'" 
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The other states . have signed on to 
California's effort at the U.S. Supreme 
Court because they fear precedents set by 
the California rulings in the 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeal expose them to similar 
litigation. 
The Supreme Court is expected to decide 
next month whether to heal' the case. 
"Michigan shares California's concerns," 
said Tiffany Brown, a spokeswoman for 
Michigan Gov. Jennifer Granholm. Officials 
there are concerned that their ability to 
administer Medicaid funds has become 
"hindered," Brown said. 
Washington State IS also supporting 
California's legal battle. Federal cOUlis 
recently unraveled cuts there affecting 
payments to pharmacies and nursing homes. 
"The inability to take prompt action to 
reduce payment rates to providers has 
caused a problem," said Bill Stephens, an 
assistant attorney general in Washington. 
The court fight raises new questions about 
the viability of the national healthcare 
overhaul signed into law by President 
Obama earlier this year. 
The federal legislation assumes a substantial 
expansion of the costly Medicaid programs 
that officials in California and elsewhere are 
proposing to abandon. 
Schwarzenegger's proposals, meanwhile, 
would face stiff opposition in the 
Legislature, where there is limited support 
for taking apali the state's healthcare 
system. 
pi'oviders and advocacy groups that have 
successfully sued the state to block the 
previous cuts are also working with the 
Democrats who control the Legislature to 
preserve services. 
"The state is . . . rushing to make budget 
decisions without doing due diligence to 
follow the federal standal'ds," said Andrew 
LaMar, spokesman for the California 
Medical Assn., which represents 35,000 
California physicians and has sued to block 
cuts in reimbursements to doctors. 
Anthony Wright, executive director of 
Health Access, a consumer advocacy group, 
said that even before the latest round of 
cutbacks, California paid its doctors and 
other Medicaid providers among the lowest 
rates in the nation. . 
More cuts to Medi-Cal, California's 
Medicaid program, would undermine it, he 
said. 
"If you further cut provider rates, you 
potentially make it that Californians with 
Medi-Cal simply will have no doctor," 
Wright said. "If the· state wants federal 
matching funds for the programs, they need 
to keep their end of the bargain." 
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"Administration Opposes Challenges 
to Medicaid Cuts" 
New York Times 
May 28,2011· 
Robert Pear 
Medicaid recipients and health care 
providers cannot sue state officials to· 
challenge cuts in Medicaid payments, even 
if such cuts compromise access to health 
care for poor people, the Obama 
administration has told the Supreme Court. 
States around the country, faced with severe 
budget problems, have been reducing 
Medicaid rates for· doctors, dentists, 
hospitals, pharmacies, nursing homes and 
other providers. 
Federal law says Medicaid rates must be 
"sufficient to enlist enough providers" so 
that Medicaid recipients have access to care 
to the same extent as the general population 
In an area. 
In a friend-of-the court brief filed Thursday 
in the Supreme Court, the Justice 
Department said that no federal law allowed 
private individuals to sue states to enforce 
this standard. 
Such lawsuits "would not be compatible" 
with the means of enforcement envisioned 
by Congress, which relies on the secretary of 
health and human services to make sure 
states comply, the administration said in the 
brief, by the acting solicitor general, Neal K. 
Katyal. 
In many parts of the country, payment rates 
are so low that Medicaid recipients have 
difficulty finding doctors to take them. 
But, the Justice Department said, the 
Medicaid law's promise of equal access to 
care is· "broad and nonspecific," and federal 
health officials are better equipped than 
judges to balance that goal with other policy 
objectives, like holding down costs. 
The administration expressed its views in a 
set of cases consolidated under the name 
Douglas v. Independent· Living Center of 
Southem California, No. 09-958. 
In 2008 and 2009, the California Legislature 
passed several laws reducing Medicaid 
payment rates. Recipients and providers 
challenged the cuts in court, arguing that the 
California plan violated-and was pre-
empted by-the federal Medicaid statute. 
The law does not explicitly allow such 
lawsuits. But the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San 
Francisco, said beneficiaries and providers 
could sue under the supremacy clause of the 
Constitution, which makes federal law "the 
supreme law of the land." In reducing 
payment rates, the appeals court said, 
California violated the requirements of 
federal Medicaid law and threatened access 
to "much-needed medical care." 
California appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which is likely to hear oral arguments in the 
fall, with a decision by next spring. 
Consumer advocates were dismayed by the 
administration's position, which they said 
undermin,ed Medicaid recipients' rights and 
access to the courts. 
"I find it appalling that the solicitor general 
in a Democratic administration would assert 
in a Supreme Court brief that businesses can 
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challenge state regulation under the 
supremacy clause, but that poor recipients of 
Medicaid cannot challenge state violations 
of federal law," said Prof. Timothy S. Jost, 
an expert on health law at Washington and 
Lee University, who is usually sympathetic 
to the administration. . 
Representative Henry A. Waxman of 
California, the senior Democrat on the 
Energy and Commerce Committee and an 
. architect of Medicaid, said the 
administration's brief was "wrong on the 
law and bad policy." 
"I am bitterly disappointed that President 
Obama would accept the position of the 
. acting solicitor general to file a brief that is 
contrary to the decades-long practice of 
giving Medicaid beneficiaries and providers 
the ability to tum to the courts to enforce 
their rights under federal law," Mr. Waxman 
said. He said that he and other Democratic 
lawmakers planned to file a brief opposing 
the administration's view. 
By contrast, many state officials agree with 
California and the Obama administration. 
The National Governors Association and the 
National Conference of State Legislatures 
filed a friend-of-the-court brief endorsing 
California's position that Medicaid 
recipients and providers could not sue. 
In a separate friend-of-the-court brief, 
Michigan and 30 other states went further. 
"Allowing 'supremacy clause lawsuits' to 
enforce federal Medicaid laws will be a 
financial catastrophe for states," they said. 
Medicaid is financed jointly by the federal 
government and the states. The number of 
recipients and the costs increased sharply in 
the recent recession and will increase further 
with the expected addition of 16 million 
people to the rolls under the new federal 
health care law. 
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Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals 
10-1016 
Ruling Below: Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2010) cert. 
granted, 10-1016,2011 WL 500227 (U.S. June 27,2011). 
Petitioner Daniel Coleman, an African-American male, received a letter of reprimand in 2007 
from one of his supervisors at the Maryland Court of Appeals concerning a communications 
protocol. Coleman unsuccessfully appealed this reprimand. A few months later, Coleman applied 
for sick leave based upon a documented medical condition. His supervisor informed him the next 
day that he would be terminated if he did not resign. 
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Coleman brought a Title VII and FMLA claim 
alleged that he was fired for requesting sick-leave, and because of his race. Coleman claims an 
earlier false contract-steering charge against him was also a factor. That charge was brought in 
retaliation for Coleman's investigation and suspension of one of his staff members in 2005. 
The district court dismissed Coleman's FMLA claim on the basis that it was baned by Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. That court concluded Congress had unconstitutionally abrogated the 
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the FMLA's self-care provision. The 
Fourth circuit affirmed the lower court, holding that when enacted, the self-care provision of the 
FMLA was not targeted at preventing discrimination and thus does not pass the congruence-and-
proportionality test for valid Congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 
Question Presented: Whether Congress constitutionally abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity when it passed the self-care leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act. 
Daniel COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS; Frank Broccolina, State Court Administrator; 
Larry Jones, Contract Administrator, Defendants-Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
Decided November 10,2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
TRAXLER, Chief Judge: 
Daniel Coleman appeals the dismissal of his 
amended complaint in this suit alleging, as is 
relevant here, violations of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), see 
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 
2003 & Supp.20 1 0), and of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), see 
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-54 (West 2009 & 
Supp.2010). Finding no enOl', we affilm. 
1. 
Coleman's Title VII claim was dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
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be granted. In reviewing such a dismissal, 
we accept the facts alleged in the complaint 
as true and construe them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. Viewed through 
that lens, the facts for purposes of this 
appeal are as follows. 
Coleman, an African-American male, was 
employed by the Maryland Court of Appeals 
from March 2001 to August 2007 and 
served as executive director of procurement 
and contract administration since early 2003. 
Coleman was supervised by Frank 
Broccolina, a white male, and Faye Gaskins, 
whose race is not specified. Larry J qnes, 
whose race also is not specified, was a 
member of Coleman's staff and was related 
to Gaskins. In October 2005, Coleman 
investigated a matter involving Jones and 
Joyce Shue, a white female. Coleman's 
investigation "resulted in a five (5) day 
suspension" for Jones. After Broccolina and 
Gaskins intervened, however, Jones's 
suspension was reduced to only one day. In 
retaliation for Coleman's investigation, 
Jones' falsely alleged that Coleman had 
steered contracts to vendors in which 
Coleman had an interest, and Jones 
encouraged Broccolina to investigate. 
Broccolina, in tum, shared the allegations 
. with others despite knowing that they were 
false. 
During his employment, Coleman satisfied 
the performance standards of his position 
and received all applicable "raises and 
increments." However, in early April 2007, 
he received a letter of reprimand from 
Gaskins concerning "a communication 
protocol." Coleman's appeal of the 
reprimand was unsuccessful. Then, on 
August 2, 2007, Coleman sent Broccolina a 
sick-leave request "based upon a 
documented medical condition." Broccolina 
contacted Coleman the next day and 
informed him that he would be terminated if 
he did not resign. Coleman alleges that he 
was fired for requesting sick leave and 
because he is black. He also al1eges that the 
contract-steering charge played a role in his 
termination. 
After exhausting his administrative 
remedies, Coleman initiated the present 
action. The complaint before us names 
Broccolina, Jones, and the Maryland Court 
of Appeals as defendants and alleges 
violations of Title VII and the FMLA. On 
defendants' motion, the district court 
dismissed the Title VII claim on the grounds 
that Coleman failed to state a claim for 
which relief could be granted, see 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and' dismissed the 
FMLA claim on the basis that it was barred 
by Eleventh Amendment immunity, see 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b )(1). 
II. 
Arguing that the complaint properly alleged 
both a claim for disparate treatment and a 
claim for retaliation, Coleman maintains that 
the district court erred in dismissing his Title 
VII cause of action. We disagree. 
We review de novo the grant of a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). When ruling 
on such a motion, "a judge must accept as 
true all of the factual allegations contained 
in the complaint." A complaint "need only 
give the defendant fair notice of what the 
claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests." However, to survive a motion to 
dismiss, the complaint must "state[ ] a 
plausible claim for relief" that "permit[ s] the 
court to infer more than the mere possibility 
of misconduct" based upon "its judicial 
experience and common sense." In this 
regard, while a plaintiff is not required to 
plead facts that constitute a prima facie case 
in order to survive a motion to dismiss, 
"[fJactual allegations must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level[.]" 
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Title VII prohibits an .employer from 
"discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . 
. . discriminat[ing] against any hidividual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race." Absent 
direct evidence, the elements of a prima 
facie case of discrimination under Title VII 
are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) 
satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse 
employment action; and (4) different 
treatment from similarly situated employees 
outside the protected class. Title VII also 
prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] 
against any of [their] employees ... because 
[the employees] ha[ve] opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice by 
[Title VII], or because [the employees] 
ha[ ve] . . . participated in any manner in an 
investigation" under Title VII. The elements 
of a prima' facie retaliation claim under Title 
VII are: (1) engagement in a protected 
activity; (2) adverse employment action; and 
(3) a causal link between the protected 
activity and the employment action. 
Here, although Coleman's complaint 
conclusorily alleges that Coleman was 
terminated based on his race, it does not 
assert facts establishing the plausibility of 
that allegation. The complaint alleges that 
Jones and Broccolina began their campaign 
against Coleman in retaliation for his 
investigation of Jones's conflict with Shue. 
The complaint fuliher alleges that Coleman 
"was treated differently as a. result of his 
race than whites" and specifically identifies 
Broccolina as a white person who was not 
disciplined despite having "outside business 
involvements." However, the complaint fails 
to establish a plausible basis for believing 
Broccolina and Coleman were actUally 
similarly situated or that race was the true 
basis for Coleman's termination. The 
complaint does not even allege that 
Broccolina's "outside business 
involvements" were improper, let alone that 
any impropriety was comparable to the acts 
Coleman was alleged to have committed. ' 
Absent such, support, the complaint's 
allegations of race discrimination do not rise 
above speculation. Thus, the district court 
correctly concluded that the complaint failed 
to state a Title VII race discrimination claim. 
See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 ("Threadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mereconclusory statements, 
do not suffice."). 
The district court also correctly ruled that 
Coleman failed to state a Title VII 
retaliation claim. No facts in the complaint 
identify any protected activity by Coleman 
that prompted the retaliation of which he 
complains. Coleman maintains that his 
protected activity was his intervention in the 
conflict between Jones and Shue. However, 
the complaint does not explain why 
Coleman's investigation would be 
considered protected activity. We therefore 
affirm the dismissal of the Title VII claim. 
III. 
Coleman next contends that the district court 
erred in dismissing his FMLA claim on the 
basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
Specifically, he argues that the district court 
erred in concluding that Congress 
unconstitutionally abrogated the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect 
to the FMLA's self-care provision. We 
disagree. 
The Eleventh Amendment . bars. suit in 
federal court against an unconsenting state 
and any governmental units that are arms of 
the state unless Congress has abrogated the 
immunity. In order to do so, Congress must 
unequivocally declare its intent to abrogate 
and must act pursuant to a valid exercise of 
its power. The first prong of this test is 
clearly satisfied here. See Nevada Dep't of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726, 
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123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003) 
(explaining that "[t]he clarity of Congress' 
intent" to abrogate the states' immunity to 
FMLA suits "is not fairly debatable"). It is 
the second requirement that is at issue. 
The Supreme Court has held that while 
Congress cannot validly abrogate a state's 
immunity from private suit under its Article 
I powers, it can do so under its Fourteenth 
Amendment, § 5 authority. The Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that "[n]o .State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or imniunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any. person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." Section 5 
authorizes Congress to enact "appropriate 
legislation" to enforce these substantive 
guarantees. This section authorizes Congress 
not only to codify the Supreme Court's 
holdings regarding the rights established by 
the. Fourteenth Amendment, but also to 
prevent future violations of those rights. 
Although Congress may "enact prophylactic 
legislation prohibiting conduct that is 'not 
itself unconstitutional,'. it may not 
substantively redefine Fourteenth 
Amendment protections." The Supreme 
Court has held that to ensure Congress 
abides by this distinction, "[t]here must be a 
congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end." 
As originally enacted, the FMLA authorized 
qualified employees to take up to 12 weeks 
of unpaid leave annually in four 
circumstances, . three of which concern 
caring for family members: bearing and 
caring for a child, adopting or providing 
foster care for a. child, and caring for a 
spouse, child, or parent with a serious health 
condition[.] The fourth circumstance is 
when "a serious health condition ... makes 
the employee unable to perform the 
functions of [his] position." Congress has 
subsequently amended the FMLA to also . 
authorize leave because of an exigency 
arising out of the fact that an employee's 
spouse, child, or parent is on covered active 
duty, or has been notified of an impending 
call to such duty in the armed forces. The 
FMLA creates a private right of action for 
equitable relief or money damages against 
any employer that denies its employee his 
FMLA rights. 
In Nevada Department of Human Resources 
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 
L.Ed.2d 953 (2003), on which Coleman 
relies, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
the FMLA's third provision, relating to 
caring for a family member with a serious 
health condition, constituted a valid 
abrogation of the states' sovereign 
immunity. In concluding that it was, the 
Court determined that Congress had enacted 
the FMLA in response to "the States' record 
of unconstitutional participation in, and 
fostering of, gender-based discrimination in 
the administration of leave benefits." Hibbs, 
538 U.S. at 735, 123 S.Ct. 1972; see also id. 
at 731, 123 S.Ct. 1972 (describing the 
gender gap in state leave policies as being 
the result of "the pervasive sex-role 
stereotype that caring for family members is 
women's work"). The Court confirmed that 
a "heightened level of scrutiny" applied to 
gender discrimination, which requires that 
classifications distinguishing between 
different genders be substantially related to 
the achievement of important governmental 
objectives. The Court held that the test was 
satisfied in the case of § 2612(a)(1)(C) 
because it was "narrowly targeted at the 
fault-line between work and family-
precisely where sex-based 
overgeneralization has been and remains 
strongest." As Hibbs concerned only this 
family-care provision, § 2612(a)(1)(C), the 
Court did not discuss whether Congress 
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validly abrogated states' immunity with 
regard to the self-care provision, § 
2612(a)(1)(D). 
The Court's analysis, focused as it is on the 
gender-related nature of § 2612(a)(1)(C), 
does not support the validity of Congress's 
abrogation of sovereign immunity for 
violations of §' 2612(a)(1)(D). And, the 
legislative history accompanying the FMLA 
shows that preventing gender discrimination 
was not a significant motivation for 
Congress in including the self-care 
provision; rather, Congress included that 
provision to attempt to' alleviate the 
economic effect on employees and their 
families of job loss due to sickness and also 
to protect employees from being 
discriminated ,against because of their 
serious health problems. Moreover, even 
had Congress intended the self-care 
provision to be protection against gender 
discrimination, Congress did not adduce any 
evidence establishing a pattern of the states 
as employers discriminating on the basis of 
gender in granting leave for personal 
reasons. Without such evidence, the self-
care provision cannot pass the congruenqe-
and-proportionality test. 
Absent a showing that the self-care 
provision is congruent ,and proportional to a 
Fourteenth Amendment injury that Congress 
enacted the provision to remedy, Coleman is 
left to argue that we should simply evaluate 
the FMLA's immunity abrogation as a 
whole rather than considering the self-care 
provision individually. But we know of no 
basis for adopting such an undifferentiated 
analysis or concluding that the Hibbs Court 
did so. Indeed, the Hibbs Court took pains 
throughout its opinion to make clear that the 
case it was deciding concerned only the 
family-leave portion of the FMLA.' 
We note that since Hibbs was' decided, each 
of the four circuit courts to consider the 
issue has concluded that Congress did not 
validly abrogate sovereign immunity as to 
the FMLA's self-care provision. We now 
join these circuits. Because we hold that 
Congress did not validly abrogate the states' 
immunity, we conclude that the district court 
properly dismissed Coleman's FMLA claim 
, as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
IV. 
In sum, holding that Coleman's complaint 
fails to state a Title VII claim for which 
relief could be, granted and that his FMLA 
claim is barred by sovereign immunity, we 
affirm the district court's dismissal of 
Coleman's action. 
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"Supreme Court Takes Maryland FMLA Case" 
Baltimore Daily Record 
June 27, 2011 
Steve Lash 
The Supreme Court will use a lawsuit by a 
former Maryland court employee to 
determine if ~tates can be sued for violating 
the self-care provision of the federal Family 
and Medical Leav~ Act. 
Daniel Coleman, once the executive director 
of procurement and contract administration 
at the Administrative Office of the Courts in 
Annapolis, claimed he was illegally fired in 
August 2007 for taking sick leave. 
But a federal judge in Baltimore found the 
state was immune from suit, a decision the 
4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
last November. 
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to 
review the case. 
In 2003, the high court held that the 
. FMLA's family-care provisions apply to 
state employers. Coleman's attorneys,· 
Michael L. Foreman and Edward Smith Jr., 
believe the same lUle should apply to the 
self-care provisions. 
However, the 2003 case, Nevada DHR v. 
Hibbs, did not address the law's self-care 
provisions. In the years since Hibbs, six 
federal circuits have found that the self-care 
provisions apply only to private employers. 
This appearance of unanimity, however, 
masks the closeness and importance of the 
issue, Coleman's lawyers argue, since the 
leading cases have recognized that it is 
subject to differing interpretations. 
This Court should grant certiorari to 
definitively resolve the question, Foreman 
and Smith successfully argued. 
Foreman, who directs the civil rights 
appellate clinic at Pennsylvania State 
. University's Dickinson School of Law, is 
counsel of record at the high court. Smith, 
who was Coleman's trial attorney, is a 
Baltimore solo practitioner. Neither lawyer 
returned telephone messages seeking 
. comment Monday afternoon. 
Deputy Maryland Solicitor General William 
F. Brockman, the state's counsel ofrecord in. 
the case, said Monday that he celiainly 
would have preferred for the case to be over 
rather than have the Supreme Court review a 
decision in favor of the state. 
Weare confident that whatever way the 
Supreme Court comes out, our clients will 
win on the merits, he added. 
In a brief to the Supreme Court, Broclanan 
argued that Congress, in FMLA's self-care 
provision, was targeting only the failure of 
the private sector to give its workers time off 
to care for themselves. 
The 4th Circuit correctly found that the self-
care provision was not intended to address 
gender discrimination and that there was no 
record of discrimination in public 
employers' practices regarding medical 
leave when FMLA was enacted, Broclanan 
wrote. 
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In his lawsuit, Coleman claims he sent a 
letter to State Court Administrator Frank: V. 
Broccolina, requesting sick leave for a 
documented medical condition. Broccolina 
denied the request and told Coleman he 
could either resign or be terminated, 
according to the lawsuit. 
Coleman was later fired, the lawsuit claims. 
Coleman, who is black, also claimed he had 
been treated differently as a result of his race 
in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
. RightAct. 
U.S. District Judge Benson E. Legg 
dismissed the Title VII claim, saying 
Coleman's complaint failed to allege facts 
that . would indicate an unlawful act 
occurred. The 4th Circuit affirmed, calling 
the complaint conclusory. 
The Title VII issue is not before the high 
court. . 
Coleman sought $1.1 million in 
compensation from the state, including 
$500,000 in compensatory damages and 
$600,000 in punitive damages. He also 
sought reinstatement. 
The Maryland Judiciary and Broccolina 
have denied Coleman's allegations. 
Judiciary spokeswoman Angelita Plemmer 
declined to comment on the case Monday. 
The high court is expected to hear Coleman 
v. Mmyland Court of Appeals et al., No. 
10-1016 during the telID that begins in 
October. 
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"PSU Law Clinic Rides Leave Law 
Tiff to High Court" 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
July 25,2011 
J en Zimmennan 
. When Michael Foreman scanned the list of 
petitions that the Supreme Court had granted 
on June 27, he said he "blinked a couple of 
times at first." 
That's because he sawthe name Coleman v. 
Mmyland Court of Appeals on it. In that 
case, the Civil Rights Appellate Clinic of 
Penn State's Dickinson School of Law-
which Mr. Foreman directs-asked the high 
court for a writ of certiorari to decide on the 
constitutionality of Congress' abrogation of 
states' 11 th Amendment immunity in 
passing the Family and Medical Leave Act. 
Mr. Foreman, who is set to argue the case 
before the Supreme Court, acknowledged 
his momentary shock: The court "only takes 
about 1 percent of the cases presented to it," 
he explained. 
The Coleman case is a test, specifically, of 
the FMLA's self-care provision, the petition 
said, and whether it annuls the states' 
immunity under the U.S. Constitution. 
Under the 11th Amendment, states cannot 
be held liable for damages and suits held by 
individuals unless Congress constitutionally 
rescinds the immunity that the amendment 
provides, Mr. Foreman explained. 
In Coleman, the plaintiff was allegedly 
wrongfully discharged after requesting leave 
from his fonner workplace, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals, under the self-care 
provision of the FMLA for a documented, 
serious health condition, according to court 
papers. 
In passing the FMLA and thus abrogating 
states' immunity, Congress sought to 
eliminate gender discrimination in the 
granting of leave from work, which Mr. 
Foreman and the clinic believe is the basis 
for the act's constitutionality. 
"I have no doubt that this is a difficult case, 
as the Supreme Court only takes difficult 
cases," he said. "However, I think it is a 
very worthy issue, and it's certainly one that 
[the justices] should hear." 
Former senior clinic member Isaac 
Wakefield, a recent graduate of Penn State 
Law who worked on the Coleman petition 
during his time with the clinic, noted that the 
quality of work on the petition and the reach 
"of this particular case are truly testaments 
to the dedication of all of th~ clinic members 
involved and their devotion to advocatil'lg on 
behalf of Mr. [Daniel] Coleman and other 
clients like him." 
Clinic members elected to become involved 
with the proceedings in Coleman after a 
student suggested the case in particular. 
"Our clinic looks for cases in which we 
think important constitutional issues-issues 
that the students may be interested in-are 
addressed," Mr. Foremansaid. 
He noted that the clinic approached the 
Coleman trial counsel during the appeal, 
and the plaintiff s attorneys believed that the 
clinic would be capable of providing 
assistance. 
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Mr. Wakefield highlighted the students' 
participation in and responsibility for the 
cases on Which the clinic opts to work. 
"Professor Foreman runs his clinic as a 
managing partner would a law firm," Mr. 
Wakefield said. "Clinic members are 
responsible for the [final] product and are 
expected to produce well-researched, 
reasoned pieces of work with cogent, well-
written arguments." 
The clinic members "sit down and talk about 
the issues and about the way in which the 
argument should be framed," Mr. Foreman 
said in regard to the process. "The students 
do the research; then, we repeatedly draft 
until we have a petition that we can file with 
the Supreme CQurt." 
According to Mr. Foreman, the strategy over 
the next several months will be to frame the 
argument in such a way that convinces a 
majority of the justices of the clinic's 
position: that the FMLA's self-care 
provision is an appropriate response to 
gender discrimination and, thus, that 
Congress constitutionally abrogated states' 
11 th Amendment immunity when it passed 
the provision. 
"When Congress passes a law that holds a 
state responsible for the owing of money, it 
has to make clear that it is invalidating the 
state's immunity [with the legislation], and 
also, there must be a constitutional reason" 
for the abrogation of the immunity, Mr. 
Foreman said. 
According to the U.S. Department of Labor, 
the FMLA provides that employers grant 
"eligible, covered employees ... up to 12 
weeks of job-protected, unpaid leave during 
any 12 month period" for the following 
conditions: the birth and care of a child; the 
adoption or fostering of a child; the care of 
an immediate . family . member who has a 
serious health condition; or the care of the 
employee's own serious health condition. 
When it passed the FMLA, "Congress was 
dealing with a big-picture case involving 
gender discrimination," Mr. Foreman said. 
"The fourth component of the FMLA, the 
self-care provision, is just part of what 
Congress viewed as the approach to 
[eliminating] gender discrimination" in 
processing employees' requests for leave 
from work. 
Mr. Foreman said he hoped to present the. 
case in December or January. 
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"4th Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Race 
Discrimination Case" 
Baltimore Daily Record 
November 14,2010 
Steve Lash 
A U.S. appeals court has upheld the 
dismissal of an $800,000 race discrimination 
case against the Maryland Judiciary, saying 
the fired worker's conclusory complaint 
failed to allege facts that would indicate an 
unlawful act occuned. 
Daniel Coleman's bias complaint failed to 
rise above the speculative level, the 4th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated. Coleman 
alleged that he was dismissed as executive 
director of procurement and contract 
administration at the Administrative Office 
of the Courts because he is black. 
In 2008, Coleman, through his attorney 
Edward Smith Jr., filed suit in U.S. District 
Court in Baltimore against the Maryland 
Court of Appeals, State Court Administrator 
Frank Broccolina and a co-worker, Lany 
Jones. 
Chief U.S. District Judge Benson E. Legg 
dismissed the case in May 2009, saying the 
complaint was devoid of any facts from . 
which to infer race-based discrimination. 
The 4th Circuit, in upholding Legg's 
decision, noted that Coleman's complaint-
alleging discrimination under Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act-stated he was 
treated differently as a result of his race than 
whites who were similarly situated. But the 
document provides no further information to 
notify the defendants of what the disparate 
treatment was or how it adversely affected 
Coleman, the 4th Circuit stated in its 3-0 
decision last week. 
Here, although Coleman's complaint 
conclusorilyalleges that Coleman was 
terminated based on his race, it does not 
assert facts establishing the plausibility of 
that allegation, Chief Judge William B. 
Traxler Jr. wrote for the appellate court .. 
Absent such support, the complaint's 
allegations of race discrimination do not rise 
above speculation. 
Smith, a solo practitioner in Baltimore, did 
not return telephone messages Friday 
seeking comment on the 4th Circuit's 
decision. 
The Maryland Judiciary, through a 
spokeswoman, declined to comment on the 
decision. . 
Joining Traxler's opmlOn were judges 
Dennis W. Shedd and James C. Dever III. 
Dever, a judge on the U.S. District Comi for 
Eastern NOlih Carolina, was sitting in on the 
case by designation. 
The 4th Circuit's ruling followed the 
Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal. 
In Iqbal, the justices dismissed a Pakistani 
Muslim's claim that then-Attorney General 
John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robeli S. 
Mueller III ordered him detained after the 
Sept. 11, 2001, tenorist attacks because of 
his national origin and religion. The high 
comi said Javaid Iqbal's complaint failed to 
allege sufficient facts to suppOli a claim of 
purposeful and unlawful discrimination. 
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Quoting from the Iqbal decision, the 4th 
Circuit said, Threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. 
Coleman, who was with the Administrative 
Office of the Courts from 2001 to August 
2007, said the illegal discrimination 
occUlTed after he investigated a personnel 
matter in 2005 that involved Jones, a 
member of the procurement and contract 
administration staff. According to the 
complaint, Jones received a five-day 
suspension, but administrator Broccolina 
intervened and Jones received a one-day 
suspenSIOn. 
Broccolina then began to investigate 
Coleman, the complaint stated. 
Coleman said he was fired in August 2007 
because of his race. 
He sought $200,000 in compensatory and 
$600,000 in punitive damages. 
* * * 
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Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC 
10-1195 
Ruling Below: Mims v. Arrow Fin. Services, LLC, 10-12077,2010 WL 4840430 (11th Cir. Nov. 
30,2010) cert. granted, 10-1195,2011 WL 1212225 (U.S. June 27, 2011). 
Petitioner Marcus Minis brought suit against Arrow Financial Services for alleged violations of 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The district court dismissed Mims' claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to an Eleventh Circuit holding that Congress granted state 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over private actions under this Act. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
on appeal. The relevant language of the TCP A is contained in Section 227 and states a person 
"may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring [an action] in an 
appropriate court of that State .... " There is a circuit split on the issue of whether this language 
preserves federal question jurisdiction for claims under the TCP A. 
Question Presented: Did Congress divest the federal district courts of their federal-question 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over private actions brought under the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act? 
Marcus D. MIMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, Defendant-Appellee. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
November 30, 2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] , 
PER CURIAM: 
Marcus Mims appeals the district court's 
dismissal of his complaint against An-ow 
Financial Services, LLC, for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Mims' complaint alleged 
that A11'0W acted in violation of' the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 227. Mims acknowledges that this 
Court has held that federal courts lack 
subject matter jurisdiction over private 
actions under the Act. Mims, however, 
contends that we should reconsider our 
binding precedent in light of two Supreme 
Court decisions and a Seventh Circuit 
decision. 
We held in Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, 
Inc. that "Congress granted state courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over private actions 
under the Act," and therefore "federal courts 
lack subj ect matter jurisdiction [ over] 
private actions under the Act." 136 F.3d 
1287, 1288-89 (11th Cir.1998), modified, 
140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir.l998). We are bound 
by this precedent: 
Mims, in asking this Court to reconsider its 
precedent, points to Grable & Sons Metal 
Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng'g, 545 U.S. 
308, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 
(2005), and Breuer v. Jim's Concrete. of 
Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 123 S.Ct. 1882, 
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155 L.Ed.2d 923 (2003). Neither of those 
cases considered the Act, and neither of 
them explicitly or implicitly overrules our 
precedent. See United States v. Kaley, 579 
F.3d 1246, 1255 ("To constitute an 
ovelTuling ... the Supreme Court decision 
must be clearly on point. ") (citations and 
quotations omitted). Additionally, the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in Brill v. 
CountrYWide Home Loans, Inc.,· 427 F.3d 
446 (7th Cir.2005), does not· overturn our 
precedent. See Kaley, 579 F.3d at 1255 
("We may disregard the holding of a prior 
opinion only where that holding is overruled 
by the Court sitting en bane or by the 
Supreme Court.") (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
Accordingly, the district court properly 
dismissed Mims' complaint for lack of. 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
AFFIRMED. 
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"A Question Worth Answering Under the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act: U.S. Supreme Court to 
Hear Whether the TCP A Contemplates Suits in 
Federal Courts" 
Reed Smith 
July 8, 2011 
Judith L. Harris & Amy S. Mushahwar 
There is no question that Congress 
contemplated a private right of action under 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), and the 
plaintiffs' bar has taken full advantage of 
that right. It has been less clear, however, 
which courts have jurisdiction over such 
suits .. The U.S. Supreme Court recently 
granted certiorari on this very issue in Mims 
v. Arrow Financial Services. 
Background 
Under Section 227 of the TCP A, a person 
"may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or 
rules of court of a State, bring in an 
appropriate court of that State ... " an action 
for a TCPA violation. Id. (emphasis added). 
The statute is silent, however, regarding 
whether, in granting jurisdiction to state 
courts under certain conditions, Congress 
meant to divest U.S. district cOUlis of their 
federal question jurisdiction and bar the 
filing of such suits in federal courts. 
The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have all held that federal 
courts lack federal question jurisdiction over 
TCPA private actions.·See, 
Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. 
Telecommunications Premium Services, 
Ltd., 156 F.3d 432 (2nd Cir. 1998) (holding 
state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
a cause of action created by the TCP A) 
ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 
513 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding Congress 
intended to refer private litigants under the 
TCP A to state court, and to preclude federal 
question jurisdiction) 
International Science & Technology 
Institute, Inc. v. Inacom Communications, 
Inc., 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding 
state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
TCP A private actions) 
Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 
131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding 
Congress granted state courts exclusive 
subject matter jurisdiction over TCPA 
private actions) 
Murphy v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding state courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over a private cause of action 
created by TCP A) 
Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 
F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1998), modified, 140 
F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding Congress 
intended to assign the TCP A private right of 
action to state courts exclusively) 
On the other hand, the· Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits have ruled that federal courts do 
have federal question jurisdiction over 
private TCP A suits. See, 
Charvat v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 630 F3d 
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459 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding federal district 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over 
TCPA private actions) 
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., 427 
F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding state 
courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction 
over TCPA private actions) 
Mims v. Arrow Financial Services 
Enter plaintiff Marcus Mims . . . and, 
ultimately, the u.s. Supreme Court. Mims 
sued in federal court in Florida under the 
TCP A private right of action provision after 
he allegedly received multiple calls to his 
cell phone from a student loan debt collector 
who used an autodialer to place the calls and 
left prerecorded voicemail messages. The 
court, however, decided it lacked federal 
question jurisdiction to hear the case and 
dismissed it. The dismissal was affirmed by 
the Eleventh Circuit. Mims petitioned for 
celiiorari, which the Court granted June 27. 
While in his celi petition Mims discussed 
common grounds for granting certiorari, 
such as the split among the federal circuits 
and the high volume of federal cases that 
have grappled with this jurisdictional issue 
(according to Mims, 19 district court cases 
between 2010 and 2011 alone), he also 
invoked tWo of the Justices' own prior 
opmlOns on TCP A' jurisdiction. Both 
Justices Alito and Sotomayor, before joining 
the Court, had ruled on cases decidIng 
TCP A jurisdiction; Justice Alito had 
actually agreed with Mims' position that 
federal courts should have federal question 
jurisdiction over TCP A private actions. 
ErieNet, Inc., 156 F.3d at 521 (3rd Cir. 
1998) (Alito, J. dissenting). Justice 
Sotomayor authored a Second Circuit 
opinion that concluded that federal courts 
could hear TCP A private actions through 
diversity jurisdiction (where the parties are 
citizens of different states and the amount in 
controversy is greater than $75,000). 
Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335 
(2nd Cir. 2006). 
Mims' petition discusses several other 
problems-from a plaintiffs perspective-
with the majority interpretation of § 
227(b)(3) of the TCPA as divesting federal 
comis of federal question jurisdiction. Mims 
argues that such an approach leaves the state 
courts with great power to interpret federal 
law and to oversee an issue that has national 
scope. Mims' second issue goes back to the 
statutory language of the TCP A. A private 
TCP A action can only be brought in a state 
court if it is "permitted by the laws or rules 
of court of a State." A state could 
theoretically, and several already do, 
prohibit private TCP A actions. 
Mims makes a number of brief arguments as 
to why the majority approach (federal courts 
lack federal question jurisdiction) is legally 
wrong on its merits. These arguments have 
been invoked and dismissed in a number of 
cases that have concluded that federal courts 
lack jurisdiction to heal' TCP A private 
actions. These arguments include: 
• The majority approach ignores the plain 
language of the statute creating federal 
question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The 
TCP A private right of action is a civil action . 
that "aris[ es] under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States." While Mims 
argues that the TCP A is a federally created 
law, and without it there would be no private 
right of action, . Mims fails to' take into 
account that federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction and that Congress can 
limit jurisdiction as it sees fit. 
• The majority approach drew the wrong 
inference when comparing the private right 
of action with the TCPA's grant of authority 
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to the states to sue in federal courts for 
TCP A violations. When a state attorney 
general sues for a TCP A violation, the 
statute explicitly states . that the federal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 227(f)(2), while the same statute says only 
that a private party "may . . . bring [an 
action] in an appropriate court of that State." 
Mims argues the term "may" permissively 
grants state courts jurisdiction and does not 
divest federal question jurisdiction from the 
federal courts. 
• Congress only spoke of state court 
jurisdiction in the private right of action 
section so as not to create the impression 
that only federal courts had jurisdiction over 
private claims. In other words, the statute 
was supposed to make sure state and federal 
courts had concurrent jurisdiction. However, 
state comis generally already have 
concurrent jurisdiction: State courts can hear 
claims arising under federal laws without 
any explicit authorization from Congress. 
Interpreting § 227(b )(3) of the TCP A as 
Mims does would make the statute's 
language redundant. 
Arguments in Mims v. Arrow Financial 
Services will not take place until the 
Supreme Court reconvenes for its 2011 
Term in October. As the petition and grant 
of certiorari highlights, telephonic marketing 
is still on the national agenda. In addition to 
potentially increasing the number of forums 
in which TCP A private actions could be 
brought, the case could also provide a forum 
for the plaintiffs' bar to generate interest 
among consumers in pursuing TCP A claims. 
F or organizations that abide by TCP A 
regulations, examining the impact Mims v. 
Arrow Financial Services could have on 
your business could be worth the time. 
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Williams v. Maryland 
10-1207 
Ruling Below: Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479 (2011). 
In 2007, an officer with the Prince George's County Police Department observed petitioner 
Charles F. Williams going through a backpack and placing something from the backpack into the 
bushes. When the officer questioned Williams, he revealed he had placed a gun in the bushes. 
Williams was charged with violating a Maryland law that requires a permit to wear, carry, or 
transport a handgun outside of one's home. 
At a bench trial, the defense put forth that Williams purchased the gun for self-defense and had 
completed the Maryland State Police application required for firearm purchase. Williams Claims 
he was transporting the gun from his girlfriend's home to his own. Williams had never applied 
for a carry permit. 
Williams was found guilty of violating Maryland's carry law and unsuccessfully appealed his 
conviction. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held the carry law satisfied the Second 
Amendment because it did not restrict wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm in the home. 
Williams continued to assert on appeal before Maryland Court of Appeals that the carry law 
violates his Second Amendment rights in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in District of 
Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed 
Williams' conviction finding language in those opinions that. could be read as an extension of the 
Supreme Court's decision beyond home possession to be dicta and thus inapposite to carry laws. 
Question Presented: Whether the right to carry or transport a registered handgun outside the 
home without a carry permit is protected by the Second Amendment. 
Charles Francis WILLIAMS, Jr. 
v. 
STATE of Maryland. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
January 05,2011 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
BATTAGLIA, J. 
In this case, we enter into the constitutional 
fray involving the scope of the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms, recently 
explored by the Supreme Court in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 
2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, -U.S. --
,130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). 
Petitioner, Charles F. Williams, Jr., seeks to 
oveliurn his conviction in the Circuit Court 
for Prince George's County for unlawful 
possession of a handgun, pursuant to Section 
4-203(a)(1)(i) of the Criminal Law Article, 
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Maryland Code· (2002), asserting that 
Maryland's regulatory scheme for handguns 
violates his right to "keep and carry arms" 
under the Second Amendment. The Court of 
Special . Appeals affirmed Williams' 
conviction, in a reported opinion, Williams 
v. State, 188 Md.App. 691, 982 A.2d 1168 
(2009), and we granted certiorari, Williams 
v. State, 412 Md. 495, 988 A.2d 1008 
(2010), to answer the following question: 
Are Md.Code Ann. Criminal Law § 4-203, 
Public Safety §§ 5-301, et seq., and 
COMAR 29.03.02.04 unconstitutional m 
light of Heller v. District of Columbia? 
We shall hold that Section 4-203(a)(1)(i) of 
the Criminal Law Article, which prohibits 
wearing, carrying, or transporting a 
handgun, without a permit and outside of 
one's home, is outside of the scope of the 
Second Amendment. We also shall hold 
that, because Williams failed to apply for a 
permit to wear, carry, or transport a 
handgun, he lacks standing to challenge 
Section 5-301 et seq. of the Public Safety 
Article, Maryland Code (2003), as well as 
COMAR 29.03.02.04. As a result, 
Williams's conviction will stand. 
During a bench trial before the Honorable 
Sean D. Wallace, the State presented the 
following facts, describing a police officer's 
encounter with Williams near a bus stop: . 
The facts, as stipulated, had the 
matter gone to trial, the facts would 
show that on· October 1, 2007, at 
approximately 5 :00 p.m., Officer 
Molake with the Prince George's 
County Police Department, was in 
the area of the Baltimore-
Washington Parkway and Landover 
Road in Prince George's County, 
Maryland, and as he was driving in 
that area, he observed the defendant 
going through a backpack near a 
wooded area nearby the cross area, 
and at one time, as the officer turned 
his cruiser around, he observed the 
defendant tum and place something 
in the brush area as if he was hiding 
something~ 
Officer Molake made contact with 
the defendant, who he would identify 
as the gentleman seated to the left 
with the green shirt and asked him 
what he was doing. The defendant 
told him he was going through the 
backpack to see what was in it. He 
then asked the defendant what he 
went and hid in the bushes, and the 
defendant hesitated and then stated 
"my gun." 
The facts described the police officer's 
recovery of Williams's handgun. and 
Williams's stat~ment to police: 
Officer Molake then recovered an 
Austria [sic] made, black Glock 
handgun with 15 rounds in the 
magazine in the brush area where he 
saw the defendant go. 
. The defendant gave a written 
statement ·after being given his 
Miranda rights by Officer Santa 
Cruz, admitting to possession of the 
gun and placing the gl(n in the bush 
area where the officer subsequently 
located it. 
The handgun test-fired as positive. 
The facts provided the following, regarding 
Williams's purchase of the handgun, 
apparently for "self-defense": 
The defense would have provided 
evidence by way of documents that 
would show that the defendant 
purchased the handgun in Realco at 
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6108 Marlboro Pike in Forestville, 
Maryland, on August 15 of 2007, , 
and that would be shown through 
Exhibit 1. Paid the balance that was 
due on that handgun on September 
14, 2007, which will be shown in 
Exhibit 2; that the defense would 
have provided evidence that the 
defendant completed the Maryland 
State Police application and affidavit 
to ,purchase a regulated firearm 
application, which is a total of three 
pages, on August 15, 2007, which 
will be shown in Exhibit 3. He 
received the certificate of 
completion, which is shown in 
Exhibits 4 and 5, on August 15, 
2007. 
The defendant would have testified 
that he purchased the handgun for 
self-defense, and that on the date of 
this arrest, he had just left the 
handgun at his girlfriend's house, 
place of residence. When he got off 
work, he went to her residence and 
picked up that handgun and was en 
route to his home when the arrest 
occurred behind the bus stop. 
The defendant was again given 
Miranda rights and gave a written 
statement that will be shown in the 
State's Exhibits Number 3 and 4. 
Judge Wallace found Williams guilty of 
wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun 
in violation of Section 4-203(a)(1)(i) and 
sentenced him to three years' incarceration, 
with two years suspended. The Court of 
, Special Appeals affirmed, determining that 
the Second Amendment is not applicable to 
the States, 5 and that, were the Second 
5 The Circuit Court's decision and the Court of 
Special Appeals's opinion in the present case were 
rendered prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, - U.S. --, 130 
Amendment to apply to Maryland, "it would 
. not invalidate the statute at issue here," 
because Section 4-203(b)(6) expressly 
permits wearing, carrying, or transporting a 
handgun in one's residence, thereby 
preserving the right "to keep and bear arms 
in the home for the purpose of immediate 
self-defense." Williams, 188 Md.App. at 
699,982 A.2d at 1172. 
Before us, as he did in the Circuit Court in a 
"Motion to Dismiss Indictment," and in his 
brief before the Court of Special Appeals, 
Williams asserts that the prohibition in 
Section 4-203(a) against wearing, carrying, 
or transpOliing a handgun without a permit 
and outside of one's home, infringes upon 
his Second Amendment right "to keep and 
bear arms." He contends that the Supreme 
Court opinions in Heller and McDonald 
make clear that the Second Amendment 
establishes a general "right of persons to 
keep and bear arms for lawful purposes." 
The State counters that the opinions in 
Heller and McDonald together stand for the 
proposition that, pursuant to the Second 
Amendment, . "states may not generally 
prohibit the possession of a handgun in the 
home for the purpose of self-defense, but 
remain free to enact reasonable restrictions 
on the possession and use of firearms." The 
State contends that the statutory scheme 
embodied in Section 4-203 is eminently 
reasonable, because Section 4-203(b)(6) 
expressly permits wearing, carrying, or 
transporting a handgun in the home. 
We begin by exploring the dictates of 
Section· 4-203(a) of the Criminal Law 
Article, which contains a prohibition against 
wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun 
in public, "whether concealed or open": 
S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), which made the 
Second Amendment applicable to the States via the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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(a) Prohibited.-(l) Except as 
provided in subsection (b) of this 
section, a person may not: 
(i) wear, calTy, or transport a 
handgun, whether concealed or open, 
on or about the person; or 
(ii) wear, calTy, or knowingly 
transport a handgun, whether 
concealed or open, in a vehicle 
traveling on a road or parking lot 
generally used by the public, 
highway, waterway, or airway of the 
State. 
The exceptions to the prohibition, contained 
in Section 4-203(b), are many: 
(b) Exceptions.-This section does 
not prohibit: 
* * * 
(2) the wearing, calTying, or 
transporting of a handgun by a 
person to whom a pelTllit to wear, 
calTy, or transport the handgun has 
been issued under [§§ 5-301-5-314 
of the Public Safe~y Article, . 
Maryland Code (2003)]; 
* * * 
(6) the wearing, calTying, or 
transporting of a handgun by a 
person on real estate that the person 
owns or leases or where the person 
resides or within the confines of a 
business establishment that the 
person owns or leases; 
* * * 
.Here, the relevant exceptions are Section 4-
203(b )(2), involving a pelTllit to wear, calTy, 
or transport a handgun in public, as well as 
Section 4-203(b)(6), permitting the wearing, 
calTying, or transporting of a handgun in 
one's residence. What is notable in the 
present case is that Williams did not apply 
for a pelTllit. 6 Moreover, at the time of his 
alTest, he was not wearing, calTying, or 
transporting a handgun in his residence, as 
pelTllitted by the statute. 
Williams, nevertheless, principally relies 
upon the Supreme Court's opinions in 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 570, 128 S.Ct. at 2783, 
171 L.Ed.2d at 637, and McDonald, -
U.S. at--, 130 S.Ct.at 3020,177 L.Ed.2d 
at 894, in asserting that the Second 
Amendment establishes a general "right of 
persons to keep and bear arms for lawful 
purposes." In Heller, Mr. Heller had applied 
for and was denied a "registration 
certificate" to possess a handgun in his 
home, pursuant to the District of Columbia's 
gun control scheme. Section 7-2502.01(a) of 
the D.C.Code (2001) prohibited 
"possess [ion] or control" of any firearm, 
without a "valid registration certificate": 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in 
this unit, no person or organization 
In the District of Columbia 
("District") shall receive, possess, 
control, transfer, offer for sale, sell, 
give, or deliver any destructive 
6 Williams argues, in this regard, that Sections 5-301 
et seq. of the Public Safety Article, Maryland Code 
(2003), as well as Title 29, subtitle 3 of the Code of 
Maryland Regulations, together governing handgun 
permitting, impose an impermissible burden on 
citizens seeking to exercise the right to "keep and 
carry a handgun.'; Williams acknowledges that he has 
"not filed an· application for a permit to carry a 
handgun," but asserts that as a result of the regulatory 
scheme, "any such application would have been 
denied." The State counters that nearly 93 percent of 
handgun permit applicants from 2006 to 2009 were 
issued permits. Nevertheless, because Williams failed 
to file an application for a permit to carry a handgun, 
he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
Sections 5-301 et seq. of the Public Safety Article, as 
well as Title 29, subtitle 3 of the Code of Maryland 
Regulations. 
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device, and no person or 
organization in the District shall 
possess or control any firearm, 
unless the person or organization 
holds a valid registration certificate 
for the firearm. 
Section 7-2502.02(a)(4) 
(2001) prohibited the 
handguns, without an 
possession in one's home: 
of the D.C.Code 
registration of 
exception for 
(a) A registration certificate shall not be 
issued for a: 
(1 ) Sawed-off shotgun; 
(2) Machine gun; 
(3) Short-barreled rifle; or 
(4) Pistol not validly registered to the 
cunent registrant in the District prior 
to September 24, 1976, except that 
the provisions of this section shall 
not apply to any organization that 
employs at least 1 commissioned 
special, police officer or other 
employee licensed to carry a firearm 
and that arms the employee with a 
firearm during the employee's duty 
hours or to a police officer who has 
retired from the Metropolitan Police 
Department. 
Section 7-2507.02 of the D.C.Code (2001) 
mandated that any other firearm within 
one's home be kept "unloaded and 
disasse~bled or bound'by a trigger lock": 
Except for law enforcement 
personnel described in § 7-
2502.01(b)(1), each registrant shall 
keep any firearm in his possession 
unloaded and disassembled or bound 
by a trigger lock or similar device 
unless such fireaim is kept at his 
place of business, or while being 
used for lawful recreational purposes 
within the District of Columbia. 
Sections 22-4504(a) and 22-4515 of the 
D.C.Code (2001) made carrying an 
unlicenced pistol in one's home or on one's 
land a misdemeanor. Section 22-4504(a) 
stated, in relevant part: 
(a) No person shall carry within the 
District of Columbia either openly or 
concealed on or about their person, a 
pistol, without a license . issued 
pursuant to District of Columbia law, 
or any deadly or dangerous weapon 
capable of being so concealed. 
Whoever violates this section shall 
be punished as provided in § 22-
4515 .... 
Section 22-4515. of the D.C.Code (2001) in 
tum, stated: 
Any violation of any provision of 
this chapter for which no penalty is 
specifically provided shall be 
punished by a fine of not more· than 
$1,000 or imprisonment for not more 
than 1 year, or both. 
Mr. Heller filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of 
Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief from the denial of his application for a 
'(registration certificate" to possess a 
handgun in his home, the licensing 
requirement insofar as it prohibited the 
carrying of a handgun in the home, and the 
trigger-lock requirement insofar as it 
prohibited the possession of "functional 
firemms" in the home. The District Court 
dismissed the complaint, and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed, reasoning ~hat· 
the Second Amendment precluded the 
District from "flatly banE ning] the keeping 
of a handgun in the home." The Supreme 
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Court granted the District's petition for a 
writ of certiorari, presenting the following 
question: 
Whether the following provisions-· 
D.C.Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-
4504(a), and 7-2507.02-violate the 
Second Amendment rights of 
individuals who are not affiliated 
with any state-regulated militia,but 
who wish to keep handguns and 
other firearms for private use in their 
homes? 
Before the Court, the District argued that the 
Second Amendment protects "only militia-
related firearm rights." Alternatively, the 
District contended that prohibiting handgun 
possession in the home was reasonable, 
because residents were permitted to possess 
shotguns and rifles, albeit unloaded or 
bound by a trigger lock. Mr. Heller 
countered that. the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to possess a 
firearm for "traditionally lawful purposes, 
such as self-defense within the home." 
Embracing an original meaning· approach, 
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, 
interpreted the language of the Second 
Amendment as conferring an individual 
right "to keep and bear AnTIs." The Court 
considered the substance of that individual 
right as "simply a common way of referring 
to possessing arms, for militiamen and 
ev~ryone else." Similarly, the phrase "bear 
Alms," reasoned the Court, referred to the 
"carrying of weapons," both in an organized 
militia and for other purposes, such as self-
defense. The COUli concluded that 
"preserving the militia" was not the only 
aim of the Second Amendment, as the 
founders "most undoubtedly thought it even 
more important for self-defense and 
hunting." This right "to keep and bear 
Arms," however, has limitations: 
Like most rights, the right secured by 
the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited. From Blackstone through 
19th century cases, commentators 
and courts routinely explained that 
the right was not a right to keep and 
carry any weapon whatsoever in any 
manner whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose. For example, the majority 
of the 19th-century courts to 
consider the question held that 
prohibitions on carrying concealed 
weapons w~re lawful under the 
Second Amendment or state 
analogues. Although we do not 
undertake an exhaustive historical 
analysis today of the full scope of the 
Second Amendment, nothing in our 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding 
the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale 
. of arms. 
Id. at 626-27, 128 S.Ct. at 2816-17, 171 
L.Ed.2d at 678 (internal citations omitted). 
In declaring Sections 7-2502.02(a)(4) 
(prohibiting the registration of handguns, 
without a home exception) and 22-4504(a) 
(prohibiting carrying a handgun within one's 
home, without a license) unconstitutional, 
the Court emphasized that handguns were 
"overwhelmingly chosen by American 
society" for self-defense and determined that 
under any standard of scrutiny, "bamling 
from the home the most preferred firearm in 
the nation to keep and use for protection of 
one's home and family, would fail 
constitutional muster." The District's 
trigger-lock requirement, contained in 
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Section 7-2507.02, did not fare any better, 
according to the Court, because the 
provision "ma[ de] it impossible for citizens 
to use [firearms] for the core lawful purpose 
of self-defense" within the home. Therefore, 
the prohibition against handguns, even 
within one's home, as well as the trigger-
lock requirement for all firearms kept within 
the home, were declared unconstitutional. 
Shortly thereafter, in McDonald, _. U.S. at 
--, 130 S.Ct. at 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d at 894, 
the Supreme Court was asked to consider 
whether the Second Amendment applied to 
the States. In that case, Otis McDonald, 
Adam Orlov, Colleen Lawson, and David 
Lawson filed a complaint in .the United 
States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that several Chicago ordinances 
violated the Second and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The Chicago residents alleged 
that the City had denied their applications to 
register handguns for possession in the 
home, in violation of the Constitution. In a 
related lawsuit, the National Rifle 
Association and two residents of Oak Park, a 
Chicago suburb, filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, seeking a declaration that 
several Oak Park ordinances were invalid 
pursuant· to the Second and Fourteenth 
Amendments. That complaint alleged that, 
but for the gun control laws, the individual 
plaintiffs would keep handguns in their 
homes for self-defense. 
The statutes at issue were "similar to the 
District of Columbia's," according to the 
Court. Section 8-20-040(a) of the Chicago, 
Illinois Code prohibited possession of a 
firearm unless registered, while Section 8-
20-050( c) provided that "[ n]o registration 
-certificate shall be issued for any of the 
following· types of firearms . . . (c) 
Handguns." The only non-governmental 
exception to the prohibition against 
handguns was for "[t]hose validly registered 
to a current owner in the City of Chicago 
prior to [1982]." Section 27-2-1 of the Oak 
Park, Illinois Code also provided that "[i]t 
shall be unlawful for any person to possess 
or carry, or for any person to permit another 
to possess or carryon hislher land or in 
hislher place of business any firearm." 
Section 27-1-1, in tum, defined "firearms" 
as "pistols, revolvers, guns and small arms 
of a size and character that may be 
concealed on or about the person, commonly 
known as handguns." 
The district court judge entered judgment on 
the pleadings for both inunicipalities. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the 
Supreme Court had never considered 
whether the Second Amendment should be 
applied to the States through the . Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In reversing, the Supreme Court determined 
that the Second Amendment right to keep 
and bear arms "is fundamental to our 
scheme of ordered liberty," and as a result, 
the Due Process Clause rendered it 
applicable to the States. The Court 
characterized Heller as safeguarding an 
individual right of "self-defense," when 
home possession was in issue, but, 
nevertheless, reiterated that regulatory 
schemes prohibiting handgun ownership by 
dangerous individuals, or prohibiting 
wearing, carrying, or transpOliing handguns 
in various public places outside of the home, 
were permissible:-
We made it clear in Heller that our 
holding did not cast doubt on such 
longstanding regulatory measures as 
"prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally 
ill," "laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as 
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schools and government buildings, 
or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale 
of arms." 
fd. at --, 130 S.Ct. at 3047, 177 L.Ed.2d 
at 926, quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27, 
128 S.Ct. at 2817, 171 L.Ed.2d at 678. 
In the present case, Section 4-203(a)(I)(i) of 
which Williams was convicted, prohibits 
"wear[ing], carry [ing], or transport[ing] a 
handgun, whether concealed or open, on or 
about the person," in public, without a 
permit. Here, sufficient evidence was 
adduced to demonstrate that Williams was 
wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun 
in public, and Williams had conceded that 
he had not obtained, or even applied for, a 
permit. 
Williams, however, attempts to bring his 
conviction of wearing, carrying, or 
transporting a handgun in public, without a 
permit, within the ambit of Heller and 
McDonald by claiming that those opinions 
would prohibit his conviction. This is not the 
case, because Heller and McDonald 
emphasize that the Second Amendment is 
applicable to statutory prohibitions against 
home possession, the dicta in McDonald that 
"the Second Amendment protects a personal 
right to keep and bear arms for lawful 
purposes, most notably for self-defense 
within the home," notwithstanding. 
Although Williams attempts to find succor 
in this dicta, it is clear that prohibition of 
firearms in the home was the gravamen of 
the certiorari questions in both Heller and 
McDonald and their answers. If the Supreme 
Court, in this dict~, meant its holding to 
extend beyond home possession, it will need 
to say so more plainly. 
Williams was . convicted of wearing, 
carrying, or transporting a handgun in 
public, rather than for possession of a 
handgun in his home, for which he could not 
be prosecuted under Section 4-203(b)(6). It 
is the exception permitting home possession 
in Section 4-203(b)(6) that takes the 
statutory scheme embodied in Section 4-203 
outside of the scope of the Second 
Amendment, as miiculated in Heller f.md 
McDonald. Section 4-203(b)(6) clearly 
permits wearing, carrying, or transporting a 
handgun "by a person on real estate that the 
person owns or leases or where the person 
resides," without registering or obtaining a 
permit, wholly consistent with Heller's 
. proviso that handguns are "the most 
preferred firearm in the nation to keep and 
use for protection of one's home and 
family." 
In affirming Williams' conviction, we find 
persuasive opinions from other courts, 
addressing analogous situations, in which a 
defendant was convicted pursuant to a 
statute prohibiting public possession of a 
firearm, while providing an exception for 
possession within the home. For example, in 
People v. Dawson, 403 I11.App.3d 499, 343 
Ill.Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d 598 (2010), 
Dawson had been found guilty· of three 
counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm 
and two counts of aggravated unlawful use 
of a weapon in connection with the 
attempted murder of Mario Brantley.· 
Dawson argued that his convictions under 
the Illinois aggravated unlawful use of a 
weapon statute should be reversed, because 
the measure violated the Second 
. Amendment. The Illinois aggravated 
unlawful use of a weapon statute under 
which Dawson· was convicted mirrors 
Maryland's Section 4-203 and relevantly 
provides: 
"(a) A person commits the offense of 
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon 
when he or she knowingly: 
(1) Carries· on or about his or her 
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person or in any vehicle or concealed 
on or about his or her person except 
when on his or her land or in his or 
her abode or fixed place of business 
any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser 
or other firearm; 
* * * 
[and] 
* * * 
(3) One of the following factors is 
present: 
(A) the firearm possessed was 
uncased, loaded and immediately 
accessible at the time of the· 
offense[.]" 
Id., 343 Ill.Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d at 604, 
quoting 720 ILCS S/24-1.6(a)(l), (a)(3)(A) 
(West 2006) (alteration In original) 
(emphasis added). 
The Illinois intermediate appellate court 
affirmed Dawson's conviction, reasoning 
that· in Heller, the. Supreme Court 
"ultimately limited its holding to the 
question presented-that the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms protected the 
right to possess a commonly used firearm, a 
handgun, in the home. for self-defense 
purposes." The court further emphasized 
that, in· McDonald, the Supreme Court 
addressed "the limited question of whether a 
ban on the possession of a handgun in the 
home violated the Second Amendment right 
to bear arms." The court concluded that the 
statute under which Dawson was convicted 
was constitutional, because it specifically 
permitted possession of a firearm within 
one's home. 
In Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096 
(D.C. 2010), Little was convicted by a jury 
of one count of carrying a pistol without a 
license, one count of possession of an 
unregistered firearm, and one count of 
unlawful possession of ammunition, as a 
result of his involvement in an attempted 
robbery. Little argued that his convictions 
must be reversed in light of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Heller, because the 
statutes "functioned as a total ban on 
handguns." The District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals rejected that argument and 
affirmed Little's conviction, reasoning that 
in Heller, "the issue was the 
constitutionality of the District of 
Columbia's ban on 'the possession of usable 
handguns in the home, '" and Little had 
conceded that he was outside of his home. 
In People v. YarbiAough, 169 Cal.App.4th. 
303, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 674 (Cal.Ct.App.2008), 
Yarbrough was arrested and convicted of 
carrying a concealed weapon in public, in 
violation of a California statute, which 
provided: 
A person is guilty of carrying a . 
concealed firearm when he or she 
does any of the following: 
(1) Carries concealed within any 
vehicle which is under his or her 
control or direction any pistol, 
revolver, or other firearm capable of 
being concealed on the person. 
(2) Carries concealed upon his or her 
person any pistol, revolver, or other 
firearm capable of being concealed 
upon the person. 
(3) Causes to be carried concealed 
within any vehicle in which he or she 
is an occupant any pistol, revolver, 
or other firearm capable of being 
concealed upon the person. 
Id. at 313 n. 5, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 674, quoting· 
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Section 1202S(a) of the California Penal 
Code. 
The California intermediate appellate court 
noted that a separate measure provided an 
exception for· possession of concealed 
weapons "anywhere within the citizen's or 
legal resident's place of residence, place of 
business, or on. private property owned or 
lawfully possessed by the citizen or legal 
resident." Although Yarbrough argued that 
the concealed weapons statute was 
unconstitutional in light of Heller, the court 
rejected that argument and affirmed his 
conviction,. reasoning that in Heller, the 
Supreme Court considered a narrow 
question, namely whether "the District's ban 
on handgun· possession in the horne 
violate[d] the Second Amendment." The 
court concluded that, "[ u ]nlike possession of. 
a gun for protection within a residence, 
carrying a concealed firearm presents a 
recognized threat to public order, and is 
prohibited as a means of preventing physical 
hann to persons other than the offender." . 
As a result, we affirm Williams' conviction 
of wearing, carrying, or transporting a 
handgun in violation of Section 4-
203(a)(1)(i) of the Criminal Law Article. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS 
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT 
. OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY 
PETITIONER. 
MURPHY, J., concurs. 
MURPHY, J., concurring. 
While I agree with the majority that the 
Petitioner's conviction should be affirmed I . , 
would not hold that the Petitioner's conduct 
is "outside of the scope of the Second 
Amendment." I would affirm on the ground 
that, . although the Second Amendment is 
applicable to an "on the street" possession of 
a handgun, that Amendment is satisfied by a 
statute that places reasonable restrictions on 
the constitutional right to bear arms. 
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"Cert. Petition in Right to Carry Case" 
The Volokh Conspiracy 
April 22, 2011 
David Kopel 
Filed earlier this week by Stephen Halbrook, 
in the case of Williams v. Maryland. In 
short, Maryland bans all . handgun 
transportation or carry without a pennit, and 
has a pennitting process which formally 
declares that it will deny pennits to almost 
everyone. As the petition explains, "the 
Maryland State Police, the Maryland 
Handgun Pennit Review Board, and the 
Maryland courts have consistently 
interpreted these provlSlons [state 
regulations] to require the applicant to 
document, typically with police reports, that 
he or she has been the victim of assaults, 
threats, or robberies, except for applications 
involving certain occupations." 
Williams was peaceably transporting his 
handgun from his girlfriend's home to his 
own home. He has been convicted, and 
sentenced to a year in prison. The state's 
highest court, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals, rejected Williams' Second 
Amendment challenge, because, supposedly, 
the Heller and McDonald affinnations of a 
general right to carry handguns (except in 
"sensitive places") is mere dicta which the 
Maryland court will not follow unless a 
future U.S. Supreme Court. cases formally 
announces "we meant what we already 
said." 
As Halbrook points out, "When the Framers 
intended that a provision of the Bill of 
Rights related to a house, they said so. [3d 
and 4th amendments.] They did not 
recognize a limited right to keep and bear 
anns only in one's house. Despite this plain 
textual reference prohibiting infringement 
on the right to 'bear arms,' the Maryland 
court argued that the right need not be 
recognized at all because this Court has not 
decided cases directly on point. 'But general 
statements of the law are not inherently 
incapable of giving fair and clear warning .. 
.' United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 
(1997).1 [note 2:] 'The easiest cases don't 
even arise. There has never been . . . a 
section 1983 case accusing welfare officials 
of selling foster children into slavery; it does 
not follow that if such a case arose, the 
officials would be· immune from damages 
[or criminal] liability.' Id." 
Further, Heller's right to carry language is 
not dicta, according to McDonald: "our 
central holding in Heller: that the Second 
Amendment protects a personal right to keep 
and bear arms for lawful purposes, most 
notably for self-defense within the home." 
As· Halbrook points out, this inescapably 
"implies a right to bear arms outside the 
home (even if not quite as 'notably' as in the 
home)." 
Williams had not applied for a pennit, which 
would. have been futile in light of 
Maryland's established policy of permit 
denials. The Maryland Court of Appeals 
held the Williams therefore lacked standing 
to challenge the statute. Halbrook responds: 
This is completely unfounded given 
Petitioner's . criminal conviction. 
Under this Court's precedents, it is 
not a requirement for standing to 
challenge an allegedly 
unconstitutional permit requirement 
that one must apply for the pennit 
and be denied. A long line of cases 
have invalidated pennit requirements 
to exercise First Amendment rights 
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in which the defendants who were 
convicted did not apply for permits. 
One of the more recent cases is 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of 
New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 
536 U.S. .150, 156 (2002) 
(invalidating permit requirement 
even though "Petitioners did not 
apply fora permit. "). 
even if there were some general 
requirement for Petitioner to submit 
an application in order to challenge 
the permit statute, that requirement 
would be eliminated here under the 
doctrine of futility. This court has 
made it clear in various contexts that 
litigants are not required to perform a 
futile act. See, 
e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 625-26 (2001) (where 
limitations imposed by wetland 
regulations were clear, and there was 
no indication 
that kind of use sought by landowner 
would have been allowed, court did 
not require submission of "futile 
applications" with other agencies); 
* * * 
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"Maryland Handgun Laws Ruled Outside 
Scope of Second Amendment" 
. The Daily Record 
January 5, 2011 
. Danny Jacobs 
Maryland's law restricting gun possession 
outside the home without a permit does not 
conflict with recent Supreme Court rulings 
that the constitutional right to keep and bear 
arms extends to individuals, Maryland's 
highest court held Wednesday. 
The Court of Appeals unanimously upheld 
the 2008 conviction of Charles Francis 
Williams Jr., who bought his handgun 
legally but was arrested outside his home for 
violating a state provision on carriage and 
transport. Williams challenged his 
conviction based on District of Columbia v. 
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
Supreme Court decisions from 2008 and last 
year, respectively, that extended Second 
Amendment rights to individuals and to the 
states. 
Judge Lynne A. Battaglia, writing for a 
unanimous court, sided with the state, noting 
other state courts have reached similar 
conclusions in Cases involving their handgun 
laws. The Maryland case is Charles F. 
Williams Jr. v. State, No. 16, Sept. Term, 
2010. 
"It is the exception permitting home 
possession . . . that takes the statutory 
scheme embodied in Section 4-203 outside 
of the scope of the Second Amendment, as 
articulated in· Heller and McDonald," 
Battaglia wrote. 
Attorney General Douglas F. Gansler, who 
argued the case on behalf of the state, said 
the issue before the Maryland court was 
straightforward. 
"The question was purely a legal one," he 
said. "It was not that complicated of a case." 
James B. Hopewell, Williams' lawyer, was 
disappointed by the opinion. 
"We believe the law strongly supported our 
position," said Hopewell, a Riverdale solo 
practitioner. "My client should not be 
prosecuted and criminalized for something 
that is not a crime." 
Williams bought his handgun legally from a 
licensed dealer in August 2007 but had not 
applied for a permit, according to the 
opinion. He had no prior criminal record, 
Hopewell said. 
Two months later, a Prince George's County 
police officer saw Williams searching a 
backpack near the woods, according to the 
opinion. Williams told the officer he had 
hidden his gun in the bushes, and he was 
arrested for unlawful gun possession. 
Williams was convicted in October 2008 
and sentenced to three years in prison with 
. all but one year suspended. His sentence had 
been on hold while his appeals were being 
heard, although Hopewell said Wednesday 
he did not know when Williams would 
begin serving time. 
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed 
Williams' conviction in October 2009. 
Battaglia dismissed Williams' claim that 
McDonald extends Second Amendment 
rights outside the home. Justice Samuel A. 
Alito Jr. wrote for the Supreme Court that 
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the Second Amendment protects "most 
notably" self-defense within the home, a 
point Hopewell seized on in oral arguments. 
"Although Williams attempts to find succor 
in this dicta, it is clear that prohibition of 
firearms in the home was the gravamen of 
the certiorari questions in both Heller and 
McDonald and their answers," the judge 
wrote. "If the Supreme Court, in this dicta, 
meant its holding to extend beyond home 
possession, it will need to say so more 
plainly." 
Said Hopewell: "It sOrt of seemed they were 
trying to kick this case up to the Supreme 
Court." 
Gansler disagreed, but said he would not be 
surprised if future cases before the Supreme 
Court challenge local and state gun laws. 
"I think there will be other cases coming 
down the road regarding the scope of the 
Second Amendment," he said. 
Judge Joseph F. Murphy, in a concurring 
opinion, Objected to Battaglia using the 
. phrase "outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment," writing that the Second 
Amendment is "'satisfied' by a statute that 
places reasonable restrictions on the 
constitutional right to bear arms." 
* * * 
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"Highest Court of Maryland Holds That Second 
Amendment Does Not Protect Carrying (Concealed 
or Not) of Guns Outside the Home" 
The Volokh Conspiracy 
January 5, 2011 
Eugene Volokh 
Here's the opinion, handed down today, in 
Williams v. State. The court interprets 
Heller and McDonald as focused on home 
possession of guns, arguing that "it is clear 
that prohibition of firearms in the home was 
the gravamen of the certiorari questions in 
both Heller and McDonald and their 
answers. If the Supreme Court, in this dicta, 
meant its holding to extend beyond home 
posseSSIOn, it will need to say so more 
plainly." 
I don't think this analysis is right. First, 
Heller's reasoning-whic1;l, even to the 
extent it goes outside the questions 
presented in the cases, ought to be taken 
seriously-strongly suggests that the Second 
Amendment does apply to carrying guns in 
public as well as to possessing in the home. 
Here's an excerpt from my discussion of the 
matter, in my Implementing the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms in Self-Defense article: 
Heller stated that bans on concealed 
carry of firearms are so traditionally 
recognized that they must be seen as 
constitutionally pelmissible .... 
The SaIne cannot, however, be said 
about general bans on carrying 
firearms in public, which prohibit 
open as well as concealed carrying. 
Heller expressly concluded that "the 
right to . . . bear arms" referred to 
carrying arms. . . . [M]any courts 
applying state constitutional [right to 
bear alms] provisions have held or 
suggested that carrying in public is 
generally constitutionally protected, 
though some courts have disagreed. 
Such protection, of course, makes 
sense when the right is (at least in 
part) a right to keep and bear alms in 
self-defense: Often, people need to 
defend themselves against robbers, 
rapists, and killers outside and not 
just in the home. Two-thirds of all 
rapes and sexual assaults, for 
instance, happen outside the victim's 
home, and half happen outside 
anyone's home. The percentages are 
even greater for robberies and 
assaults~ So a ban on carrying 
weapons outside the home-
especially in places that one 
practically needs to frequent, such as 
the streets on the way to work or to 
buy groceries-is a serious burden 
on the right, more so than the ban on 
handgun possession struck down in 
Heller (which would have at least 
left open some possibility of self-
defense with shotguns or rifles). 
I should have also noted that Heller's 
dictum accepting-as traditionally 
recogmzmg restrictions on Second 
Amendment rights-"laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings" 
strongly suggests that laws forbidding the 
carrying of fire alms in other places do 
implicate the Second Amendment. 
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Second, even if Heller is read as simply 
holding that the Second Amendment 
protects home possession of guns, this 
simply means that whether the Second 
Amendment protects gun carrying is an open 
question. It seems to me that the court 
should have given a reasoned answer to that 
question; and it seems to me this court didn't 
do that, other than by discussing some cases 
from other jurisdictions, which also didn't 
offer a reasoned answer to that question. In 
our constitutional 'system, the definition of 
the scope of constitutional rights is not left 
simply to the Supreme Court. Lower courts 
may and must consider arguments for 
recognizing that a particular constitutional 
right makes unconstitutional a particular 
law, even if the Supreme Court has not yet 
so held (un1es$ the Supreme Court has held 
the contrary, which it certainly hasn't as to 
this issue). . 
The defendant is arguing that the right to 
"bear arms" includes carrying arms in 
public. Heller at least makes clear that this IS 
a plausible position, even if that question 
was beyond the scope of the particular 
challenge involved in that case. (See D. C. v. 
Heller, starting with the text "At the time of 
the founding, as now, to 'bear' meant to 
'carry."') Why shouldn't this position be 
accepted? The Maryland court decision does 
not, it seems to me, offer an answer to that 
question. 
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Ruling Below: United Statesv. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011). 
On June 5, 2008, Sean Masciandaro was found by a police officer sleeping in his vehicle which 
was illegally parked on national park property. As the Masciandaro was presenting the officer 
with his license and registration, the officer observed a machete-type knife under the driver's 
seat. This prompted the officer to ask Masciandaro if there were any more weapons in the 
vehicle. Masciandaro informed the officer a bag in the vehicle contained a loaded handgun for 
which he had an expired Virginia concealed carry permit. 
A magistrate judge found Masciandaro guilty on a charge of illegally carryirig a loaded handgun 
in a motor vehicle on national parkproperty. The district court upheld Masciandaro's conviction, 
rejecting his facial challenge to the applicable law on the basis of the Second Amendment and 
declining to determine a level of scrutiny to apply to that challenge. The Fourth Circuit affirmed 
and applied an intermediate level of scrutiny, holding that the government had shown the 
regulation reasonably served a substantial interest in providing for the public safety in national 
park areas. 
Questions Presented: (1) Does the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution protect 
a right to possess and carry a firearm for self-defense outside the home? (2) If there is a Second 
Amendment right to possess and carry a firearm for self-defense outside the home, is it 
constitutional to prohibit law-abiding citizens' possession and carrying of loaded weapons in 
motor vehicles while on National Park Service land? 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Sean MASCIANDARO, Defendant-Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the FOUlth Circuit 
Decided March 24,2011 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, writing for the 
cOUlt except as to Part m.B: 
Sean Masciandaro was convicted of carrying 
or possessing a loaded handgun in a motor 
vehicle within a national park area, in 
violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b). He 
challenges his conviction on two grounds: 
(1) that he was improperly charged under § 
2.4(b), because after he was arrested but 
before he was tried, that regulation was 
superseded by a more lenient regulation that 
provided for state law to govern the legality 
of his actions; or alternatively (2) that 
section 2.4(b) violates the Second 
Amendment as applied to him and facially. 
Because we conclude that the holding in 
United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 64 
S.Ct. 359, 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944), as well as 
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the general federal savings statute, 1 U.S.C. 
§ 109, denies defendants an automatic 
entitlement to the benefit of post-arrest 
changes in the law, we find that 
Masciandaro was properly tried under the 
law as it existed on the date of his arrest. 
On Masciandaro' s constitutional challenge, 
we conclude that Masciandaro' s Second 
Amendment. claim to a right to carry or 
possess a loaded handgun for self-defense is 
assessed under the intermediate scrutiny 
,standard, and, even if his claim implicates 
the Second Amendment, a question we do 
not resolve here, it is defeated by applying 
that standard. We conclude, that the 
government has amply shown that the 
regulation reasonably served its substantial 
interest in public safety in the national park 
area where Masciandaro was arrested. Thus, 
we hold that. 36 C.F.R. § 2A(b) is 
constitutional as applied to Masciandaro's 
conduct. 
Although Masciandaro has also mounted a 
separate facial challenge to § 2.4(b), we 
conClude that this challenge is foreclosed by 
our determination that the regulation is 
constitutional on an as-applied basis. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
I 
On June 5, 2008, at about 10:00 a.m., United 
States Park Police Sergeant Ken Fornshill, 
who was conducting a routine patrol of 
Daingerfield Island, near Alexandria, 
Virginia, observed a Toyota hatchback 
parked illegally. The vehicle was parked 
parallel to the side of the parking lot, in 
violation of the sign indicating "Front End 
Parking Only." As Sgt. Fornshill approached 
the vehicle, he saw Masciandaro and his 
girlfriend sleeping inside and awoke them 
by tapping on the window. He asked 
Masciandaro for his driver's license, which 
Masciandaro produced from a messenger 
bag located in the vehicle's rear 
compartment. While Masciandaro· was 
retrieving his license, Sgt. Fornshill noticed 
a large "machete-type" knife protruding 
from underneath the front seat, prompting 
him to ask Masciandaro whether there were 
any other weapons in the vehicle. When 
Masciandaro replied that he had a loaded 
handgun in the same bag, Sgt. Fornshill 
placed Masciandaro under arrest. Following 
a search, Fornshill uncovered a loaded 9mm 
Kahr semiautomatic pistol, and at the police 
station, Masciandaro produced an expired 
Virginia concealed weapon carry permit. 
Daingerfield Island, where Masciandaro was 
arrested, is not an island but an outcropping 
of land extending into the Potomac River 
near Alexandria. The area, which is 
managed by the National Park Service, is 
used for recreational purposes and includes a 
restaurant, marina, biking trail, wooded 
areas, and other public facilities. 
Masciandaro was charged with "carrying or 
possessing a loaded weapon in a motor 
vehicle" within national park areas, in 
violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b), and failing 
to comply with a traffic control device (the 
parking sign), in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 
4.12. These regulations were promulgated 
by the Secretary of the Interior under 16 
U.S.C. § 3, which authorizes the Secretary 
to "make and publish such rules and 
regulations as he may deem necessary or 
proper for the use and management of the 
parks, monuments, and reservations under 
the jurisdiction of the National Park 
Service." Violations of these regulations are 
punishable by a fine of not more than $500 
or imprisonment not exceeding six months, 
or both. 
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At trial, Masciandaro explained that he 
carried the handgun for self-defense, as he 
frequently slept in his car while traveling on 
business, and that while traveling, he often 
kept cash, a laptop computer, and other 
valuables on hand. The place where 
Masciandaro was arrested on June 5, 2008, 
was 20 miles from his residence in 
Woodbridge, Virginia. 
On April 30, 2008, slightly more than a 
month before Masciandaro was arrested, the 
Secretary of the Interior proposed a revision 
to 36 C.F.R. § 2.4, which was designed to 
harmonize the regulation of firearms in 
national parks with that by the States. The 
proposal advocated adding a new provision 
to § 2.4 which would allow individuals to 
possess loaded, operable firearms within 
national parks whenever it was legal to do so 
under the laws of the state in which the park . 
was located, so long as the individual was 
not otherwise prohibited from doing so by 
federal law. On December 10, 2008-six 
months after Masciandaro' s arrest but less 
than two months before his trial-the 
Secretary published a final version of the 
regulation, to take effect January 9, 2009, 
which provided: 
Notwithstanding any other provision 
in this Chapter, a person may 
possess, carry, and transport 
concealed, loaded, and operable 
firearms within a national park area 
in accordance with the laws of the 
state in which the national park area, 
or that portion thereof, is located, 
except as otherwise prohibited by 
applicable Federal law. 
73 Fed. Reg. 74,966, 74,971-72 (codified at 
36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h)). 
When 36 C.F.R. § 2.4 (h) took effect, 
Masciandaro had not yet been tried, and he 
promptly filed a motion with the magistrate 
judge to dismiss the charges against him, 
arguing that. § 2.4(h) had effectively 
superseded § 2.4(b). He also argued that, in 
any event, § 2.4(b) violated the Second 
Amendment, as applied to him and facially. 
The magistrate judge denied the motion to 
dismiss, and, on February 3, 2009, found 
Masciandaro guilty on both counts. The 
judge imposed a $150 fine on the handgun 
violation and a $50 fine on the· parking 
violation. Masciandaro appealed only the 
conviction on the handgun charge to the 
district court. 
On March 19, 2009, while Masciandaro' s 
appeal to the district court was pending, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia 
issued a preliminary injunction, blocking 
enforcement of newly promulgated § 2.4(h), 
because the Department of the Interior had 
failed to conduct the required environmental 
impact analysis. Responding to this ruling, 
Congress promptly added language to an 
unrelated piece of legislation, which in 
essence reinstated § 2.4(h) by statute. 
Section 512 of the Credit CARD Act 
provides: 
The Secretary of the Interior shall 
not promulgate or enforce any 
regulation that prohibits an 
individual from possessing a firearm 
including an assembled or functional 
firearm in any unit of the National 
Park System or the National Wildlife· 
Refuge System if-
(1) the individual is not otherwise 
prohibited by law from possessing 
the firearm; and 
(2) the possession of the firearm is in 
compliance with the law of the State 
in which the unit of the National 
Park System or the National Wildlife 
Refuge System is located. 
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16 U.S.C. § 1a-7b(b). 
On appeal, the district court rejected 
Masciandaro's argument for application of § 
2.4(h) in lieu of § 2.4(b) and affirmed the 
magistratejudge's ruling. Relying mainly on 
United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 64 
S.Ct. 359, 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944), the court 
. held that it was proper to try Masciandaro 
under the law as it existed at the time of his 
arrest. Addressing the constitutionality of § 
2.4(b), the court did not decide what level of 
scrutiny to apply but held that even applying 
strict scrutiny, the provision was narrowly 
tailored to serve the compelling 
governmental interest in public safety and 
thus was constitutional on an as-applied 
basis. The court rejected Masciandaro's 
facial challenge because he had not 
"demonstrat[ ed] from actual fact " that a 
substantial number of instances exist in 
which § 2.4(b) could not be applied 
constitutionally. 
From the jUdgment of the district court, 
dated August 26, 2009, Masciandaro filed 
this appeal. 
II 
[The Court upheld the lower court's 
determination that Masciandaro was 
properly prosecuted under applicable law at 
the time of his arrest, notwithstanding 
subsequent legal developments postdating 
his arrest.] 
III 
We now turn to Masciandaro' s 
constitutional challenge to 36 C.F.R. § 
2.4(b). Masciandaro contends that the 
Second Amendment, as construed by the 
Supreme COUli in its "watershed" decision 
in Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), 
guaranteed to him the right to possess and 
carry weapons in case of confrontation and 
thus protected him from prosecution under § 
2.4(b) for exercising that right in a national 
park area. He explains that 
[H]e travels extensively because of 
his small business and is frequently 
forced to sleep in his car while he is 
on the road. He has a Second 
Amendment right to keep a loaded 
handgun in the back of his car for the 
purpose of self-defense and defense 
of the valuable business property, 
cash, and personal propeliy he 
carries with him in the car. 
Masciandaro points out that his handgun is 
the "quintessential self-defense weapon" and 
that he is exactly the type of "law-abiding 
citizen" who· is the primary intended 
beneficiary of the Second Amendment's 
protections. 
The government maintains that the holding 
of Heller is inapplicable here. It argues: 
In Heller, the Supreme Court held 
that the District of Columbia law that 
"totally ban[ned] handgun 
possession in the home" and 
prohibit[ ed] rendering any lawful 
firearm in the hou.se operable for the 
purpose of immediate self-defense 
violated the Second Amendment. 
Because the Supreme COUli's 
decision is limited to the possession 
of firearms in the home, it does not 
invalidate the regulation at issue, 
which narrowly involves only the 
possession of a loaded firearm in a 
motor vehicle on National Park 
Service land. 
Both parties are correct, albeit incomplete, 
in their descriptions of the holding in Heller, 
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yet both disagree on the scope of the 
constitutional right articulated there. Thus, 
in resolving Masciandaro's constitutional 
challenge, we will begin with a discussion of 
Heller's holding and then proceed to 
address, seriatim, the scope of the Second 
Amendment right t6 keep and bear arms; the . 
scrutiny· that is applied in determining 
whether a regulation of firearms in national 
parks is justified;' the question of whether a 
national park is a "sensitive place" where 
prohibiting firearms is a presumptively 
lawful regulatory measure; and the 
application of our conclusions to 
Masciandaro's circumstances. 
A 
The Second Amendment states, "A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed. " 
Resolving the longstanding issue whether 
the Second Amendment guarantees an 
individual right to keep and bear arms or a 
collective right to do so in connection with 
militia service, the Supreme Court in Heller 
held, based on "the historical background of 
the Second Amendment," that the 
Amendment guarantees the "pre-existing" 
"individual right to possess and ca11'y 
weapons in case of confrontation." Heller, 
128 S.Ct. at 2797 (emphasis omitted). 
Because the right predated the Constitution, 
the Court looked. to the historical record 
when articulating its nature, noting that the 
right was secured to individuals according to 
"'libertarian political principles,' not as 
members of a fighting force," to "protect[ ] 
against both public and private violence." It 
also observed that throughout the country's 
history, Americans have valued the right not 
only to be able to prevent the elimination of 
militia, but "even more important[ly], for 
self-defense and hunting." 
Considering the constitutionality of a 
District of Columbia statute that prohibited 
private citizens from possessing handguns 
and required other legal firearms, such as 
long guns, to be stored in a fashion that 
rendered them inoperable, the Court held 
that the statute violated the .Second 
Amendment, stating: 
The handgun ban amounts to a 
prohibition of an entire class of arms 
that is overwhelmingly chosen by 
American society for that lawful 
purpose. The prohibition extends, 
moreover, to the horne, where the 
need for defense of self, family, and 
property is most acute. Under any of· 
the standards of scrutiny that we 
have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights, banning from 
the horne the most prefe11'ed firearm 
in the nation to keep and use for 
protection of one's horne and family, 
would fail constitutional muster. 
* * * 
We must also address the District's 
requirement (as applied to 
respondent's handgun) that firearms 
in the home be rendered and kept 
. inoperable at all times. This makes it 
impossible for citizens to use them 
for the cote lawful purpose· of self-
defense and is hence 
unconstitutional. 
Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18 (internal 
quotation marks, footnote, and citation 
omitted). 
But in reaching its holding, the Court did not 
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define the outer limits of the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. It 
did point out, however, that the right was 
"not unlimited, just as the First 
Amendment's right of free speech was not." 
Id at 2799; see also id at 2816 (noting that 
. the right was not "a right to keep and carry 
any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose"). 
Illustrating this point, the Court related that 
a majority of the 19th-century courts that 
considered prohibitions on carrying 
concealed weapons held them to be lawful 
under the Second Amendment. It 
summarized: 
. Although we do not undertake an 
exhaustive historical analysis today 
of the full scope of the Second 
Amendment, nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to' cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding 
the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale 
of arms. 
Id at 2816-17. 
The Court explained in a footnote that it was 
identifying these "presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures only as examples." 
Not only did the Heller Court not define the 
outer limits of Second Amendment rights, it 
also did not address the level of scrutiny that 
should be applied to laws that burden those 
rights. It found it unnecessary to do so 
because the District of Columbia law under 
consideration would violate the Second 
Amendment "[u]nder any of the standards of 
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights." 
Two years after deciding Heller, the 
Supreme Court revisited the Second 
Amendment in McDonald v. City of 
. Chicago, - U.S. --, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 
177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), holding that the 
Second Amendment was applicable to the 
. States by incorporation into the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Explaining Heller further, the 
McDonald Court stated that "self-defense is 
the central component" of the individual 
right to keep and bear arms and that. this 
right is "fundamental." McDonald also 
reaffirmed that Second Amendment rights 
are far from absolute, reiterating that Heller 
had "assur[ ed]" that many basic handgun 
regulations were presumptively lawful. In a 
similar vein, the McDonald Court noted that 
the doctrine of "incorporation does not 
imperil every law regulating firearms." 
The upshot of these landmark decisions is 
that there now exists a clearly-defined 
fundamental right to possess firearms for 
self-defense within the home. But a 
considerable degree of uncertainty remains 
as to the scope of that right beyond the home 
. and the standards for determining whether 
and how the right can be burdened by 
governmental regulation. 
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, writing 
separately on this Part m.B: 
B 
Invoking Heller's direct holding, 
Masciandaro argues that because he 
regularly slept in his car, as much as three to 
five days a week while traveling on 
business, his arrest for carrying or 
possessing a handgun ran afoul of Heller's 
core protection of the right "to use arms in 
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defense of hearth and home." Alternatively, 
he contends that if his car is found not to be 
his home, his arrest nonetheless violated a 
more general right to carry or possess a 
handgun outside Of the home for self-
defense. 
I would rej ect Masciandaro' s argument that 
his car, even when he slept in it frequently, 
was his "home" so as to fall within the core 
protection articulated in Heller. In the 
circumstances where Masciandaro had a 
residence in Woodbridge, Virginia, which 
was only 20 miles from where he was found 
sleeping by Sgt. fornshill, and the place 
where he was found sleeping was a public 
parking place, we need not explore further 
the factors essential to making a place· a 
person's home for Heller's core protection. I 
would conclude, in the circumstances of this 
case, that Masciandaro' s car was not his 
home. 
Masciandaro also argues that he possessed a 
constitutional right to possess a loaded 
handgun for self-defense outside the home. I 
would agree that there is a plavsible reading 
of Heller that the Second Amendment 
provides such a right, at least in some form. 
The Heller Court began by noting that the 
right predated the Constitution and always 
was an important part of individual 
. freedom-one of "the fundamental rights of 
Englishmen." It found that the right included 
the right to "protect[ ] [oneself] against both 
public and private violence," thus extending 
the right in some form t6 wherever a person 
could become exposed to public or private 
violence. Because "self-defense has to take 
place wherever [a] person happens to be," it 
follows that the right extends to public areas 
beyond the home. MOl'eover, the right to 
keep and bear arms was found to have been 
understood to exist not only for self-defense, 
but also for membership in a militia and for 
hunting, neither of which is a home-bound 
activity. Indeed, one aspect of the right, as 
historically understood, was "to secure the 
ideal of a citizen militia, which might be 
necessary to oppose an oppressive military 
force if the constitutional order broke 
down." 
Consistent with the historical understanding 
of the right to keep and bear arms outside 
. the home, the Heller Court's description of 
its actual holding also implies that a broader 
right exists. The Court stated that its holding 
applies to the home, where the need "for 
defense of self, family, and propeliy is most 
acute," suggesting that some form of the 
right applies where that need is not "most 
acute." Further, when the Court· 
acknowledged that the Second Amendment 
right was not unlimited, it listed as examples 
of regulations that were presumptively 
lawful, those "laws forbidding the carrying 
of firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings." If the 
Second Amendment right were confined to 
self-defense in the home, the Court would 
not have needed to express a reservation for 
"sensitive places" outside of the home. 
What the Heller Court describes as the 
general preexisting right to keep and bear 
arms for participation in militias, for self-
defense, and for hunting is thus not strictly 
limited to the home environment but extends 
in some form to wherever those activities or 
needs occur, just as other Amendments 
apply generally to protect other individual 
freedoms. But I would not conclude that the 
right is all-encompassing such that it extends 
to all places 01' to all persons, as the 
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized. 
The complex question of where it may apply 
outside the home, and what persons may 
invoke it, is, however, not one that we need 
to fully answer, because it appears 
sufficiently clear that, in this case, 
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Masciandaro's claim to self-defense-
asserted by him as' a law-abiding citizen 
sleeping in his automobile in a public 
parking m-ea-does implicate the Second 
Amendment, albeit subject to lawful 
limitations. And any analysis of it, therefore, 
requires review of the government's interest 
in regulating firearms through 36 C.F.R. § 
2.4(b) under the appropriate level . of 
scrutiny, which we now address. 
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, writing for the 
court: 
C 
Masciandaro argues that § 2.4(b) should be 
analYzed under strict scrutiny, because at the 
time of his anest, he was a law-abiding 
citizen who was simply seeking to exercise 
his "fundamental" right to self-defense. 
Without responding to Masciandaro' s 
argument directly, the government asserts 
that § 2.4(b) satisfies the strict scrutiny 
standard, as it is narrowly tailored to 
advance a compelling government interest in 
public safety. In making this argument, 
however, we do not understand the 
government to be taking a specific position 
on the level of scrutiny to apply. 
In Heller, the Supreme Court expressly 
avoided deciding what level of scrutiny 
should be applied when reviewing a law 
burdening the right to keep and bear arms, 
because . it concluded that the District of 
Columbia's handgun ban under 
consideration before it "would fail 
constitutional muster" "[u]nder any of the 
standards of scrutiny [traditionally] applied 
to enumerated constitutional rights[.]" The 
Court did, however, rule out a rational basis 
review, because that level of review "would 
be redundant with the separate constitutional 
prohibitions on inational laws." Moreover, 
by listing several "presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures," the Court provided a 
hint as to the types of governmental interests 
that might be sufficient to withstand Second 
Amendment challenges, as well as the 
. contexts in which those interests could be 
, successfully invoked. 
We have held that intermediate scrutiny 
should be applied when reviewing a Second 
Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(9), which prohibits the possession of 
firearms by a person convicted of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 
United States v, Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 677 
(4th Cir.2010). In Chester, officers 
sem-ching Chester's home in West Virginia 
uncovered a 12-gauge shotgun and a 9mm 
handgun, both of which Chester was 
prohibited from possessing under § 
922(g)(9) because he had a prior 
misdemeanor conviction fo):, domestic 
violence. In response to Chester's challenge, 
we concluded that the scope of the Second 
Amendment extended to Chester's activity 
in possessing firearms in the home for self-
defense and that the burden on possession of 
the firearms imposed by § 922(g)(9) was 
subject to intermediate scrutiny. We 
explained: 
Although Chester asserts his right to 
possess a firearm in his home for the 
purpose of self-defense, we believe 
his claim is not within the core right 
identified in Heller-the right of a 
law-abiding, responsible citizen to 
possess and cany a weapon for self-
defense-by . virtue of Chester's 
criminal history as a domestic 
violence misdemeanant. 
Accordingly, we conclude that 
intermediate scrutiny is more 
appropriate than strict scrutiny for 
Chester and similarly situated 
persons. 
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Id. at 682-83[.] 
In the case before us, Masciandaro was a 
law-abiding citizen at the time of his an'est, 
without any· criminal record, whereas in 
Chester, the defendant was a domestic 
violence misdemeanant. On the other hand, 
Chester was in his home, where the core 
Heller right applies, whereas Masciandaro 
was in a public park. These different 
contexts might call for different judicial 
approaches. Indeed, . as has been the 
experience under the First Amendment, we 
might expect that courts will employ 
different types of scrutiny in assessing 
burdens on Second Amendment rights, 
depending on the character of the Second 
Amendment question presented. Under such 
an approach, we would take into account the 
nature of a person's Second Amendment 
interest, the extent to which those interests 
are burdened by govemment regulation, and 
the strength of the government's 
justifications for the regulation. As we stated 
in Chester: 
The Second Amendment is no more 
susceptible to a one-size-fits-all 
standard of review than any other 
constitutional right. Gun-control 
regulations· impose varying degrees 
of burden on Second Amendment 
rights, and individual assertions of 
the right will come in many forms. A 
severe burden on the core Second 
Amendment right of armed self-
defense should require strong 
justification. But less severe burdens 
on the right, laws that merely 
regulate rather than restrict, and laws 
that do not implicate the central self-
defense concem of the Second 
Amendment, may be more easily 
justified. 
Chester, 628 F.3d at 682 (quoting Skoien, 
587 F.3d at 813-14). 
As we observe that any law regulating the 
content of speech is subject to strict scrutiny, 
we assume that any law that would burden 
the "fundamental," core right of self-defense 
in the home by a law-abiding citizen would 
be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we move 
outside the home, firearm rights have always 
been more limited, because public safety 
interests often outweigh individual interests 
in self-defense. Since historical meaning 
enjoys a privileged interpretative role in the 
Second Amendment context, this 
longstanding out-of-the-home/in-the-home 
distinction bears . directly· on the level of 
scrutiny applicable. Indeed, one of the 
principal cases relied upon in Heller upheld 
a state concealed carry ban after applying 
review of a decidedly less-than-strict nature. 
Were we to require strict scrutiny in 
circumstances such as those presented here, 
we would likely foreclose an extraordinary 
number of regulatory measures, thus 
handcuffing lawmakers' ability to "prevent[ 
] armed mayhem" in public places, and 
depriving them of "a variety of tools for 
combating that problem[.]" While we find 
the application of strict scrutiny important to 
protect the core right of the self-defense of a 
law-abiding citizen in his home ("where the 
need for defense of self, family, and 
property is most acute," we conclUde that a 
lesser showing is necessary with respect to 
laws that burden the right to keep and bear 
alms outside of the home. Accordingly, we 
hold that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) will survive 
Masciandaro's as-applied challenge if· it 
satisfies intermediate scrutiny-i.e., if the 
government can demonstrate that § 2.4(b) is 
reasonably adapted to a ~ubstantial 
governmental interest. 
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D 
Perhaps to avoid being required to carry any 
burden to justify its firearms regulations in 
national parks, which are properties owned 
and inanaged by the government, the 
government contends that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) 
is a law regulating firearms in "sensitive 
places," as identified in and therefore is 
presumptively constitutiona1[.] Arguing that 
Daingerfield Island is a sensitive place, the 
government states that 
a large number of people, including 
children, congregate in National 
Parks for recreational, educational 
and expressive activities. Park land is 
not akin to a gun owner's home and 
is far more analogous to other public 
spaces, such as schools, municipal 
parks, governmental buildings, and 
appurtenant parking lots, where 
courts have found firearms 
restrictions to be presumptively 
reasonable. Furthermore,' as the 
. district court noted, the locations 
within the National Parks where 
motor vehicles travel are even more 
sensitive, given that they. are 
extensively regulated thoroughfares 
frequented by large numbers of 
strangers, including children. 
It argues that in these circumstances, the law 
is presumptively "narrowly tailored to 
advance the compelling government 
interest" in public safety. 
Masciandaro contends that the parking lot at 
Daingerfield Island was not a "sensitive 
place" like a school or governmental 
building, as referenced to in Heller. He 
argues: 
The George Washington Memorial 
Parkway, where [he] was charged 
with violation of the superseded 
[National Park Service] weapons 
regulation, is a public road and a 
major traffic thoroughfare in the 
Washington metropolitan area and is 
not a sensitive place .... 
* * * 
There is a patchwork of regulations 
that allow people to use and possess 
weapons on NPS land, including 
parkways and remote forests and 
parks across the United States. Those 
regulations reflect the [Department 
of Interior's] determination that NPS 
land is not sensitive, as a general 
matter. Indeed, the very same NPS 
regulation [36 C.F.R. § 2.4] that 
prohibits possession of loaded 
weapons in motor vehicles indicates 
that it is lawful to hunt with 
weapons, use them for target 
practice, have them in residential 
dwellings, use them for research 
activities, and carry them for 
protection in "pack trains" or on trail 
rides, all on NPS land. 
(Citing 73 Fed. Reg. 74,966, 74,971 (Dec. 
10,2008)). 
Masciandaro points out that the National 
Park Service itself "has explicitly 
distinguished between the sorts of 'sensitive 
places' mentioned in Heller (schools and 
government buildings) on one hand and 
national parks on the other" when it 
explained that "nothing in [36 C.F.R. § 2.4] 
shall be construed to authorize concealed 
carry of firearms in any Federal facility or 
Federal court facility as defined in 18 
U.S.C. § 930." 
These arguments raise the question whether 
the "sensitive places" doctrine limits the 
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scope of the Second Amendment or, instead, 
alters the analysis for its application to such 
places. 
The Supreme Court in Heller did state twice 
that the Second Amendment's right to bear 
arms was "not unlimited." For example, it 
stated: 
Like most rights, the right secured 
by the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited. . . . Although we do not 
take an exhaustive historical analysis 
today of the full scope of the Second 
Amendment, nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on . . . 
laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings. 
Id. at 2816-17 (emphasis added). 
Because of the relation between the first 
statement and the examples, one might 
conclude that a law prohibiting firearms in a 
sensitive place would fall beyond the scope 
of the Second Amendment and. therefore 
would be subject to no further analysis. But 
the Court added a footnote to its language, 
calling these regulatory measures 
''presumptively lawful." The Court's use of 
the word "presumptively" suggests that the 
miiculation of sensitive places may not be a 
limitation on the scope of the Second 
Amendment, but rather on the analysis to be 
conducted with respect to the burden on that 
right. 
The arguments of counsel about the meaning 
of the "sensitive places" language raise 
difficult questions about the scope of the 
Second Amendment and the scrutiny to be 
given to government regulations in sensitive 
places. In Chester, we explained the 
ambiguity inherent in these questions: 
Having acknowledged that the scope 
of the Second Amendment is subject 
to historical limitations, the Court 
cautioned that Heller should not be 
read "to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions" such as ... "laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings." [Heller, 128 
S.Ct.] at 2816-17. Heller described 
its exemplary list of "longstanding 
prohibitions" as "presumptively 
lawful regulatory measures," id. at 
2817 n. 26, without alluding to any 
historical evidence that the right to 
keep and bear arms did not extend to 
... the conduct prohibited by any of 
the listed gun regulations. It is 
unclear to us whether Heller was 
suggesting that "longstanding 
prohibitions" such as these were 
historically understood to be valid 
limitations on the right to bear arms 
or did not violate the Second 
Amendment for some other reason. 
Chester, 628 F.3d at 679. 
In Marzzarella, the Third Circuit labored 
over the same ambiguity: 
We reco gnize the phrase 
"presumptively lawful" could have 
different meanings under newly 
enunciated Second Amendment 
doctrine. On the one hand,· this 
language could be read to suggest the 
identified restrictions are 
presumptively lawful because they 
regulate conduct outside the scope of 
the Second Amendment. On the 
other hand, it may suggest the 
restrictions are presumptively lawful 
because they pass muster under any 
standard of scrutiny. 
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Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91. 
We need not, however, resolve the 
ambiguity in the "sensitive places" language 
in this case, because even if Daingerfield 
Island is not a sensitive place, as 
Masciandaro argues, 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) still 
passes constitutional muster under the 
intermediate scrutiny standard. 
.E 
In reaching this result, we conclude first that 
the government has a substantial interest in 
providing for the safety of individuals who 
visit and make use of the national parks, 
including Daingerfield Island. Although the 
government's interest need not be 
"compelling" under intermediate scrutiny, 
cases have sometimes . described the 
government's interest in public safety in that 
fashion. The government, after all, is 
invested with "plenary power" to protect the 
. public from danger on federal lands under 
the Property Clause. As the district court 
noted, Daingerfield Island is a national park 
area where large numbers of people, 
including children, congregate for 
recreation. Such circumstances justify 
reasonable measures to secure public safety. 
We also conclude that § 2.4(b)'s narrow 
prohibition .is reasonably adapted to that 
substantial governmental interest.· Under § 
2.4(b), national parks patrons are prohibited 
from possessing loaded firearms, and only 
then within their motor vehicles. We have 
no occasion in this case to address a 
regulation of unloaded firearms. Loaded 
firearms are surely more dangerous than 
unloaded firearms, as they could fire 
accidentally or be fired before a potential 
victim has the opportunity to flee. The 
Secretary could have reasonably concluded 
that, when concealed within a motor vehicle, 
a loaded weapon becomes even more 
dangerous. In this respect, § 2.4(b) is· 
analogous to the litany of state concealed 
carry prohibitions specifically identified as 
valid in Heller. 
By permitting park patrons to carry 
unloaded firearms within. their vehicles, § 
2.4(b) leaves largely intact the right to 
"possess and CruTY weapons in case of 
confrontation." While it is true that the need 
to load a fireruID impinges on the need for 
armed self-defense, intermediate scrutiny 
does not require that a regulation be the least 
intrusive means of achieving the relevant 
govennnent objective, or that there be no 
burden whatsoever on the individual right in 
question. Moreover, because the United 
States Park Police patrol Daingerfield 
Island, the Secretary could conclude that the 
need for armed self-defense is les·s acute 
there than in the context of one's home. 
Accordingly, we hold. that, on 
Masciandaro's as-applied challenge under 
the Second Amendment, § 2.4(b) satisfies 
the intermediate scrutiny standard. 
IV 
In view of our determination that 36 C.F.R. 
§ 2.4(b) is constitutional under the Second 
Amendment as applied to Masciandaro, a 
priori we reject his facial overbreath 
challenge to § 2.4(b). 
Without entertaining the novel notion that an 
overbreath challenge could be recognized 
"outside the limited context of the First 
Amendment," we conclude that a person, 
such as Masciandaro, to whom a statute was 
constitutionally applied, "will not be heard 
to challenge that statute on the ground that it 
may conceivably be applied 
unconstitutionally to others, in other 
situations not before the Court." This 
conclusion "reflect[s] the conviction that 
under our constitutional system courts are 
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not roving commISSlOns assigned to. pass 
judgment on the validity of the Nation's 
laws." Accordingly, we reject his facial 
challenge. 
Because we conclude that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) 
was properly applied to Masciandaro's 
conduct and that § 2.4(b) is constitutional as 
applied to the circumstances in this case, we 
affirm the judgment of the district court. 
AFFIRMED 
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, with whom 
DUFFY, Senior District Judge, Joms, 
writing for the court as to Pmi IILB: 
We are pleased to join Judge Niemeyer's 
fine opinion with the exception of Part III.B. 
In our view it is unnecessary to explore in 
this case the question of whether and to what 
extent the Second Amendment right 
recognized in Heller applies outside the 
home. 
This case underscores the dilemma faced by 
lower courts in the post-Heller world: how 
far to push Heller beyond its undisputed 
core holding. On the question of Heller's 
applicability outside the home environment, 
we think it prudent to await direction from 
. the Court itself. See Williams v: State, 417 
Md. 479, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (2011) ("If the 
Supreme Court, in [McDonald's ] dicta, 
meant its holding to extend ,beyond home 
possession, it will need to say so more 
plainly."); see also Sims v. United States, 
963 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C.2008). 
There mayor may not be a Second 
Amendment right in some places beyond the 
home, but we have no idea what those 
places are, what the criteria for selecting 
them should be, what sliding scales of 
scrutiny might apply to them, or anyone of 
a number of other questions. It is not clear in 
what places public authorities rimy ban 
firearms altogether without shouldering the 
burdens of litigation. The notion that "self-
defense has to take place· wherever [ a] 
person happens to be," appears to us to 
portend all sorts of litigation over schools, 
airports, parks, public thoroughfares, and 
various additional government facilities. 
And even that may not address the place of 
any right in a private facility where a public 
officer effects an arrest. The whole matter 
strikes us as a vast terra incognita that 
courts should enter only upon ·necessity and 
only then by small degree. 
There is no such necessity here. We have no 
reason to expound on where the Heller right 
mayor may not apply outside the home 
because, as Judge Niemeyer ably explains, 
intermediate scrutiny of any burden on the 
alleged right would plainly lead the cOUli to 
uphold the National Park Service regulation. 
The trend toward constitutional' avoidance 
seems, finally, to be taking hold. 
Ashwander, at long last, is back. See 
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347~ 56 
S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). The seminal case seems to be 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 
S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), which 
cut back 9n Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 
121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)~ 
and relieved the circuit courts of the need 
and burden of. deciding constitutional 
questions in cases that could be resolved on 
narrower grounds. Just as the qualified 
. immunity inquiry in that case could assume 
arguendo the violation of a constitutional 
right, so too can the application of 
intermediate scrutiny in this case assume 
arguendo the existence of a right. Courts 
take this approach routinely in \ harmless 
error determinations as well. 
Sometimes saying a little less, rather than a 
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little more, is a nice way to discharge our 
primary responsibility to the parties before 
us of deciding their case. At other times, of 
course, the need for clarity and guidance in 
future cases is paramount, but in this 
instance we believe the most respectful 
course is to await that guidance from the 
nation's highest court. 
There simply is no need in this litigation to 
break ground that our superiors have not 
tread. To the degree that we push the right 
beyond what the Supreme COUli in Heller 
declared to be its origin, we circumscribe the 
scope of popular goVernance, move the 
action into court, and encpurage litigation in 
contexts we cannot foresee. This is serious 
business. We do not wish to be even 
minutely responsible for some unspeakably 
tragic act of mayhem because in the peace of 
out judicial chambers we miscalculated as to 
Second Amendment rights. It is not far-
fetched to think the Heller Court wished to 
leave open the possibility that such a danger 
would rise exponentially as one moved the 
right from the home to the public square. 
If ever there was an occasion for restraint, 
this would seemto be it. There is much to be 
said for a course of simple caution. 
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"Cases Lining up to Ask Supreme Court to Clarify 
Second Amendment Rights" 
Washington Post 
August 14,2011 
Robert Barnes 
A funny thing has happened in the three 
years since gun-rights activists won their 
biggest victory at the Supreme Court. 
They've been on a losing streak in the lower 
courts. 
The activists found the holy grail in 2008 
when the Supreme Court's 5 to 4 decision in 
District of Columbia v. Heller said the 
Second Amendment guaranteed an 
individual right to own a firearm 
unconnected to military service. The court 
followed it up with McDonald v. Chicago 
two years later, holding that the amendment 
applies not just to gun control laws passed 
by Congress but to local and state laws as 
well. 
The decisions were seen as a green light to 
challenge gun restrictions across the 
country, and the lawsuits have corne raining 
down-more than two a week, according to 
the anti-gun Brady Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence. But it is the Brady Center that is 
crowing about the results. 
"Three years and more than 400 legal 
challenges later, courts-so far-have held 
that the Supreme Court's ruling in Heller 
was narrow and limited, and that the Second 
Amendment does not interfere with the 
peopie's right to enact legislation protecting 
families and communities from gun 
violence," the center said in a report 
optimistically titled "Hollow Victory?" 
Even those challenging gun restrictions 
acknowledge that the courts have been 
unwilling to expand upon the basic right that 
most people agree Heller bestowed: the 
. ability to keep a handgun in one's horne for 
self-defense purposes. 
The subsequent rulings "clearly highlight 
the struggles lower courts are having after 
receiving the Supreme Court's guidance in 
Heller and ~McDonald," said Antigone 
Peyton, an Alexandria lawyer. "They're 
afraid to be out front on the law." 
As Maryland's highest court, the Court of 
Appeals, put it: "If the Supreme Court ... 
meant its holding to extend beyond horne 
possession, it will need to say so more 
plainly." 
If the court has more to say, two men from 
opposite sides of the Potomac River are 
hoping it will accept their cases in order to 
do so. 
In the Maryland case, Charles F. Williams 
Jr. is challenging his 2008 conviction in 
Prince George's County of violating the 
state's prohibition on wearing, carrying or 
transporting a firearm in public without a 
permit. Williams had his legally acquired 
gun in a bag as he traveled from his 
girlfriend's horne to his own. 
Williams acknowledges that he had not 
applied for a permit. But his attorney, 
Stephen. Halbrook, says that shouldn't 
matter: the Maryland law is so restrictive 
that it "basically says ordinary people can't 
get one." He argues in his petition that the 
law violates the Supreme Court's "analyses 
and plain statements in Heller and 
McDonald that the right to bear arms exists 
outside the horne." 
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Peyton represents Sean Masciandaro, a 
reptile wrangler from Woodbridge, who was 
convicted of violating a ban on having a 
loaded firearm· in a vehicle on national 
parkland. Mas ciandaro , who puts on 
educational demonstrations as owner of 
Raging Reptiles, said he was exhausted from 
traveling when he pulled off George 
Washington Memorial Parkway to take a 
nap at Daingerfield Island near Reagan 
National Airport. 
A Park Police officer noticed him illegally 
parked, woke Masciandaro and, seeing a 
knife under his seat, asked if he had other 
weapons. Masciandaro said there was a 
loaded handgun in a bag in his trunk. 
(Masciandaro said the gun was for 
protection from people, not his animals, 
which travel separately.) 
Masciandaro was convicted and paid a fine 
but argues in his petition to the court: "If 
there is a Second Amendment right outside 
the home, it surely applies to law-abiding 
citizens carrying handguns for self-defense 
while traveling on public highways." 
He is appealing a decision of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, where 
Masciandaro had the misfortune of pleading 
his case before a panel that included Judge J. 
Harvey Wilkinson III. Wilkinson is a 
conservative stalwart, but has criticized the 
Heller decision as an example of judicial 
activism. 
He was unequivocal that any expansion of 
the right in Heller would have to come from 
the Supreme Court. 
"This is serious business," Wilkinson wrote. 
"We do not wish to be even minutely 
responsible for some unspeakably tragic act 
of mayhem because in the peace of our 
judicial chambers we miscalculated as to 
Second Amendment rights." 
It was clear from the beginning that much 
litigation would be needed to define the 
contours of Justice Antonin Scalia's 
majority opinion in Heller. 
In key parts, it is a half-empty, half-full 
decision that allows both sides in the bitterly 
contested fight over gun rights to indulge in 
wishful thinking. 
Gun-control advocates point to Scalia's. 
instruction that "nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on ... laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings." 
But Halbrook, Williams's lawyer, says that 
"obviously means that the right to bear arms 
includes the carrying of firearms in non-
sensitive places." 
Although the Brady Center trumpets 
Scalia's finding that there is no right to 
"carry any weapon whatsoever in any 
manner whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose," the Second Amendment 
Foundation takes that as confirmation that 
"there is a right to carry at least some 
weapons, in some manner, for some 
purpose." 
The latter argument is in a brief supporting 
Masciandaro's appeal written by Alan Gura, 
who argued the Heller case. He said the case 
provides a perfect chance to "clarify" for 
recalcitrant lower courts that the Second 
Amendment "applies beyond the threshold 
of one's home." 
But if neither Williams nor Masciandaro 
strikes the court as the right opportunity for 
the next round of Second Amendment 
jurisprudence, Gura assures that there are 
more cases on the way. 
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